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Defence Services Command and Staff College
Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka-1216
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Mirpur Papers

Defence Services Command and Staff College

Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka – 1216, Bangladesh

Telephone: 88-02-8031111

Fax: 88-02-9011450

E-mail: info@dscsc.mil.bd

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Message from the Chief Patron

I am pleased to see the published version of the research journal of Defence Services Command & Staff College, *Mirpur Papers*, Volume-27, Issue 31. This publication reflects the intellectual vista of the Course Participants of Defence Services Command and Staff College. Besides the Course Participants, the faculty members and alumni of the College also shared their knowledge and experiences on national and international issues through their writings in this issue of *Mirpur Papers*.

I am happy to know that this issue of “*Mirpur Papers*” contains articles of a wide range of subjects. Some articles are issues of pure military interest like Clausewitz’s grand strategy, military reforms, capacity building of Armed Forces, challenges of future UN peacekeeping etc. In this issue, social topics like emotional intelligence and change management in the Armed Forces have also been included. Besides, contemporary subjects like repatriation of Rohingyas from Bangladesh, necessity for the military leaders to adapt to 4th generation operational environment etc have enriched the quality of the publication. All the authors have delved into the subjects to reach meaningful conclusions. I am sure, the rich contents of the analytical and informative write-ups will indeed be beneficial to the readers.

Finally, I take the opportunity to congratulate and commend the Editorial Board, all contributors, reviewers and all others involved in the process of publication of this journal.

Major General Md Jubayer Salehin, SUP, ndu, psc
Commandant
Defence Services Command and Staff College

EDITORIAL

Like previous years, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur, Bangladesh has published MIRPUR PAPERS this year. This professional journal primarily accommodates the articles written by the Course Participants of Staff Course. Besides, the journal also includes write ups by the faculty members and alumni of the College. This issue contains total sixteen articles covering diverse topics.

The 1st article is on ‘Emerging Strategic and Operational Environment: Insights for Future Military Leaders’. In this article, the researcher argued that the future military leaders continually need to update their views on emerging trends to cope with the challenges posed by operational environment. In contemporary wars solely military forces are insufficient to counter emerging threats; militaries across the globe need to adjust and adapt constantly to the evolving complex nature of threats.

The 2nd article brings an insight on ‘Emotional Intelligence: Importance in Building Bangladesh Army Leadership with Suggested Model.’ The study discussed about few models and importance of Emotional Intelligence in building Bangladesh Army Leadership. The researcher also suggested an Emotional Intelligence Model for Bangladesh Army Leadership. Moreover, Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the recommended Emotional Intelligence Model are also projected in the paper.

The next article is on “Clausewitz’s ‘On War’: an Overview.” This paper introduces Clausewitz’s important lessons to young military professionals. ‘On War’ is a difficult read for amateur readers to comprehend. This article is intended to act as an ice-breaker, and it brings forward only those lessons that the author considers the most important especially for the military researchers.

An article on difficulties and consequences of military reforms in post-Soviet Russia comes next in the queue. An evaluation of the success of the planned reforms at different times identifies in this paper that lack of political and military leaderships’ intention seeking true reform, absence of comprehensive long term plan and military’s traditional outlook had been the key influencing factors in Russia’s military reform. This article will give an understanding that military reform is a challenging and mammoth task.

In the 5th article, the researcher identified that SAARC has not made much quantifiable achievements and has become a ‘Paper Tiger’. The core issue was addressed as mistrust among the member states. Conflicts between the states, lack of political will, fear of dominion by India and Pakistan, lack of economic cooperation are discussed as few main reasons for mistrust.

The 6th article is on ‘Preparedness for Sustained Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) Operation in CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) Environment’. In recent years, the threat of use of CBRN weapon by both state and non-state actors is indeed becoming a reality with the changing geopolitical environment. The researcher has discussed the perceived CBRN threats and its impact on sustained BAF Operations. At the end, plausible CBRN defence measures are also discussed elaborately.

The next article focuses on the capacity building of Bangladesh Navy (BN) in UN Mission through infrastructure development and training. This is a glance of the writer’s research during the course. The research identified that capacity building through infrastructure development and training can enhance BN participation in UN Missions. It is also anticipated that the research will significantly contribute towards opening new arenas for BN participation in UN Missions.

The 8th article is on ‘Change Management: An Introspection in Bangladesh Armed Forces Perspective’. Today, change management has become a science. Command echelon at every level is very frequently entrusted with the responsibility of implementing changes. This article may help the command echelon to have elementary theoretical knowledge and understanding on change management.

The 9th article is on ‘The Rohingya: The Saga of Deliberate Denaturalization.’ This write up underscores a crucial concern: the Rohingya Issue is gradually getting normalized and forgotten by Myanmar’s delay and denial. The researcher also argued that disregarding all types of global pledges, criticism and condemnation, Myanmar was successful with a strategy of procrastination – ‘Acting passive and waiting for things getting ‘normalized’ with time’.

The next article of this issue is regarding the strategy of Bangladesh to ensure smooth repatriation process of Rohingya. As Myanmar Army reckoned the Rohingya Muslims as a threat to their subsistence, Bangladesh needs to change its strategy to ensure smooth repatriation of Rohingya refugees. The research initially figures the strategy adopted by Bangladesh for the repatriation of Rohingya. It then diagnoses the impediments which have induced hedge for repatriation. Confessing the intricacy of Rohingya issue, the research then advocates adopting smart power strategy for the smooth repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

The 11th article is on the challenges of future UN Peacekeeping Operations with particular emphasis to challenges pertinent to Bangladesh. The researcher notably identified the tremendous hard work, dedications and supreme sacrifice of UN peacekeepers of Bangladesh which all together brought the great success of Bangladesh in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Basing on today’s changing operational environment,

the research suggests the measures required to address the future challenges for Bangladesh to be the leading Troops Contributing Country (TCC) under the banner of UN.

The next article is about recurrent relocation of officers that affects the academic development of their preteenager descendants. If preteenagers' academic growth is not overseen prudently, relocation's adverse impacts are likely to foil the future generation's pathway. At this context, the author states about the utilization of the positive implications of recurrent relocation of parents to subdue the adverse effects on preteenagers' academic growth. This research analyses parents' contribution in preteenagers' academic growth and finally proposes parents' 'Action Plan' on recurrent relocation.

In the 13th article gives an overview of the US involvement in Vietnam War. The author gives an inside analysis of the Vietnam War especially the insurgency period, that played pivotal role in defeating the US forces. Being motivated by Maoist Guerrilla insurgency strategy, the inferior North Vietnamese insurgents displayed an incredible resistance initially against French and later against the US. The strategic perspective of pre and post insurgency period (1961-1964) is a must read for any reader to understand the Vietnam War. Therefore, this research will give an insight to carry home number of enduring lessons that will sharpen the professional acumen of any military leader.

The 14th article focuses on the professional development and management of army officers. The author stated that a meticulous career planning can provide competent and dedicated officers corps to lead their under-command in the battlefield. Hence, the prolonged absence from the unit at the early stage of service life will have a significant impact on the professional development and subsequent career progression of young officers. At this backdrop, the researcher endeavours to identify implementable options and ascertain plausible modification of the existing career planning of young officers.

Overseas Course Participant from India discussed about Nanotechnology, which is one of the most promising technologies of this century and holds immense potential for enhancement of capabilities of Naval forces. The author opined that, presently its potential has not been adequately leveraged by the Navy. Therefore, there is a need at the global level to modify existing international regulations to cater for the changes which will be brought by the use of nanotechnology in the armed forces. This research highlights the scope for leveraging nanotechnology by the Navy through development of better weapons, surveillance equipment and Network Centric Warfare capabilities.

The last article of this publication focuses on the list of encouraging factors that plays significant role in recruitment of quality candidates in Bangladesh Army. The author emphasized on the requirement of Bangladesh Army to induct quality officers in response to the rapid expansion of the force. However, it is observed that the existing encouragement process is falling short of meeting the demand of Bangladesh Army. The study also reflects the change in socio-economic environment that entitles the candidates with enhanced opportunities to select lucrative professions. Therefore, the author concluded that a comprehensive ‘Candidates’ Encouragement Process’ may attract the young generations to choose Bangladesh Army as their profession.

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EMERGING STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: INSIGHTS FOR FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sharif Ul Alam, psc, Arty

Abstract

Global and regional security environment in 21st century is undergoing profound transformation. Today states are confronting complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to their national security. Blurring zone between war and peace, internationalization of local war, economic coercion, rise of right wing ultra-nationalism are few of the significant characteristics of today's security environment. Globalization, communication revolution, technological advancement, demographic changes, climate changes, elements of failed or failing states etcetera are the key drivers of those changes. Contest of ideology, use of smart power, expansion of the battle space through cyber and space domain, uncertainty about the relevant legal frameworks, proxy and internationalization of local wars are also significant trends of contemporary wars. In today's operational environment lines between war and peace are blurred and the blurred zone is a landscape of constant political, economic and security competition that requires constant attention to ensure security of a state. Military leaders continually need to update their views on emerging trends to cope with the challenges posed by operational environment. They also need to focus on few important areas like pattern of future warfare and force planning for that, integration of smart power in security strategy, capacity development in cyber and space and knowledge-based warfare to face the challenges of future warfare. In contemporary wars solely military forces are insufficient to counter emerging threats; militaries across the globe need to adjust and adapt constantly to the emerging complex nature of threats. Hence military education today needs to reorient from narrow conventional military training to broad understanding of contemporary wars where socio-politics, economy, information, cyber and space are important ingredients of operational environment. Military leaders of today need to understand the intricate changes that are taking place in the security environment in the correct perspective to cope with the challenges they pose.

Introduction

Global and regional security environment in 21st century is undergoing profound transformation.¹ Scholars of social and political science argue that the concept of state (Westphalia system)² and the character of warfare both are changing.³ Globalization, communication revolution, technological advancement, demographic changes, climate

change, elements of failed or failing states etcetera are the key drivers of those changes.⁴ Today states are confronting complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to their national security.⁵ Contemporary wars present a new array of threats that defy simple categorization; rather today threats are combination of conventional, irregular, cyber-crime, terrorism, criminalization and numerous other intractable issues. Lines between war and peace are blurred and the blurred zone is a landscape of constant political, economic and security competition that requires constant attention to secure geopolitical interest and as well as for the security of a state.⁶

In contemporary wars solely military forces are insufficient to counter emerging threats; militaries across the globe need to adjust and adapt constantly to the emerging complex nature of threats.⁷ The use of military force (hard power) now depends on its effective coordination with non-military means like diplomacy, economy and politics (the idea is theorised as smart power).⁸ Today's security environment demands creative application of means and ways to achieve the ends of a war. Military forces require adapting unpredictable and unorthodox threats as well as need to meet conventional operational needs. Military leaders continually need to update their views on emerging trends to cope with the challenges posed by operational environment. Hence military education today needs to reorient from narrow conventional military training to broad understanding of contemporary wars where socio-politics, economy, information, cyber and space are important ingredients of operational environment. Today military leaders need to operate independently, take initiative in combat and develop new and creative applications of military art to overcome the new challenges.

Military leaders of today need to understand the intricate changes that are taking place in the security environment in the correct perspective to cope with the challenges they pose. The paper will first briefly study three different wars: a full scale conventional war (Gulf War-1990), a hybrid war (Annexation of Crimea-2014 by Russia) and a complex, intractable civil war (Syrian War-2011-till date) and also identify salient features of emerging geostrategic and operational environment from that. Then it will put forward few relevant insights for military leaders of today to prepare them for the future war.


STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY WARS

Gulf War (1990-91)

The Gulf War (2 August 1990–28 February 1991) was waged by Coalition Forces of thirty-four nations led by the US against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war was conducted in two phases. The phase 1- Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990-16 January 1991), was coalition build-up of forces

(approximate 6,97,000 troops) and defense of Saudi Arabia. The phase 2 - Operation Desert Storm (17 January -28 February 1991) started with the most intensive air campaign in military history (17 January -24 February 1991) that flew over 100,000 sorties and dropped 88,500 tonnes of bombs. It was followed by Operation Desert Sabre, a swift ground offensive (24-28 February 1991) that bought decisive Coalition victory against Iraqi forces.⁹


Figure-1: Coalition Ground Offensive (24-28 February 1991)




Source: Internet¹⁰

The ground offensive displayed an outstanding outflanking manoeuvre (see Figure-1) and operational level deception (Operation Hail Mary Play) that defeated large Iraqi land forces (approximately 6,50,000) by only 100 hours of battle (mostly unopposed).¹¹ The Gulf War-1990 stands out as a significant achievement in US military history as it was the swiftest victory (as shown in figure-2) with least causality (total 760 Injured and 148 killed in action as shown in Figure-3).

Figure-2: Duration of Major US Wars since 1775- Till Date



Source: Internet¹²

Figure-3: US Casualties in Major Wars since 1775 till DateSource: Internet¹³

The war occupies a prominent position in military history due to exhibition of a stunning operational manoeuvre supported by superior military technology, joint warfare, air land battle and massive logistics built-up.¹⁴ Pentagon proclaimed the war as the harbinger of future wars.¹⁵ President George W Bush commented that ‘The extraordinary triumph buried the specter of Vietnam forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.’¹⁶ Despite stunning military victory there are widespread debates about the correct identification and achievement of strategic and operational level objectives of the war as post war geopolitical developments indicate that Coalition military victory further aggravated chaos, unrest and instability in Iraq and Gulf Region.


Annexation of Crimea (2014) by Russia

Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014) is a unique example of a hybrid war where Russia employed a wide range of political, economic, diplomatic as well as overt and covert military measures to annex Crimea and to achieve its geopolitical objectives.¹⁷ Russia intimidated and coerced Ukraine by massing military forces on the border of Ukraine for military exercises. It also deterred NATO against any interference and shifted global focus from Crimea to the Ukrainian borders. Russian Special Forces unit in disguise occupied Parliament and key official buildings, established checkpoints, organized pro-Russian populations and established control in Crimea. Subsequently with progressive political developments Crimean Government held a referendum on 16 March 2014 where 96.77% Crimean voted in favour of joining Russia.¹⁸ The war showed the world that

through proper combination of political, social, diplomatic and military measures a war can be won even without firing a single bullet.

General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces conceptualized contemporary Russian operational art of hybrid warfare. He opined that conventional geopolitical paradigms no longer exists and the main battlefield is not in the territorial lines, rather in the minds of people.¹⁹ He also argues that the very rules of war have changed and broad application of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures is essential to achieve the objectives of a conflict.²⁰ The idea preach use of military forces only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the war. Following Figure-5 is the graphics representation of Gerasimov's concept of hybrid warfare.

Figure-5: General Gerasimov's Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare




Source: Internet²¹

Russian military aptly demonstrated the art of hybrid warfare in their Annexation of Crimea. The same idea is also used in numerous contemporary wars like 2nd Lebanon War (2006).

The Syria War (2011-Continued)

The Syrian War (2011-continued) started in March 2011 as part of the wave of popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in states such as Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, known as the Arab Spring. However, the Syrian uprising soon turned into a protracted international war with the involvement of numerous internal and external militias (like Free Syrian Army, Al-Nusra Front, ISIL, Kurdish People's Protection Units-YPG, Hezbollah, Fatimiyun Brigade et cetera) as well as states like US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel et cetera.²² Figure-6 below shows the complex web of support and hostility relationship among the belligerents.

Figure-6: Complex Web of Support and Hostility Relationship in Syrian War




Source: Internet²³

Though the war started with complex and interlinked socio-political and ethnic tensions, presently regional and international actors are at the helm of the war.²⁴ Belligerents differ widely in their ideologies and visions about the future of Syria; hence, there is a very narrow possibility of political reconciliation in near future.²⁵ The war has created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions; till date it is the largest source of displacement in the world²⁶ (see Figure 6) with 13.5 million people requiring humanitarian assistance and 6.7 million people displaced from their homes.²⁷ Both pro


Assad and anti-Assad belligerents are part of atrocities and civilians deaths as shown in Figure-7. From current events of the war it can be assumed that atrocity is likely to remain the persistent character of Syrian war in future also.

Figure-7: Major Populations of Forcibly Displaced People by Country of Origin (2011-2019)



Source: UNHCR Website²⁸

Figure-8: Civilian Death Caused by Belligerents of Syrian War (2011-2018)



Source: Internet²⁹

The war is so intractable and complex in nature that military scholars widely differ regarding classification of the war (whether it's a civil war or hybrid war or compound war).³⁰


EMERGING STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Due to advancement of science and technology, globalization and numerous other geo-political and economic developments characteristics of strategic and operational environment is rapidly evolving. Future military leaders need to understand the major trends of emerging strategic and operational environment to prepare them for future wars. Following are few of the significant characteristics of emerging strategic and operational environment:

The Changing Nature of States

Scholars of social and political science argue that the concept of 'State', the most basic building block of the global system is changing.³¹ Due to globalisation and information revolution today states have been joined in the economic, political and military domain by a plethora of non-state actors like private entities, transnational organisations and localised ethnic groups. Figure-9 shows the continuum of actors in global stage that enjoys different level of independence from a state's sovereignty who many a time overwhelm a state's legal and political power.³² Consequentially states are gradually losing their monopoly in use of force (legal right to wage war).³³

Figure-9: The Continuum of Actors in Geopolitical Issues




Source: Booz Allen Hamilton³⁴

Moreover the numbers of failed and failing states are increasing across the globe due to ethnic disharmonies, rebel movements and insurgencies. Few of the emerging socio-

political and economic alliances like EU, change the classical characteristics of a state. Out of this chaos, a new kind of political entity, termed as the '**Post-National State**' is emerging.³⁵ In military domain these developments ushered an era of '**Post-Clausewitzian War**' in which the trinity of the people, the army and the state is no longer an effective framework to analyse a war.³⁶

Figure-10: Clausewitz's Trinity in Conventional Context and Today's Changed Environment Context



Source: Internet³⁷

In today's changed environment Clausewitz's trinity (people, army and government) are replaced by new actors and ideology as shown in Figure-10. Thus the classical understanding of warfare is changing.


Changing Character of War

Though the nature of warfare is enduring as argued by Clausewitz, the character of contemporary warfare is changing.³⁸ Competing cultures, civilizations, and associated ideologies, information and communication technology proliferation, globalization, advancement of science and technology, elements of failed and falling states are the key drivers of those changes.³⁹ Following are the key trend of changes:

- Moral and cognitive dimensions are dominant feature of contemporary wars (Contest of ideology, not territory or economic gain)
- Integration of political, diplomatic, military, economic and information power of a nation in achieving objective of a war (Hybrid warfare and prominence of smart power)
- Primacy of information domain (Information operation and role of media)
- Expansion of the battle space (Emergence of cyber and space dimension as 4th and 5th dimension of battle space)
- Traditional norms of warfare are changing (Legal and ethical dimensions of drone strike, cyber hacking, artificial intelligence etcetera issues are evolving)

Study of last 30 years war indicate (see Figure-11) that internal war is the main trend of contemporary warfare, interstate war has reduced to a significant level and internationalized interstate war has increased in recent time.

Figure-11: Trends of Contemporary Warfare (1946-2019)




Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset⁴⁰

The role of soft power (non-military means) in achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and in many cases, they have exceeded hard power (military forces) in their effectiveness.

Blurred Zone between War and Peace

A survey of modern conflicts reveal blurring lines between not only war and peace but also amongst military and non-military operations, diplomacy and warfare, allies and adversaries, state and non-state actors, conventional and unconventional means and even amongst national boundaries.⁴¹ Globalization and information revolution have diffused these distinctions. The blurred zone between war and peace is called grey zone where most of the military operations are conducted in contemporary time.⁴² The conflict between US and China in the South China Sea and Korean Peninsula in present time can be termed as a conflict in grey zone. Conflict in this zone is characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved and uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks. Political, economic, informational, and military antagonism in this zone is intense than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.

Figure-12: Grey Zone in the Spectrum of Conflict




Source: Nicholas Drummond, *The Spectrum of Conflict*⁴³

Proxy and Internationalization of Local War

War in Syria, Yemen and different states of Africa demonstrate another key trend of contemporary war that is proxy and internationalization of local wars. In proxy war other states play a major role in supporting and directing a part to a war, but do only a small portion of the fighting themselves. It is the most successful kind of political war being waged in contemporary time.⁴⁴ It allows states to secure ideological and strategic objectives without putting a significant number of their own troops in war. The total number of actors involved in these proxy-wars has increased significantly in recent time as shown below in Figure-13:


Figure-13: Proxy Actors in Contemporary Wars



Source: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies⁴⁵

Similar to proxy, a war spills-over to the international level when a weak government cannot cope with internal ethnic, economic, social, and political issues and seek regional and global support to safeguard own political power. Following figure-14 shows that the number of internationalized intrastate wars increasing from seven to eighteen from 2008 to 2018.

Figure-14: Overview of the Number of Internationalized Intrastate Wars from 1988-2018




Source: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies⁴⁶

In 2018 internationalized intrastate war accounted 35% of all wars (as opposed to 18% in 2008). Internationalization is a major cause of prolonged civil war because belligerents receive external support as seen in the case of Syria and Yemen.

Economic Coercion

In contemporary time states employ economic tools to exert influence; states also exploit vulnerabilities and interdependent relationship to achieve geopolitical interest.⁴⁷ Majority of the global and regional actors use economic coercion as a significant policy tool to pursuit their geopolitical interest. In international relation it is one of the most effective tools to deter a state in present time. For example following Figure-15 shows an increasing trend of US economic sanctions in last two decades and in 2019 it was 82 that is all time high in US history.

Figure-15: Statistics of Annual Sanction by U.S. Department of the Treasury




Source: Internet⁴⁸

Other key global actors like EU is also using economic coercion against Russia to secure its geopolitical interest.⁴⁹ Both China and Russia also proposed counter economic measures in 2019 against states who comply with U.S. measures.⁵⁰ The rising level of economic sanctions indicate that it is becoming a key tool of national strategy to achieve geopolitical objectives.

South Asian Regional Security Environment

South Asia accounts for about 39.49% of Asia's population and over 24% of the world's population.⁵¹ Each state has its own internal security issues that are rooted in ethno nationalism, ethno religious and identity politics.⁵² Recent rise of right-wing ultra-nationalism in few of the states have seriously hampered regional stability.⁵³ Long standoff between India and Pakistan as well as US attempt to balance the rise of China have far reaching security implication in the region. Presently China attempts to become the centre of a web of economic relationships with numerous projects like 'One Belt One Road', 'New Maritime Silk Road' and 'Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank' to secure its economic and geopolitical interest.⁵⁴


Figure-16: Overland and Maritime Belt and Road Initiative



Source: Internet⁵⁵

Those communication network and infrastructural developments have far reaching security implications. For example China is securing its energy supply route with ports along the sea route which security analysts termed as 'String of Pearls'.⁵⁶

Figure-17: String of Pearls- Strategic Routes and Lanes in Indian Ocean



Source: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)⁵⁷

These developments have created strategic uncertainty and security dilemma among the nations of Indian Ocean Region.

INSIGHTS FOR FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS


Military leaders need to understand the complex dimensions of changes taking place in the strategic and operational environment and their effect on security as well as on the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of a state to cope with the challenges and prepare for the days ahead. Few of the significant insights for future military leaders from above mentioned trend of changes and developments are as follows: -

Characteristics of Future War

Michael Howard, the eminent scholar and military strategist, once observed that the purpose of future gazing in war is not to get it right, but to avoid getting it terribly wrong.⁵⁸ War is the most complex and unpredictable of all human activity.⁵⁹ Study of contemporary wars reveal that categories of wars are blurring and no longer fit into specific type or classification.⁶⁰ In future war a military might have to conduct different types of military operations simultaneously like convention military operation, different unconventional military operations, psychological operation and humanitarian aid operation.⁶¹ Such operational environment would demand specialized skills like creativity, digital literacy, cyber and space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence,

operational adaptability, cultural and language proficiency etcetera.⁶² At operational and tactical level it would be essential to integrate unique capabilities of all five domains (named as multi-domain operation) to meet tactical and operational challenges.⁶³

Figure-18: Multi-domain Operations to Achieve Unity of Effort



Source: US Military Pamphlet⁶⁴

The main idea of multi-domain operations is to achieve synergy and unity of effort through integration of all five domains rather than fighting in individual and separate domain.


Force Planning for Future Warfare

Study of contemporary security environment suggest that the possibility of state on state conventional war has reduced to a significant level.⁶⁵ Armed forces across the world are in a dilemma in that they seem to be preparing for a war they less likely to face and constantly adapting for a war which is not mandated as their primary task.⁶⁶ Hence, it is essential for Armed Forces to be trained and prepared for numerous other non-traditional tasks. In such environment capability based force planning rather than threat-based force planning is more likely to address the ambiguity and uncertainty of future operational environment.⁶⁷

Knowledge is Key in Future Warfare

The world has witnessed evolution of platform-centric, network centric and information-centric warfare in last thirty years.⁶⁸ Presently a transformation from information-centric warfare to knowledge-centric warfare is in progress.⁶⁹

Figure-19: Transformation from Platform Centric Warfare to Knowledge Centric Warfare



Source: Internet⁷⁰

Military scholars recognize knowledge as the centre of gravity of future warfare. They argue that in future the determinants of success will not be superior military hardware rather superiority in knowledge will be the key factor in winning a conflict.⁷¹ In future knowledge will shape the battle space and create conditions for success. Military leaders need continued study of the changing geo strategic and operational environment in appropriate context and continually update their understanding on emerging trends in warfare. Uncertainty and unpredictability of future warfare can be faced with maximum effectiveness through being trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty.⁷²


Integrating Smart Power in National Security Strategy

Globalization, socio-economic and political interdependence amongst states as well as global accountability through institutions like UN and its other affiliated bodies have weakened the effectiveness of hard power (military power) in international relation.⁷³ Nations are increasingly functioning in a world of law and norms; institutions have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behaviour in international politics.⁷⁴ In the transformed international system solely military power is insufficient to pursue national interest rather smart power are crucial tool in this regard.⁷⁵ Smart power concept demands a strong military to be reinforced by other elements of national power like diplomacy, economy, alliances, partnerships and institutions. Military leaders need to understand the importance of harnessing the political, diplomatic and economic dimensions of national power with military to formulate a viable national security strategy.

Developing Capability in Cyber and Space Domain

Alongside land, air and sea, space (the 4th dimension) and cyber (the 5th dimension) are the critical dimensions of today's operational environment.⁷⁶ They are gradually becoming integrated in all military activities. Military use of space and cyber in communication and information domain is the force multiplier with the greatest impact.⁷⁷ Battlefield is progressively extending to space and in future it will be an area of contest among belligerents. Militaries need to develop capability in military use of space to remain relevant in future wars. Similarly in recent time the use of cyber space to pursue national interest has increased exponentially. In contemporary time it has taken a leading role in wars between states and has become one of the critical security concerns of states.⁷⁸

Figure-20: Incidents of Cyber Espionage



Source: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)⁷⁹

Figure-20 shows that cyber espionage has significantly increased in last couple of years. Majority of these are state sponsored. For example, As US-China relation deteriorates, there has also been an increase in reported Chinese cyber espionage.⁸⁰ Russian cyber-attack to influence political process in US and EU countries are the most critical security

challenges faced by those nations in recent time. Hence, militaries need to develop cyber capability to safeguard national interest both during peace and war.

Conclusion

War is the most complex and unpredictable of all human activities. To navigate through the uncertainty and unpredictability a military leader should continuously study and observe the major trends of current and emerging strategic and operational environment. Due to advancement of science and technology, globalization and numerous other geopolitical developments this environment is rapidly evolving. The evolving character of both state and warfare, blurring zone between war and peace, internationalization of local war, economic coercion, rise of right wing ultra-nationalism are few of the significant characteristics of today's security environment.

Due to numerous socio-political reasons few of the states (like states of EU) are gradually losing significant characteristics of a state and a new kind of political entity named as the 'Post-National State' is emerging. In military domain these developments ushered an era of post-Clausewitzian war in which the trinity of the people, the army and the state is no longer an effective framework to analyse a war. Characteristics of contemporary warfare are also changing in few areas. Contest of ideology, use of smart power, expansion of the battle space through cyber and space domain, new ethical and moral dimensions are few of the prominent features of contemporary wars. Moreover opacity of the belligerents (like in Syrian war), uncertainty about the relevant legal frameworks (drone and cyber-attack), proxy and internationalization of local wars are also significant trends of contemporary wars. Economic coercion has increased and it has emerged as a significant policy tool in international arena. In South Asia, recent rise of right-wing ultra-nationalism in few of the states have seriously hampered regional stability. Rise of China as economic and military power has security implication for south Asian region as well.

Complex dimensions of changes taking place in the strategic and operational environment need to be observed closely by military leaders to prepare them for the future days ahead. Abovementioned developments would add numerous new dimensions in military strategy and thinking. Pattern of future warfare and force planning for that, integration of smart power in security strategy, capacity development in cyber and space, knowledge based warfare are few of the areas where military leaders need to focus for facing challenges of future warfare. Study of contemporary wars reveals that difference between categories of wars is blurring and in future a military might have to fight different types of war like convention war, unconventional war, psychological operation and humanitarian aid operation simultaneously in a particular situation. Such operational

environment would demand specialized skills like creativity, digital literacy, cyber and space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence, operational adaptability and cultural and language proficiency etcetera. At operational and tactical level it would be essential to integrate unique capabilities of all five domains (named as multi domain operation) to meet tactical and operational challenges. Contemporary security environment suggest Armed forces to be trained and prepared for numerous non-traditional tasks like humanitarian aid, cyber security, psychological operation etc. In this environment capability based force planning rather than threat-based force planning is more likely to address the ambiguity and uncertainty of future operational environment. Alongside land, air and sea, space (the 4th dimension) and cyber (the 5th dimension) are the critical dimensions of today's operational environment. In contemporary time it has taken a leading role in wars between states and has become one of the critical security concerns of states. Militaries need to develop cyber capability to safeguard national interest during both peace and war.

Knowledge is the new centre of gravity for future military operation. Military leaders need continued study of the changing geo strategic and operational environment in appropriate context and continually update their understanding on emerging trends in warfare. In the transformed international system solely military power is insufficient to pursuit national interest rather soft power like economy, diplomacy and other elements of national power need to be integrated in national security strategy. Challenges of future warfare can be faced with maximum effectiveness through being trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty. As war is the most complex and unpredictable of all human activity military leaders need to continually observe and study present and future trend to meet the unpredictability and uncertainty of coming days.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sharif Ul Alam, psc, Arty was commissioned with 43rd BMA Long Course in the Regiment of Artillery on 26th November 2000. He commanded 27 Field Regiment Artillery. He served as Directing Staff in Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and Instructor Gunnery in School of Artillery. He participated in Counter Insurgency Operations in Chattogram Hill Tracks (CHT). He was a Brigade Major of an Artillery Brigade. Besides different courses at home he attended Intelligence Staff Course at India. He is a graduate of Defense Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Mirpur and Royal Brunei Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Brunei. He participated in UN Peace Keeping Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI). He completed his Masters in International Security from Massey University, New Zealand with distinction. Presently he is serving as Assistant Military Secretary at Military Secretary Branch, Army Headquarters.

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN BUILDING BANGLADESH ARMY LEADERSHIP WITH SUGGESTED MODEL

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sanaullah, psc, Engrs

Abstract

The effectiveness of military leadership depends on the ability of leaders to cope up with the continuously changing situation. It is to manage the emotion of himself and the led. Emotional Intelligence (EI) is the aptness to regulate one's own and other people's emotions. Militaries around the world are putting significant emphasis on EI. Bangladesh (BD) Army, presumably, are yet to include EI as one of the *prima facie* of leadership attributes. BD Army has always been a leader-led organization that focuses on the ability of the leaders to take tangible roles. This can effectively motivate all men under him. Recently, EI is identified as one of the vital leadership attributes and foundational traits. It has the potential to contribute and enhance the quality of BD Army leadership. The study found that emotionally intelligent army leaders are more effective and successful than others. For greater effectiveness, institutional training and a suitable environment are needed for developing EI in BD Army leadership.

Introduction

Emotional Intelligence (EI) mentions the ability of a person to cope up and check his or her emotions. At the same time, bears the ability to check the emotions of others. As Daniel Goleman remarks, "If you are tuned out of your own emotions, You will be poor at reading them in other people." BD Army has always been a leader-led organization. As such, a leader's development was never out of sight and many programs are undertaken for leadership enhancement. Institutional leadership training is organized in academies under various courses. These courses are always at a single-service and joint-service level. A study on EI will surely help BD Army leadership to progress further in pursuit of excellence.

While looking for articles, precis, and pamphlets to study army leadership, many writings were found. All writings covered attributes and characters of leadership but no writing has been found which focused on EI in respect of BD Army Leadership. EI is thought to be one of the *prima facie* of army leadership attributes. To face challenges, we should assess our leadership environment. Accordingly, a study must be needed to examine the importance of EI for BD Army leadership. We need to learn EI with available models. Lack of EI in leadership may not only cause individual discontent, rather it may affect BD Army leadership attributes.

The core issues of various unlikely incidents are due to discontentment, distrust, and lack of confidence. Mostly, leaders may not lay the foundation of trust among the led which ultimately end with few unwanted acts. To build confidence in leadership, we need to unearth the importance of EI in building leadership and suggest an appropriate model of EI. We need to study the emotional aspects of leadership. This paper is delineated to provide an overview of EI with various models. Then presenting leadership environment and challenges of the BD Army in terms of EI development. Thereafter, the importance of EI in building BD Army leadership is highlighted. Finally, a suggested EI model for BD Army is discussed.

OVERVIEW OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Gradual Advancement of EI

In the history, it was found that many scholars compared the EI with social intelligence. At first, Thorndike (1920) introduced this concept of social intelligence. Gradual advancement of EI is as follows:

- a. **In the 1930s** - Edward Thorndike described the concept of *social intelligence* as the ability to get along with other people by being able to understand the internal states, motives, and behaviors of oneself and others.¹
- b. **In the 1940s** – David Wechsler developed the concept of *non-cognitive intelligence* stating that it is essential for success in life. Intelligence is not complete until we are not able to define its non-cognitive aspects.²
- c. **In the 1950s** – Humanistic Psychologist Abraham Maslow suggested that people can build *emotional strength*.³
- d. **In the 1960s** – Michael studied the term "*emotional intelligence*" which seems first to have appeared in 1964.⁴
- e. **In 1983** - Howard Gardner in his book, *Frames of Mind* introduced *Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Intelligence* and said it is as important as IQ.⁵
- f. **In 1990**– Psychologists published their landmark article, —*Emotional Intelligence* in the journal *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*.⁶
- g. **In 1995** - The concept of EI got popularized after the publication of Daniel Goleman's book —*Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ*.⁷


- h. **In 2010** – EI: Toward Clarification of a Concept.⁸
- j. **In 2020** – Why you need EI to get ahead in 2020.⁹

EI and the Models

EI is the capacity to control own emotions and also to influence others emotions. EI has been defined by Peter Salovey and John Mayer as “the ability to monitor one’s own and other people’s emotions, to discriminate between different emotions and label them appropriately, and to use emotional information to guide thinking and behavior.”¹⁰ Basing on this definition, four abilities were proposed. Those are perceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions.

These abilities are distinct yet related. Currently, there are three main models of EI : The Ability model, the Mixed model, and the Trait model.

Figure 1: EI Models




Source: Adapted from Psychology of Emotion Blog Post, 2019

Ability Model of EI

The standard parameters for new intelligence to define EI are conceptualized by Salovey and Mayer. Following their continuing research, their initial definition of EI was revised to –“The ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth.” However, after pursuing

further research, their definition of EI evolved into “the capacity to reason about emotions, and of emotions, to enhance thinking.”

Figure 2: Ability Model




Source: Adapted from Mayer & Salovey, 1997, Revised, January 2020

Mixed Model of EI

This EI model is based on Daniel Goleman 25 emotional intelligence characteristics. It is known as a mixed model because it mixes EI qualities with additional personality traits which are not related to either emotion or intelligence. This model is constructed on five sets of emotional competencies.

Figure 3: Mixed Model of EI




Source: Adapted from Daniel Goleman *Harvard Review*, 2019

Trait Model of EI

K. V. Petridis analysed an ideological difference between the ability-based model and a trait-based model of EI. He has been promoting the later for number of times in various journals. Trait EI is “a constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the lower levels of personality. Trait EI should be searched within a personality framework. An alternative label for the same construct is trait emotional self-efficacy.”

Figure 4: Trait Model of EI



Source: Adapted from Psychology of Emotion Blog Post, 2018

Comments: After discussing various models, it is felt that EI would be an internal part of building army leadership. Now it is pertinent to highlight the BD Army leadership environment and challenges in terms of EI.

EI: BD ARMY LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT AND CHALLENGES

BD Army Leadership Environment

The Basis of BD Army Leadership: BD Army officers and soldiers must understand what leadership is and what leadership does. The army leadership is not like leaders of the corporate world or politics. It is different because it has to lead during combat where the question of life and death involves. Any mistake or wrong judgement will not give

him second chance. That is why army leaders need to have a high level of intellect in the cognitive domain and a substantial amount of EI.

Leadership Environment in BD Army: Every member of the BD Army is a leader or led and the level of responsibilities may vary. Members in the loop are under command to some and commander to others or vice-versa. The leadership environment is discussed as follows:

- a. **Socio-Economic Development:** Young leaders and led of the Army are the products of a changing society. The economic solvency of the members of the present society increased much. Better education facilities and improved means of communication have increased the level of awareness of the soldiers. Eroded moralities and loss of core values of life are a by-product of a fast-changing society. Today, military leadership's traditional ethos is tending to shift from its original place. Sometimes a sense of belongingness to the service gets a lesser priority than that of personal requirements.
- b. **Socio-Political Factors:** The trends of the latest wars in the 21st century are no longer defending the sovereignty of individual nation-states. Rather, international wars between belligerents may have a spill-over effect on other states. At the regional level, internal conflict may have a near-war situation among the regional states. Vested groups wrongly portrayed ideological and religious motivation. The changing political environment brings changes in the psychological motivations of Army officers and soldiers.
- c. **Functional Factors:** The conditions of conflict and war change with time and circumstances. BD Army would always find itself involved across the spectrum of war and peacetime operations. Armed forces take part in promoting peace in the form of disaster relief, in aid of civil power, nation-building activities in both the national and international arena. Besides, traditional peace-keeping sometimes extends to political tasks.
- d. **Technological Advancement:** Global technological advancement has put mark locally. The advancement may not be at par with a developed country. It changed the livelihood of society. Besides, in the conventional scenario, the pace of technological advancement is rapidly changing. It is also outdated the ability to cope up in terms of training. It provides the required resources to fight a modern battle. The situation demands higher-order training and resource management.

BD Army Leadership Challenges

There are challenges everywhere. As it is so in leadership. Where there are challenges, there are rooms for improvement. Few challenges of BD Army leadership are discussed below:

- a. **Soldiering and Qualification:** In the Private Sector, in most cases, business and industry get readily trained manpower with appropriate skills. They attract employees with payment facilities. On the contrary, defense forces have to extract from unskilled manpower for recruitment. Required skills are attained through appropriate training. They need to be conditioned to endure difficult and demanding service conditions.
- b. **Requirements of Selflessness:** Few officers and men view the service as a job, the military as an occupation. The slogan 'Army is a way of life' should be maintained. United Nations Mission should not become a motivating factor in service. Materialistic aspirations drift someone from a 'Nation before self' attitude. Under command should have high loyalty and a sense of belongingness. Managing this situation in organizational true spirit through leadership is a challenge for the military leaders.
- c. **Zero Error Syndromes:** The magnitude of the task for a unit has increased manifold. The tasks are operational, administrative, and special in nature. Keeping Under-command motivated in all assignments remains as a challenge for superiors. Besides, the fear of things going wrong, known as 'zero error syndromes' is another barrier in the command psyche in attaining objectives. 'Zero error syndromes' leads to over-supervision also. Over-supervision of commanders at different levels curtails flexibility of the command.
- d. **Preparedness for Future Operations:** The present trend of wars is against non-state actors where, fortunately, BD Army hardly needs to involve. Future trend of warfare will be short, intense, involving multi-dimensional non-linear operations. It is characterized by movement, manoeuvre, and high lethality. Keeping pace with the fast-moving modern world is a challenge for the country.
- e. **Maintaining Army Values and Ethos:** Army values and ethos are the guiding principles for service members. These are very important because they define character traits that help, develop, and maintain military discipline. Honesty, moral courage, integrity, and unquestionable loyalty have important implications for the effectiveness of military leadership.

Comments: BD Army leadership is bounded by maintaining a perfect chain of command. The pattern of tasks, roles, and responsibilities are changing with time. Dimensions in leadership challenges are also posing different looks. It is now highly required to discuss the importance of EI in building BD Army leadership.

IMPORTANCE OF EI IN BUILDING BD ARMY LEADERSHIP

EI has significant importance in building BD Army leadership. As per Daniel Goleman, leaders who are effective, they all are similar. They all pose a very high degree of EI. IQ is not irrelevant, it is needed but it is more needed during entry-level or recruitment. So, many researchers have conducted research in this field. They have suggested that at the later stage, EI is more important than IQ for developing leadership skills. EI has a set of five skills that are comparable to the leadership principles of the BD Army. Following are the five grounds where EI is equally important to build the BD Army leadership:

a. **Motivation:** This creates energy to the under command at the time of distress and misfortune. In BD Army, motivating ability is considered the most significant attribute for any leader. Leaders with a high degree of motivation can achieve beyond imagination and also can motivate their subordinates. The motivation of a leader comes from inner factors rather than from external causes. The symbol of high levels of motivation is the obvious passion and pride of the leader. Leaders of this kind display amazing zeal and enthusiasm in doing things better. When the Commanding Officer of a unit is having high motivation, he continues to remain optimistic. He believes in his men even during tough conditions. He seems to maintain good EI.

b. **Self-Regulation:** Self-regulation bears a lot of significance for our army leaders for many reasons. Firstly, if our leaders are reasonable, will be able to make an environment where trust and fairness will prevail. All the members of the unit consider their commanding officer a 'role models'. Secondly, self-regulation is very vital in the current environment of social changes. In case of an unexpected crisis, the commanding officer will not be puzzled. He will come up with a brilliant idea that will be appropriate for the situation. Self-regulation is the reflection of a leader's intellect, wisdom, and acceptance of ambiguity. In quest of responsibility, leaders must willingly do his duties. They should fulfill the obligations and prove commitment to the best of their abilities.

c. **Self-Awareness:** It is to focus on the leaders' character, feelings, and actions to influence others. Self-Awareness in EI is one of the most important components that needs a profound understanding of emotions, strengths, and flaws. Army leaders who have robust self-awareness, usually are not critical and

again not unrealistically hopeful. Their morals, ethics, and goals are clear and they lead their unit accordingly. They are devoid of any dilemma. Like any other army, BD Army also has leaders of strong self-awareness and at the same time, some leaders lack it. However, confident leaders would not prefer to do anything unfair. They do not want short term and superficial success for the unit. Leaders should have emotions and they cannot go away with it. The military leaders of great proportions of self-awareness will always find ways and means to manage his emotions.

d. **Social Skill:** It is an interacting and communicating skill of EI. In the context of the present leadership environment and VUCA world, 'Social Skill' is needed for a leader to manage and influence other people's emotions successfully. It is quite simple to understand that smiling at people makes them smile back. It will make both leaders and led feel better and stay bonded. Other skills, like persuasion through motivation, communication skills, learning about the conflicts are also covered by social skills. A couple of listening ears, a touch of talking, a bowl full of knowledge, a basis of trust, a cup full of commitment, and understanding are enough for building bonds among the leaders and the led.

e. **Empathy:** It is an understanding of the chemistry of under command and sharing leaders' acumen to others. The most easily distinguishable EI in leadership is empathy. But, when it comes to army leadership, empathy is hardly encouraged or admired. The very word seems not suitable for the army in the tough realism of the Army environment. Sympathy and empathy are not the same. For any leader, empathy should not mean attractive and populist by accepting other emotions. Rather, it means thoughtful consideration while making sensible decisions. Leaders at all levels should maintain EI and should not compromise with the discipline. Leaders with EI and good prudence can manage any tough situation.

EI is crucial for achieving success in Army leadership. However, EI is required for army leadership to succeed. Few models of EI are discussed below:

SUGGESTED EI MODEL FOR BD ARMY LEADERSHIP

Suggested EI Model for BD Army Leadership

We must adopt and practice the values and ethos of the BD Army in our routine works. EI helps to develop a foundation for building the trust of the soldiers. Leaders must not break that trust. Trust is the core of our leadership. A Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

was done to unearth a suitable EI model for BD Army leadership. Basing on survey, interviews, and FGD analysis are shown below:

Figure 5: Recommended EI Model



Source: Adapted from Daniel Goleman, *Harvard Review*, 2019

Table 1: Brief Explanation of the Recommended EI Model

	Definition	Attributes
Self- Awareness	The capacity to identify and understand their moods, emotion, drives, and their effect on others	Self-confidence Accurate self-judgement Self-critical and sense of humor
Self-Regulation	The capacity to the device or redirect upsetting needs and temperament The personality suspend judgment to think before performing	Honesty and integrity Comfort with uncertainty Holistic to adjustment
Motivation	A desire to act for motives that go beyond money or status A personality to chase goals with vigor and persistence	Strong energy to achieve Hopefulness even in the face of defeat Organizational commitment

Empathy	The aptitude to appreciate the emotional build up of other people Skill in handling people according to their emotional responses	Knowledge in developing and containing talent Cross-cultural sympathy Devoted to subordinates
Social Skill	Talents in dealing with relationships and building networks A talent to find a common field and develop a relationship	Efficiency in leading change Persuasiveness Proficiency in building and leading teams


Source: Author's Construct

Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Recommended EI Model


A quantitative and qualitative analysis is done of the recommended EI model for BD Army leadership, concerning principles of leadership behavior. Here, EI is presented in five different components:

- a. **Self-Awareness:** The study has identified a few attributes of this component of EI that are available to a leader who has self-awareness. In a survey (total 45 respondents), varied percentages (as mentioned beside) of respondents agreed that self-awareness has, 91.11% agree with the relevance of seeking self-improvement, 60% agreed with seeking and accept responsibility, 46.67% agreed with be proficient. But as a whole 26.67%-91.11% agreed that, existing all principles of leadership behavior have relevance with the EI component of self-Awareness. In another survey, a question was asked that Self-Awareness of a leader helps him to become better adjusted and more effective. A total of 90 respondents participated and among them, 30 persons strongly agreed and 48 persons agreed that Self-Awareness helps to become better adjusted and more effective. But two respondents disagree with the above statement.

Figure 6: Relevance of Self-Awareness with Leadership Principles




Source: Author's Construct

Figure 7: Self-Awareness Helps a Leader to be More Effective


Source: Author's Construct

b. **Self-Regulation:** The study found that self-regulation can help a leader to make sound and timely decisions. In a survey (total 45 respondents) varied percentage (as mentioned beside) of respondents agreed that self-regulation has, 66.67% agree relevance with make sound and timely decision, 40% agreed with being proficient and lead by example. But as a whole, 24.44%-66.67% agreed that, existing all principles of leadership behavior have relevance with the EI component of self-regulation. In another survey, a question was asked that leaders who can self-regulate their emotions can control their demands. A total of 90 respondents participated and among them, 32 persons strongly agreed and 46 persons agreed that Self-Regulation helps a leader to become better adjusted and more effective. But one respondent disagrees with the above statement.

Figure 8: Self-Regulation with Leadership Principles

Source: Author's Construct


Figure 9: Leaders with Self-Regulation can Create Better Environment




Source: Author's Construct

c. **Empathy:** The study has identified a few attributes which directly influence the leaders' character. In a survey (Total 45 respondents), varied percentage (as mentioned beside) of respondents agreed that empathy has, 73.33% agree with relevance of knowledge and care for your subordinates, 44.44% agreed with keeping your men informed, 42.22% agreed with Built team and challenge its ability of your subordinate. But as a whole, 26.67%-73.33% agreed that existing all principles of leadership behavior have relevance with the EI component of empathy. In another survey, a question was asked that sustained motivation in a team is possible to achieve if the leader has adequate empathy towards the led. A total of 90 respondents participated and among them, 34 persons strongly agreed and 43 persons agreed that empathy helps a leader to become better adjusted and more effective. However, 12 respondents remain neutral on the question.

Figure 10: Relations of Empathy with Leadership Principles




Source: Author's Construct

Figure 11: Leaders with Empathy will have Sustained Motivation

Source: Author's Construct


d. **Motivation:** In a survey, (total 45 respondents) varied percentage (as mentioned beside) of respondents agreed that motivation has, 86.67% agree relevance with providing direction. 53.33% agreed with developing the potential of your subordinate. As a whole 37.78%-86.67% agreed, that existing all principles of leadership have relevance with the EI component of motivation. The study has identified a few attributes of this component of EI that are available to a leader. These are strong initiatives to achieve, hopefulness even in the face of disappointment, organizational obligation. In a survey, a question was asked to military leaders with high motivation, display extraordinary initiative, and enthusiasm to do things better. A total of 90 respondents participated and among them, 50 persons strongly agreed and 28 persons agreed that the motivation helps a leader to become better adjusted and more effective. However, 07 respondents remain neutral on the question and 03 persons disagree.

Figure 12: Relation of Motivation with Leadership Principles

Source: Author's Construct


e. **Social Skill:** The study found that social skill helps in building the team spirit. In a survey (total 45 respondents) varied percentages (as mentioned beside) of respondents agreed that social skill has, 53.33% agree relevance with build the team and challenge its ability. 51.11% agreed with know and care for your subordinate and 48.89% agreed with keeping your men informed. But as a whole 33.33%-53.33% agreed that, existing all principles of leadership behavior have relevance with the EI component of social-skill. In a survey, a question was asked military leaders with high social skills, display extraordinary initiative, and enthusiasm to do things better. A total of 90 respondents participated and among them, 28 persons strongly agreed and 51 persons agreed that social skill helps a leader to become better adjusted and more effective. However, 07 respondents remain neutral on the question and 03 persons disagree and 01 person strongly disagree.¹¹

Figure 13: Relevance of Social-Skill with Leadership Principles



Source: Author's Construct

Figure 14: Leader with good Social-Skill lead the team better



Source: Author's Construct

The suggested model is discussed exhaustively with the help of personality traits and leadership behaviors. The model has also found out the relevance with leadership principles and EI skills. BD Army should adopt the suggested model to build leadership. The lessons of EI should be included in the command and leadership practices. EI should be focused on all military training institutions. There might have other models in building BD Army leadership, those can be studied in the future.

Conclusion

In history, it was found that many scholars compared the EI with social intelligence. EI traces back to 1920 by Thorndike as a concept of social intelligence. It evolved with the years and found it appropriate to develop Army leadership. Several EI models deal with different emotional characteristics. All the models are identical to disclose the inner qualities of leaders. Those qualities are highly required to lead the led.

EI is closely related to the BD Army leadership environment and challenges. The officers and soldiers must understand what leadership does for them. We need to put forward EI with the changing situation. Today's leadership environment is changing with socio-economic, political, cultural, and technological advancement. There are challenges in BD Army leadership. Soldiering and qualification, the requirement of selflessness, zero-error syndrome, maintaining the values and ethos of our Army are few challenges. Those challenges should be addressed by the leaders with the values of EI.

EI plays a significant role in building BD Army leadership. Effective leaders are similar. They all pose a very high degree of EI. It has a set of skills that are comparable to the leadership principles of the BD Army. EI builds trust between the soldiers and the officers. A suggested model is conceptualized by Daniel Goleman, 1995.¹² Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the suggested model is done. This EI model is related to the leadership principles of the BD Army. All leaders and led will certainly reap the benefits out of this suggested EI model.

Recommendations

BD Army needs to develop a positive environment that will help to build ideal leadership. BD Army should take the necessary steps to create a suitable environment in the units and formations. Emotional aspects of leadership should be nurtured and practiced at all levels.

BD Army leadership challenges to be addressed with the proper knowledge of EI. The gap between leaders and led to be bridged by EI.

To promote the effectiveness of leadership, BD Army should adopt the suggested EI model to build leadership. The lessons related to EI should be included in the Command Leadership and Management practices. At the same time, the authority may establish Leadership Training in BD Military Academy and other training institutions focusing on EI.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sanaullah, psc, Engrs was born on 01 January, 1974 in Matlab Uttar, Chandpur, Bangladesh. He was commissioned with 31 BMA Long Course in the Core of Engineers on 19 December, 1994. He attended a number of courses at home and abroad. He is a Graduate from Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Mirpur Cantonment. He has completed Masters in Business Administration (MBA) from Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), Mirpur Cantonment with distinct credentials. His duties and appointments include Regimental Staff, Company Commander, Project Officer of various Army level projects, Garrison Engineer (Project), Dhaka. There are number of mega projects those are successfully completed under his direct supervision and guidance. The Officer has served as a General Staff Officer Grade-1 (Research) in Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka. He has also served in United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNMIL (2004-05) and South Sudan, UNMISS (2011-12). Presently, the officer is serving as Assitant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA&QMG) in Engineers Centre and School of Military Engineering (ECSME), Qadirabad Cantonment, Natore.

CLAUSEWITZ'S ON WAR: AN OVERVIEW

Brigadier General Md Mainur Rahman, SUP, awc, psc

Abstract

Among all the military strategists ever lived, Clausewitz is possibly regarded as the most prominent and widely revered. This Prussian general started writing on military strategy in his early twenties, and continued till his untimely death at the age of fifty one. His lone major work, *On War*, has turned out to be the most comprehensive work on military strategy ever. Today, Clausewitz's *On War* constitutes an essential part of training curricula in most of the institutions teaching military strategy around the globe. Naturally, development in technology has rendered many aspects of Clausewitz's lessons largely irrelevant, especially at operational and tactical levels. But Clausewitz's teachings on national policy and warfare, different types of war, strategic and operational art, climate, fog and friction of warfare, on military genius, and many other issues remain surprisingly relevant even after about two centuries. Many of his teachings have stood the test of time and serve as a benchmark for military thinkers today, and possibly will continue to do so in the days to come. This paper is a humble effort to introduce Clausewitz's important lessons to young military professionals. *On War* is a difficult book to read and comprehend. Even mid-career officers are generally awed by *On War* and normally prefer to stay away from it. This article is intended to act as an ice-breaker, and it puts forward only those lessons that the author considers the most important. This write-up is definitely not meant for the avid readers and expert analysts of Clausewitz. To them, many of the discussions and explanations may appear as oversimplifications. Instead, it aims at the budding military professionals, with the hope of kindling their interest for further reading on this master strategist.

Introduction

Among all the military theorists who ever lived, Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is possibly regarded as the most influential. This Prussian general started writing on military strategy in his early twenties, and continued till his death at the age of fifty one. After his untimely demise, Clausewitz's lone major work was published by his widow. *Vom Craig*, translated *On War* in English, has arguably turned out to be the most comprehensive work on military theory ever. Today, this seminal book constitutes an essential part of training curricula in many of the military training institutions around the globe. Many of Clausewitz's teachings have stood the test of time. *On War* serves as a benchmark for military thinkers today, and perhaps will continue to do so in the days to come.

Ironically, Clausewitz's lifespan covered a stagnant era for science and technology when hardly any notable scientific breakthrough took place. Even the few centuries preceding his time did not experience any significant technological advancement. Clausewitz lived in a period when the infantry rifles had a maximum range of fifty yards, and artillery canons could barely reach three hundred yards.¹ But immediately after his death, scientific discoveries came thick and fast and revolutionized almost everything, including warfare. The decade following his death (1830-1840), for example, witnessed the invention of breech-loading, rifled weapons and development of railroads. Military technology had since then passed through major milestones like iron-clad steam powered warships, machine guns and long range artillery, tanks, submarines, aerial combat platforms, nuclear arsenal, and so on. Today, armies of 21st century are witnessing revolution in technologies like space, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, robotics, nanotechnology, autonomous platforms and alike; and these are redefining the character of future battlefields.

If the warfare has transformed so much in last two centuries, the question that naturally comes to our mind is – how can Clausewitz still remain relevant? Answer to this query can possibly be found in the fact that despite revolutionary changes in the character, the nature of warfare has remained largely unchanged. That's precisely the reason why the 4th century Chinese master Sun Tzu appeals to military thinkers today. But learning Clausewitz has not been an easy task. *On War* is a difficult piece to comprehend. Roughly six hundred pages in volume, it is written in a style that is not very reader friendly. Besides, as the book was basically in draft form, discourse on particular issues are sometimes found scattered in different places. Readers occasionally need to glean relevant information from various parts to develop a complete understanding on a particular issue. If Clausewitz had time for completing the revision, possibly *On War* could have been better organized and easier to negotiate.

This paper is a humble effort to introduce Clausewitz to young leaders of Bangladesh Armed Forces. Even mid-career officers are generally awed by *On War*, and prefer to stay away from it. This article is intended to act as an ice-breaker, and it covers only those lessons that are considered most relevant. It begins by briefly touching upon the life sketch of Clausewitz, and thereafter highlights the important lessons with author's opinions and explanations wherever necessary. Towards the end, it also highlights some criticisms of Clausewitz's works. This write-up is definitely not meant for the advanced level readers and avid Clausewitz enthusiasts. To them, many of the discussions and explanations may appear as oversimplifications. As already mentioned, it aims at the beginners, with the hope to generate interest for further reading on this master strategist.

Life Sketch

Carl Von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in Prussia. His father was a lieutenant in Prussian military. The family did not have any aristocratic lineage, which limited his career prospects. Clausewitz joined army at the age of twelve, and was immediately baptized in active combat as Prussia set out for a war against armies of the First French Republic. After the war, he returned to garrison in 1795 and started devoting much of his time for military studies. Clausewitz passed out from the military school of Berlin in 1804 at the top of the merit list. In this institution, he came in contact with Scharnhorst – his lifetime mentor, who is considered as the most influential person in shaping Clausewitz's thinking. Upon graduation, he was appointed as adjutant of the Prussian prince. Clausewitz wrote his first article in 1805, and was on course to continue with further scholarly works.

But the tranquility of Clausewitz's peacetime career was interrupted when Prussia went to war against Napoleon in 1806. Unlike his previous experience, this time Clausewitz witnessed the humiliating defeat of his own Army, which proved no match to the French Army under Napoleon. During the war, he was arrested with the prince, remained a prisoner of war till 1807, and finally was allowed to return home. Clausewitz despised Napoleon's aggression against his motherland, so much so that when Napoleon forced Prussia to make territory available for invasion of Russia in 1811, he resigned his commission and joined Russian Army. It was only when Prussia joined war against France in 1813, Clausewitz returned to his own army.

In 1818, Clausewitz was given the directorship of war college of Berlin and was promoted to the rank of major general. In 1819, he began writing *On War*, and in next eight years completed the first six of planned eight parts, and drafts of remaining two parts. Possibly in 1827, he finally came to a conclusion that all his parts needed revision. Clausewitz could revise and rewrite only first chapter of the first part before his untimely death in 1831 of cholera. His wife Marie, daughter of a Count, a devoted partner and source of inspiration to Clausewitz, published *On War* in 1832.

Statecraft and War

Clausewitz is very rightly credited for laying down the correct strategy formulation framework that flows down from national or policy level to military strategic level. He uses a variety of expressions to define war, calling it “a duel on large scale” or “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” But his definition of war that has earned wide acceptance worldwide suggests “war is a continuation of policy by other means.”² By this

definition, Clausewitz puts it beyond any question that military is just another instrument of national power at the disposal of political leadership. It is government who makes final decisions to further national interests, if necessary, by waging wars, alongside other elements of national power as necessary. He also underlines that the political objectives would always determine the military objectives, and not vice versa. Clausewitz then goes on to include the general people in the equation, and makes his description of war a remarkable trinity: between the government, people and the military. As he frames it:

As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its elements of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; and the third the government.³

Having outlined the trinity, Clausewitz warns that a theory that seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship ignoring any of the aforementioned would be totally useless. In present context, this trinity between the government, military and people does not only remain valid, but assumes even greater importance. With democratic form of governments in place in most countries, people's role in the trinity has, beyond doubt, assumed greater prominence. Politically aware, empowered and well-informed people in most countries today are definitely better suited for their role in the trinity.

Purpose and Means in War

For a nation to achieve victory in war, Clausewitz identifies three broad objectives: the enemy armed forces, the country, and enemy's will power. Considering the country as a geographic identity, it may be said that enemy resistance is a factor of two elements: physical strength, and will to fight. If we want to put it in a simple mathematical equation, it may be expressed as:

$$\text{Resistance} = \text{Means} \times \text{Will}$$

The aim of war, broadly speaking, is to bring the enemy resistance down to zero, or minimum. Considering the equation, this can be achieved by addressing either or both of the two elements. The quickest way possibly is the destruction of enemy forces (means) – to put them in such a condition that they can no longer carry on to fight. Occupation of enemy country may also become imperative so that enemy cannot generate fresh forces. But destruction of adversary's force to such an extent is difficult, and may require a

vastly superior army. That brings us to the second option – wearing down the enemy by a process of attrition. This aims at both enemy's physical strength and will to fight. It basically means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of enemy's physical and moral resistance.⁴ Finally, the third option is pure resistance – aimed mainly at enemy's will to fight. This method – though apparently negative, is actually very useful, especially to the weaker country in the conflict. It aims at incurring such costs to the adversary that in the end his political object does not seem worth the effort it costs. Clausewitz substantiates the same by mentioning that, "once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."⁵ Before embarking upon a decision to wage war, it is of utmost importance for the political and military leadership to understand the purpose and means available to achieve the desired ends.

Climate of War

Clausewitz underlines four elements that make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance. Considered together, it becomes clearly evident how much fortitude of mind is needed to negotiate these risky and volatile components. The element that is omnipresent in war is danger, much like the air surrounding our environment. According to Clausewitz, the highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is courage. Exertion, the second element, refers to the tremendous pressure that war creates on the physical and mental strength of every man. Determination and strength of character are extremely essential to survive in such climate. Besides, war is clad with out and out uncertainty - about enemy, terrain, weather, and sometimes even own allies and friendly forces. Due to this uncertainty, danger and fear of unknown, men are always inclined to overestimate enemy's strength. Finally, the one element that makes war a gamble is chance. Clausewitz points out that no other human activity is so continuously or universally bounded with chance. As a result, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war. The same plan can result in an astounding victory or a disastrous defeat. A small twig can ricochet a bullet from its deadly course and save a commander, allowing him to live a long life basking in the glory of victory, and vice versa.

Friction in War

Possibly no other military thinker has attached so much emphasis on fog and friction of war as Clausewitz. Very rightfully, he identified this to be a force that theory can never quite define. According to Clausewitz, "action in war is like movement in a resistant element."⁶ Everything takes much longer time than initially envisaged, countless minor things add together and pose unsurmountable challenges to commanders. This reminds us

of Benjamin Franklin's (1706-90) the famous proverbial rhyme on 'the horseshoe nail' that we have heard numerous times while growing up as military professionals:

For want of a nail the shoe was lost
For want of a shoe the horse was lost
For want of a horse the rider was lost
For want of a rider the message was lost
For want of a message the battle was lost
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

Apparently insignificant forces of nature like rain, fog or mist can slow down advance, or impede visibility to such extent that attackers lose direction. A failed attack at tactical level can have disastrous consequences for strategic level and may even decide the outcome of war. The inherent tendency for things to go wrong (widely known in armed forces as Murphy's Law) is compounded by external influences and apparently insignificant factors such as weather.⁷ Besides, there are weak soldiers in every fighting unit, and in reality a unit's rate of advance is only as fast as the slowest man undertaking the march. As it is often said, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. It is the climate of war, coupled with fog and friction that make a real war remarkably different from a war on paper. Friction makes easy things difficult, and it's a phenomenon that cannot be understood unless one has experienced war.

Leadership Qualities

Clausewitz underlines the leadership qualities desirable from a military commander as 'military geniuses.' He outlines few fundamental traits: courage, power of intellect, *coup d'oeil*, determination, presence of mind, strength of character, and ability to relate warfare with the ground. As war is a realm of danger, Clausewitz considers courage as the first and foremost requirement. Courage can be of two types: courage in the face of personal danger and courage to accept responsibility, both of which are important. War is also a domain of uncertainty, so power of intellect is another prerequisite to be able to see through the fog and ambiguity. *Coup d'oeil* refers to an 'inner eye', which can simply be called as instinct. Clausewitz vividly outlines how courage, power of intellect, *coup d'oeil* and determination can combine together in most difficult situations:

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are responsible: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.⁸

Presence of mind, another important trait, helps the leaders to deal with the unexpected, and quick thinking is definitely a prerequisite in the face of danger. Strength of character refers to keeping calm at times of exceptional stress and violent emotions, and relates to temperament and self-control. Clausewitz suggests that a strong character is one who will not be unbalanced by the most powerful emotions and will continue acting rationally.⁹

Operational Art

Clausewitz considers warfare as both art and science – with the term art of war being more suitable than science of war. He defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the object of war.”¹⁰ In his book, he frequently uses the two terminologies – means and ends – do describe the art of warfare. “In tactics,” writes Clausewitz, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat, the end is victory.”¹¹ At strategic level, victorious engagements are the means, and ends are those objects which lead directly to peace.¹² Today, US military manuals define strategy as “the alignment of ends, ways and means - informed by risks - to attain goals.”¹³ This stark familiarity between these two explanations substantiates how much relevance Clausewitz’s theory still holds.

Clausewitz can also be credited with explaining most of the key concepts of operational art like centre of gravity, decisive points and lines of operations with exceptional clarity. His explanation on centre of gravity still holds good. As he points out, “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of those characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed.”¹⁴ A commander need to attack enemy centre of gravity while protecting one’s own. On decisive points, Clausewitz mentions, if superiority in numbers is impossible, “the forces available must be deployed with such skill that even in the absence of an absolute superiority, a relative superiority is attained at the decisive point.”¹⁵ This is where the talents of the strategist is necessary; the *coup d’oeil* to distinguish the decisive point and the resolution to concentrate everything available against it, stripping forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives. Even today, lessons on operational art use the definitions of Clausewitz as anchoring points.

Defence Vis-a-Vis Attack

Clausewitz considers defence as a stronger form of war than attack, although its objective is negative.¹⁶ It is easier to hold ground than to take it, to preserve than to acquire. A weaker force, unless it is desperate, does not attack a stronger one; it stays on the defensive and makes up for its weakness by maximizing the advantages of a defensive

position. But Clausewitz's defence is not meant to be passive, "defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."¹⁷ He explains that defence essentially consists of two phases – parrying the attackers blow and then launching counterblows. Thus, it is about finding the right balance between these two elements, waiting and parrying; and then choosing the right time and place to unleash that "flashing sword of vengeance" which Clausewitz described as 'the greatest moment for the defender.'¹⁸ No surprise, this may evoke our memories of launching the formation reserve in powerful counter attack during collective training exercises.

While Clausewitz emphasizes defence as the stronger form of warfare, he also maintains that attack is necessary for victory. Defence enjoys the advantage of terrain, while the attack has the advantage of initiative. He continues with this further by reminding that defence has a negative object and should only be used as long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as one is strong enough to pursue a positive object (attack). Despite this, Clausewitz's teaching on primacy of defence drew notable criticisms. It was regarded by pre-1914 strategists as an embarrassment, to be ignored or explained away.¹⁹ Some even argued that would Clausewitz live long enough to revise his text, he would have changed his mind. But the First World War (1914-18) has silenced many of his critics with numerous manifestations of impregnable defensive battles, thanks to the deadly combination of trench warfare and machine guns.

Unconventional Warfare

Clausewitz highlights his concepts of unconventional warfare calling such a force "the people in arms." Though this may loosely mean a revolutionary or guerrilla force, Clausewitz basically envisaged this as a force operating side by side with regular army, much like the concept of blending conventional with unconventional forces that has been adopted by Bangladesh Army. He believed that "any nation that uses it intelligently well, as a rule, gain some supremacy over those who disdain its use."²⁰ Clausewitz compares unconventional warfare with the process of evaporation, and posits that its effect depends on how much surface is exposed. As is known, a large surface area allows much more water to evaporate in the air. Similarly, greater the surface of contact area, thinner the enemy is likely to be deployed and more effective will the people's war be. He underlines conditions under which such a force can be effective: inaccessible difficult terrain in the interior, large area of operation, long duration, and national character suiting such resistance. Such force, he opines, should never be employed against the main enemy force, instead it should 'nibble at the shell and around the edges'. People in arms should also not get engaged in decisive battles with regular enemy forces, neither should they try

to defend a piece of ground against determined attacks. Such employment principles clearly manifests that it should be used in a complimentary role as force multiplier.

Criticism

Naturally, Clausewitz's teachings have also drawn notable criticisms. Many analysts have commented disapprovingly on total absence of his attention on enemy economic and industrial capacity to carry on the war. Clausewitz even went on to mention that "the conduct of war has nothing to do with making guns and powder coal, sulphur, saltpeter, copper and tin; its given quantities of weapons that are ready for use and their effectiveness...it does not enquire how a country should be organized and a people trained and ruled in order to produce the best military results."²¹ Apparently, Clausewitz focused too much on the situation at hand, possibly due to the influence of the lightning speed of Napoleonic wars and the urgency with which Prussia had to confront it. Napoleonic campaigns shaped his career and dominated his thinking to a great extent. It is easy, however, to criticize Clausewitz in hindsight, having experienced the key role of economic and industrial might of nations in waging wars, especially during World War II. Besides, Clausewitz has never shown the slightest awareness about wars fought in maritime dimension which were then very frequent for many nations across Europe. But this too is not difficult to understand as oceans laid beyond his cultural horizon.²²

Conclusion

About Clausewitz's *On War*, American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie made a bold statement: "his is not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war."²³ It is indeed difficult to disagree with him. No other military theorist has dealt with the theory of warfare in such an all-encompassing manner. But *On War* did not earn its place overnight. Clausewitz had a formidable competitor – a contemporary theorist – Antoine de Jomini. Jomini's main work, *Treatise on Major Military Operations of the Seven Years War*, was published in 1816. Jomini believed that military strategy was controlled by invariable scientific principles. Refuting this idea, Clausewitz underlined that everything was uncertain in war, calculations needed to be based on variable quantities, and intangible psychological factors played a major role. Thus no scientific formulae could work in combat. But Jomini commanded wider acceptance until the end of the nineteenth century. Clausewitz eventually came under spotlight when Helmut von Moltke, the architect of Prussia's military triumph over Austria and France, made it public in 1873 that Clausewitz influenced him most.²⁴ Soon thereafter, Clausewitz's ideas began to find solid ground, and by the beginning of twentieth century, started dominating the German Army. Within next few decades, it managed to spread across Europe, America, Russia, and rest of the world.

Clausewitz did not expect his book to be a grand success. Instead, he expressed a modest hope that his book would not be forgotten, and “might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject.” Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see his predictions go delightfully wrong. Naturally, development in technology has rendered many aspects of his teachings largely irrelevant, especially at operational and tactical levels. But Clausewitz’s teachings on national policy and warfare, strategic and operational art, climate, fog and friction of war, leadership qualities, and many other issues remain surprisingly relevant even after about two centuries. Just to cite an example, Clausewitz suggested imposing an “unacceptably high cost” as a means to force enemy to making peace. Since Hiroshima, nuclear weapons have been a perfect example of how the same can be executed. As already discussed, he has also drawn criticisms from his contemporaries. His successors like Fuller and Liddell Hart did not approve many of his concepts either. But general acceptance and respect that Clausewitz still commands today, clearly epitomizes his relevance.

This paper has offered a cursory view of only a handful of important issues from *On War*. What has been presented can be termed, at the most, as the tip of an iceberg. It is not possible to summarize *On War* in few pages, neither the same was intended. As already pointed out, *On War* is a voluminous and difficult-to-comprehend book, which makes it quite unpopular to beginners. This article aims at taking readers across that mental hurdle – by stimulating interest on this nineteenth century grand master and his timeless work. If this broad-brush sketch can make some of the budding professionals of Bangladesh military interested about Clausewitz and draw them into studying *On War*, this endeavor will be considered a success.

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Brief Biography



Brigadier General Md Mainur Rahman, SUP, awc, psc was commissioned on 21 June 1991. In his long career, Brigadier General Mainur has served in various appointments. The officer has commanded 4 East Bengal Regiment at home and abroad. As Brigade Commander, he has commanded 21 and 305 Infantry Brigades. As Instructor, Brig Gen Mainur served in tactics wing of SI&T and also as a directing staff of DSCSC, Mirpur. The officer has undertaken two UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and DR Congo. As a senior staff officer, Brigadier General Mainur has served as the Assistant Military Secretary to the honourable President of Bangladesh. Presently, he is serving as the Director, WE&S Directorate in Army Headquarters.

MILITARY REFORMS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: DIFFICULTIES AND CONSEQUENCES

Colonel Mohammad Sheraf Uddin Khan, afwc, psc, psc(j)

Abstract

Military reforms in post-Soviet Russia had been an issue of core concern. Starting in 1992, a good number of formal reform efforts were undertaken that demand systematic assessment to determine the level of success. An evaluation of the success of the planned reforms at different times identifies in this paper that lack of political and military leaderships' intention seeking true reform, absence of comprehensive long term plan and military's traditional outlook had been the key influencing factors in Russia's military reform. It also reveals that reform is a difficult and holistic task which involves not only reequipping and technological advancement of entire Armed Forces but also transforming the institution's structure, orientation and values to meet the modern day challenges. Detail focus on other parameters divulges that issues of erratic political understanding of reforms, state of civil-military relation, military's resistance to reforms, systemic corruption in the Armed Forces, present negative demographic trend of Russia and unhealthy working environment in the military demand due attention for accomplishing genuine and sustainable reform of the Russian Military. Above all, if the reduction of conscription does not become a reality then the core concerns for Russia's military reforms may remain unaddressed at least in the near future.

Introduction

Russian Armed forces inherited the legacy of the attitude of Soviet forces as an unavoidable reality. The military was in need of reform from the moment of creation. The need to reduce, restructure and reconstitute the enormous military machine, that had been the core structure of the collapsed Soviet Union, was one of the most obvious and demanding tasks for the leadership of the new Russian State in early 1992.¹ The leaders could recognize the necessity of reform, but considering the other reform needs at hand military was always at the lowest priority. However, a politics of military reform had been prevailing and rounds of reform plans have surfaced over the period one after another starting with President Yeltsin's one in 1992 immediately after the creation of Russian Military. Absence of long term blue print and desired level of political concern hindered reform process to progress significantly. Failure of Russia in Chechen War in 1994 and low level of performance in Georgian War of 2008 exposed the weaknesses of Russian Armed Forces and revealed the acute necessity of true reform. After Georgia the

reform process started with renewed focus and progressed quite a bit. With their successful annexation of Crimea in 2014 and effective intervention in Syria, one can very well argue that Russian Armed Forces have been reformed significantly. In Ukraine, Russian military's speedy deployments and displayed capability to sustain forces for prolonged period without noticeable degradation of effectiveness are indicators of their combat efficiency.² Vladimir Putin's government has also showed concern to carry forward this reform process through continuous increase of military spending that reached 6.59 per cent of GDP in 2016.³ But there also exists arguments against where analysts view that instantaneous management and focused training exercises with specific force elements probably have developed Russia's ability to perform better in the recent operations but have not improved their actual combat capability as perceived.⁴ What is the actual state of Russian military then? This opens up necessity for analysing the issue of Russian Military reform further.

At this backdrop, initially this paper will focus on theoretical overview of military reforms with little highlight on Russian Armed Forces. An evaluation of the success of the planned reforms at different times will identify that inconsistent political concern for military reform, short term reform plans and military's outdated stance on reform requirement are the influencing factors in Russia's military reform. It will also be revealed that reforms are dependent more on desire of Russia's political and military leadership whose commitment to military reform are mostly driven by individual interest.⁵ Besides, it will identify that Russia's military reform is a colossal task that involves not only reequipping almost entire Armed Forces but also transforming the institution's structure, orientation and values.⁶ Detail focus on other parameters will divulge that issues of erratic political understanding of reforms, state of civil-military relation, military's resistance to reforms, systemic corruption in the Armed Forces, present negative demographic trend of Russia and unhealthy working environment in the military demands due attention for accomplishing genuine and sustainable reforms of the Russian Military.

Definition and Dimensions of Military Reforms – Theoretical Overview

In general term, reform means actions in order to change any institution or practice to make it better. Military reform involves actions focused at increasing the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. According to Wheeler and Korb, genuine military reform involves identification of doable to change the military into an effective institution.⁷ Actions may require restructuring, downsizing, upgrading and improving working condition of the military. Countries may undertake military reform tasks under circumstances like: change in leadership, strategy and political priorities, economic decline, changed level of military

and security threats; evolution of new technology, weapon and types of military operations; a change in the equilibrium of militaries of the region; current forces inability to undertake basic tasks and missions; and outdated of current holding of weapons and armaments.⁸ In the present day context, most countries plan military reforms to decrease defence budget for allocating more money towards economic and significant social concerns. It is difficult to make a feasible military reform plan without first analysing national development priorities, identifying concrete limitations and targets.⁹ While undertaking military reform tasks, absence of a long term reform plan may turn reform efforts futile.

Russian Armed Forces was created from the remnant of Soviet Army on 07 May 1992 with an inherent necessity of reform for the legacy, outdated doctrine and orientation.¹⁰ Before embarking on analysis of Russian military reform efforts, it is essential to comprehend Russian military's hierarchical structure and their perception of reform. In Russia, General Staff and Ministry of Defence (MoD) work as parallel organisations where General Staff has more capabilities to influence decisions involving military affairs. The strategic culture of retaining military expertise within the military domain has been continuing to be practiced from Soviet days. The Armed Forces tend to rely on conscripts as a major source of personnel with a certain percentage of 'contract professionals.' About reform, Russian MoD defines it as conversions of the military both in terms of quality and quantity envisioned to increase efficiency to meet the demands of changing external and internal environments.¹¹ With this reform outlook, from the inception of Russian Armed Forces, several reform efforts have been undertaken by the government. The reform efforts have been successful to certain extent overcoming many difficulties but many reform objectives remained unaccomplished. The subsequent paragraphs will discuss and analyse the reforms undertaken at different times evaluating the extent of their success.

Planned Military Reforms in Post-Soviet Russia and Levels of Success

Immediately after official forming of Russian Military, President Yeltsin's Defence Minister Pavel Grachev announced three-point reform package in May, 1992. The broad plans were: reforming of the General Staff of Russia's Armed Forces by 50 per cent reduction in personnel; incorporating a new rapid-deployment "mobile" operational command through brigade based structure obsoleting the prevailing division concept including withdrawal of strategic force deployed overseas; reduction of military personnel to 1.5 million from 2.7 million by 1999 where up to half of the non-commissioned officers (NCO) and privates would be 'contract' volunteers.¹² Russia's terrible economic condition hindered Grachev to carry forward the planned reforms. Out

of planned six mobile force brigades he could form only three. While trying to implement the decision to reduce conscription by 35% the military started failing to provide required personnel even to the priority units.¹³ Altogether, Grachev's reforms were mostly unsuccessful except his success in extracting the strategic troops from abroad.¹⁴

After Grachev's initial failure to reform efforts, President Yeltsin ratified a fresh military doctrine in November 1993.¹⁵ Beside other issues, the doctrine established two priorities for technological developments at par with Western standards.¹⁶ But this remained confined to theory only. Consequently, Russia's Armed Forces failed in their first significant military operation in the post-Soviet era in Chechnya in 1994. Yeltsin was embarrassed with image crisis for this failure and sacked Grachev.¹⁷ Overall, the conflict exposed their weakness and provided renewed political impetus for reforms. New Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev issued a modest reform package in May 1997 focusing on structural reforms and force.¹⁸ The plan was to reduce the strength to 1 million including longer-term aspirations to advance the military technologically. But the plan did not focus much on important issues like enhancing civil oversight of the military, reforming command and control structure, and refurbishing of the defence industry.¹⁹ The 1998 financial crisis caused most of the Sergeyev's ambitious reform to remain unattained mostly.²⁰ Broadly, the failure of military reform within this period can be attributed to a lack of understanding of the issue and poor leadership by Boris Yeltsin. Analysis shows that reform efforts have been unsuccessful for three reasons: undue resistance from military, lack of true desire from the political leadership and lack of prudence of the decision makers in persuading the planned actions.²¹

In 2000, Vladimir Putin approved an updated military doctrine which also did little to create the grounds for meaningful military reform like the previous endeavours.²² Putin's Defence Minister Ivanov's military reform package issued in 2003 was almost an imitation of the earlier proposals in terms of contents. Ivanov also failed to progress markedly because of not paying attention on two important aspects which imbalanced the overall social condition of the Russian military: lower remuneration and 'hazing'.²³ An official survey conducted by the MOD also validated the servicemen's feelings of social insecurity for lower salary.²⁴ Condition was upsetting and many servicemen's families stress level went unbearable making the social environment critical. The undesired and unhealthy social environment made recruiting a difficult task and quality individuals were refraining from joining military creating a vacuum of professionals gradually. On the issue of transformation of the military industrial base, extensive corruption hindered the process and industry remained inefficient.²⁵ Altogether, it appears that political

leadership were not appropriately focused on true military reform or they were unable to check how far the plans were implemented in reality.²⁶

Georgian War of 2008 again exposed the weakness and shabbiness of the capabilities of the Russia's military.²⁷ This brought decisive political impetus for renewed reform efforts. The reform effort was augmented with allocation of additional budget. Beside increase of 16 per cent budget in 2012, a projected \$730 billion were planned for acquisition of advanced weapons and equipment by 2020.²⁸ The then Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov planned to reduce the strength of the military to 1 million where core focus of his reform concerned three areas: organizational transformation, personnel improvement and armament modernization. Plan was to convert the armed forces into a professional combat ready volunteer force that would reduce the percentage of conscripts to 20 per cent. It was also planned not to assign conscripts for any operational role progressively.²⁹ Serdyukov's reform package succeeded quite a bit through his 'bulldozing' approach but could not do much in improving the 'social condition' and 'humanisation' aspects. He was indifferent to the military command structure and did not value their inputs.³⁰ Probably, for that reason, the 'National Security Strategy to 2020' and 'New Military Doctrine' issued by Serdyukov appeared to be disconnected from actual reform efforts.³¹ At some point, military personnel publicly protested against Serdyukov and Putin had to sack him. The new defence minister General Sergei Shoigu kept the continuing reform efforts on but brought change in dealing with the military. Shoigu started displaying respect for the military traditions that Serdyukov barely did.³²

President Vladimir Putin could understand military's reform needs and remained closely involved in rejuvenation and rearmament of the military and improved its efficiency considerably to conduct modern combat operations compared to the previous years.³³ Russian Northern Fleet submarine force, reintroduction of large scale Soviet-style snap exercises ('SNAPEX'), increasing range and frequency of strategic bomber patrols are the indicators of force readiness. Russia's Special Forces competence displayed in Crimea and effective joint actions in Syria exhibited the matured joint force capabilities of the Russian Forces. It is claimed that Russia has now achieved capability of launching two simultaneous large scale operations. During an occasion, even President Putin claimed that Russia's military accomplished a new level of battle readiness fully supported by Russian society.³⁴ Unquestioningly, the combat power of the Russian Armed Forces has increased significantly but has the all-inclusive sustainable reforms been achieved?

Military reform is a comprehensive process which embraces core political, economic, and social questions. It involves establishment of meaningful civilian control over the Armed

Forces including deciding optimum size, improving working condition and ensuring social security of the Armed Forces. Without resilient civilian-political control over the defence institutions, true military reform is likely to remain unattainable. In case of Russia, though the reforms were progressing well under Serdyukov, the next Defence Minister Shoigu took some backward steps within the area of civil-military relations. He started wearing the rank and uniform of General as the Defence Minister and appointed more military personnel in the MOD removing civilians from those appointments that deteriorated the civil-military relation. Due to this backward steps, analysts viewed 'Shoigu's taking over as Defence Minister' to be the end of meaningful military reform in Russia.³⁵ An analytical look towards military reforms of Russia discloses the main roadblocks that hinder Russia's aspiring military reform objectives: state of civil-military relations including political understanding of reform; systemic corruption and resistance to institutional transformation in the Armed Forces, demographic trends that hinders the idea of abolishing conscription, unhealthy working condition within the military.³⁶ It is necessary to have a detailed look at the issues listed above including their consequence to develop a better understanding of the Russian military reform.

Political Understanding of Reform and Civil-Military Relation in Russia

While Yeltsin did not get him involved in the military reform at all, Putin and his administration segregated military reform from other issues in its implementation and could not comprehend that the military is part of the society not an isolated entity.³⁷ In general terms this isolated view approached reforms in general understanding of: strength reduction, weaponry modernisation and terminating conscription.³⁸ There was never any blueprint for reform. Political leaders exercised very little control over reform that they practically left to the Military Generals to accomplish.³⁹ The military also did not follow any deliberate planning process to decide the feasible reform; mostly the decisions used to be taken by a group of influential generals who were biased towards promoting or safeguarding own interests. An influential circle of military officers used to work out the reform agendas that were barely supported by feasibility analysis or any research base.⁴⁰ Generally, Russia rather than thoughtful transformations took ad-hoc system of military reform with insincere solutions that resulted in retaining large armed forces with a top heavy command structure. This type of structure was suitable for warfare like World War II (1939-45) that Russia is unlikely to face in future.⁴¹

In the Soviet era civilian control over the military was very strong.⁴² After the demise of Soviet-union, the party based control disappeared and the civilian authorities of Russia could not establish effective control over the military and military started functioning without required degree of legislative governance. Therefore, Russia's Civil-Military

Relations (CMR) started its journey with a crucial defect. According to Huntington, the features of CMR include: military's recognition of its limited area of "professional competence," military's acceptance of the civil and political leaders' authority over them, political leaders' respect for the autonomy of the armed forces and limited involvement between the political and military spheres.⁴³ Russia's CMR lacks almost all of these dynamics. Three mileposts in the path of institutional decay of Russia's CMR: Gorbachev's approval of military's participation in politics, Yeltsin's acceptance of continuation of the same and Putin's restoration of complete presidential control over the military. The institutional decay resulted in the evolution of the concept of superpresidential authoritarianism where civil control over the military practically transformed to presidential control.⁴⁴

In Russia, MOD and General Defence Staff have continually functioned as equivalent entities.⁴⁵ This is a hindrance to exercising civilian oversight on military. The State Duma's (lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) capability to oversee the activities of Russia's military leaders is also limited.⁴⁶ This absence of functional legislative oversight on military has enhanced Kremlin's personal level of control over military.⁴⁷ As such implementation of defence reform has almost become mostly a presidential matter whether be implemented actually or not. Under the super-presidential arrangement, the presidents have not concentrated on developing military as an effective institution that may potentially challenge President's authority later. Rather the unethical practice of appointing top brass of the military by president without taking consent of parliament is continuing. Presidents have been using the General Staff and the Armed Forces for achieving own ends even by pacifying military and even accommodating corruption. Putin's division of the country in accordance to former military districts sounds like an appeasement of military in Kremlin's authority exercising.⁴⁸

Distinct absence of civilian in the defence management system is a major impediment in developing a balanced civil-military relation in Russia. There exists very limited place for civilians in the defence management system but military is represented well in the key organizations of civilian oversight. Probably, the paucity of civilian expertise on military matters due to systemic non-exposure to detailed military matters is a reason for such poor representation.⁴⁹ But, it seems that lack of political desire can be responsible for this as well since there had been no visible effort in last decades to create civilian experts in the field of military. For this reason may be, 7 out of 11 important posts in the MOD are still held by military.⁵⁰ The civilians holding positions in the MOD hardly possess any authority to argue over the military decisions. There is basically no oversight of the military issues except interference from the president to whom military remains an instrument of political power. The supreme authority is still now placing importance on

technological advancement of the military putting institutional reform to lower priority, without which sustainable reform will remain a far cry.

Military's Resistance to Institutional Transformation

Russia's Government and Military have established "conflict of interest" that threatens to upset military reform. The main topic of disagreement is that the government continues to seek a lean fighting force while the Military is in favour of Soviet style mass military.⁵¹ With its strong resistance capability, the Russian military has been successful in persuading the government to accept its exaggerated threat assessment and necessity of maintaining large Armed Forces. It is alleged that to this end, like Soviet times General Staff has been unduly using Russian military intelligence network to portray an exaggerated level of threat from the west to the political leadership and persuaded them to continue with the high percentage of defence expenditure.⁵²

The issue of 'gradually terminating conscription' has been pronounced in all the reform plans. But the top brass of the military was never in favour of moving away from conscription and continued to resist the idea of conversion to contract army propounding that Russia never had a contract based army and still not yet prepared for such conversion and a small army would not be able to defend the country against physical aggression like WWII. Russia's strategic culture of seeing them as a worldly power also played a role in maintaining a large army. Under such setting, even after the plan to reduce the Armed Forces, recently Putin decided to increase the strength again. There are other precedences where military was able to revert political decision on reforms, e.g., Serdyukov's reversal of the decision made to curtail number of officers in the Army and Shoigu's decision to bring back the abolished rank of Warrant Officer.⁵³ Therefore, undesired resistance from military to drag the reform efforts will remain a major concern in the coming days.

Systemic Corruption in the Military

Rampant military corruption is one of the key hindrances to the reform implementation. In 2003, the top brass of the Russian military was involved in corruption amounting 43 billion Rubles; allegedly they had been accumulating huge wealth by misappropriating procurement and construction funds. The issue of extensive use of conscript soldiers for personal needs was a well accepted practice and was not considered as corrupt action.⁵⁴ Corruption went so widespread that even President Putin once in his address to the Federal Assembly stated it to be an area of serious concern.⁵⁵ Systemic corruption prevails in different forms within military tiers. It ranges from presenting wrong information to grabbing money. For example, the military authority very often wrongly

projects the number of personnel serving in the Russian Military.⁵⁶ Officers at many levels corruptly manipulate the number of personnel thereby grab the extra money claimed against the fictitious manpower.⁵⁷ The practice of paying salaries in cash has enabled this unethical practice within the military installations.⁵⁸ In the field of military procurement, it is assumed that at least 20 per cent of expenses are directed towards unplanned purposes and substantial misappropriation takes place through exploitation of the contractors.⁵⁹

Indifferent views of Russian leadership towards corrupt acts and to some extent accommodating corruption have practically fueled corruption. For example, General Aleksandr Pereliakin who was deported from his position in UN mission in Croatia, for allegation of corruption, never faced any legal action at home.⁶⁰ Rather he was rewarded with a special appointment in Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.⁶¹ Over the period corruption continued to increase and in 2012 financial cost of corruption increased 450 percent than that of the previous year.⁶² Corruption have eaten away the core values of the Armed Forces so badly that Russian commanders even do not hesitate to get involved in corruption in operational zone. Corrupt action of Viktor Kravchuk, Commander of the Baltic Fleet back in 2012 can be referred to this end. Kravchuk allegedly spent elsewhere or misappropriated the money allocated for the construction of barracks, housing, and other facilities for 11th Army Corps.⁶³ A worse example can be cited where two officers misappropriated approximately 4 million Ruble from the soldiers' money in Lipstek Air Base in 2011.⁶⁴ As a whole, failure to reform the monopolistic structure of the industry, lack of transparency in procurement and absence of proper oversight and accountability have allowed corruption to flourish impeding the desired level of reform of the military. In the present context of Russia, it is not easy to free the military from corruption where the regime itself is corrupt, where corruption has become the way of life.⁶⁵

Demographic Trends Impeding Idea of Abolishing Conscription

The idea of abolishing conscription in Russia has been mostly rhetoric because the politicians were never in consensus about that. It started from Yeltsin but did not even materialise under Putin;⁶⁶ because, conscripted troops are considered as a useful internal political means for Russia's authorities. But from the point of proficiency, is it really possible to build a professional army based on conscription? The answer is probably 'no'. Compulsory military service fundamentally reduces the motivation of soldiers. Ultimately, those who cannot 'slip-off' from being conscripted, land in the military. Conscripts in the military try to minimise difficulties and endeavour to maximise benefits. In contrast, professional soldiers have a completely different motivation. But, is it actually possible for Russia to give away conscription? With the targeted million plus

strength of the military and a negative demographic trend where the numbers of 18-27 years old population will decline by 2023 it seems a remote possibility. Military's necessity to compete with other security organs for getting better recruits substantiate the possibility further.⁶⁷ So far, the idea of replacing conscripts by contract soldiers did not materialise significantly because in the present day context army cannot attract the type of individuals it wants to enroll. On the other hand, conscripts cannot guarantee a technologically advanced army. A military organised with bulk of conscripts cannot reach to a level of professionalism required to fight the modern day technology heavy war. Perhaps, the solution lies in small professional armed forces that can be sustainably maintained within the demographic limitations and changing perception of the military in the society.

Hazing and Unhealthy Working Condition

The most alarming barrier to genuine military reform in Russia is abuse widely known as 'hazing' and '*dedovshchina*' (translates as "the rule of grandfathers") a brutal and a terrible way to guarantee discipline in Russian Army.⁶⁸ This malignant practice of severe human rights violation caused hundreds of soldiers to become deserter every year and get involved in criminal acts.⁶⁹ Serdyukov's reforms could decrease the length of conscription from 24 months to 12 months but failed to reduce '*dedovshchina*' and thereby failed to attract eligible youth towards conscription. Now-a-days, even mothers are not interested to see their boys conscripted; consequently mostly personnel with criminal background are landing as conscripts. For instance, in 2009 nearly 60 percent of the conscripted individuals had criminal records.⁷⁰ The cumulative effect of conscripting recruits having criminal pasts has adversely affected the professionalism and morale in the Russian Armed Forces. Hazing has also played its role in dissuading suitable individuals to join as contract soldiers. Though contract soldiers are not expected to come across harsh treatment like the conscripts, officers very often forget this constraint and abuse them. As such many of the contract soldiers are not renewing their contracts for this prevailing phenomenon of 'hazing'. Even many of the best non-commissioned officers have been leaving as soon as their contract expires showing the problem of '*dedovshchina*' as the main reason.⁷¹

After rounds of reform efforts the salary of the armed forces personnel has been raised but majority of servicemen feel that social conditions and living standards have not improved significantly.⁷² On the other hand, lower pay of the contract soldiers compared to their civil equivalent discourage them to get engaged in short-service contracts.⁷³ Consequently, to get adequate and suitable personnel Russian Military has recently followed the age old Soviet technique of forcing individuals to go to Ukraine to fight.

When the soldiers of the 33rd Brigade were not willing to fight in Ukraine, the military forced conscripts to sign as professional contract soldiers by exposing them to unbearable living condition for prolonged period. This does not commensurate with the idea of leadership to 'humanise' the military which is a foremost requirement for honest reform.

Some Recent Reform Data and Analysis

Russian political elites had never been in consensus about the type and pattern of military reform: mobilisation army or contract based professional army. This uncertainty was revealed through the diverging rate of reducing conscription and increasing contract soldiers at different times. After all the previous reform attempts to reduce the strength, Putin has declared to increase the strength of armed forces to 1.897 million.⁷⁴ To facilitate accomplishment of this target level, Deputy Defense Minister Tatyana Shevtsova declared in 2018 that military pay and pensions will increase four percent per annum in 2018, 2019, and 2020.⁷⁵ Question remains: will it be contributing to increase the number? The recent data on soldiers' enlistment and retention is not that encouraging. Approximately 100,000 shortages in enlisting non-conscript soldiers in 2017 and an average rate of 10,000 soldiers per year not renewing their contract give an indication that Russia is gradually getting away from forming a professional army.⁷⁶ Ultimately conscription may remain the only option as it enables greater ideological control over the command structures and political control over the military. Most probably, to establish such ideological control over military Putin's government has announced in February 2018, the decision to reinstate political administration in the armed forces like the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ Therefore, the true reform of Russian Army is likely to stall.

Conclusion

Reform process of the Russian Armed Forces has started in 1992 that is still continuing. In the initial years, military reform remained at the lowest tier of priority due to indifferent attitude of President Yeltsin and inappropriate understanding of reform needs. Reform agendas in general lacked required level of research, long term outlook and feasible implementation plan. Failure in the Chechen War of 1994 initiated new impetus in the reform initiatives but could not progress significantly due to Russia's economic challenges and military's resistance to change. After poor performance in 2008 Georgian war, the reform started in full swing, powered by substantial financing under Defence Minister Serdyukov. He accomplished many of his reform objectives but could not address the 'humanisation' aspect of the reform, an essential for meaningful reform. Under President's Putin close supervision and sufficient financial allocation the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces increased mentionably. They could also display the same

during annexation of Crimea in 2014 and effective joint actions in Syria. But the criticism remains that the success achieved are instantaneous not holistic and will not sustain if core issues remain unaddressed. In addition to increasing combat efficiency improving CMR, getting rid of culture of undue resistance from the military, eliminating corruption, improving working environment and diminishing image of military are major areas of concern. Above all these, true political desire will remain the key driving factor for successful reform.

The politicians were never in a consensus on what type of military Russia actually needs; rather the supreme authorities played with the civil-military relation to make it imbalanced. And in name of civilian control, Russia has long been practising presidential control of the Armed Forces that enabled the presidents to use military as an instrument of political power. Now, the military has decayed more as an institution instead of becoming efficient and the civilian control over military has gradually diminished. Without legislative oversight corruption has turned out to be a way of life. The corruption gradually has erased the basic military values and the military corrupt actions are taking place in operational areas also. Widespread hazing and '*dedovshchina*' could never be addressed which is dissuading suitable youths from joining military and tendency to avoid 'being conscripted' is on the rise. The negative demographic trend further deteriorated the intake ratio. At this juncture, the president's decision to increase the strength of the military is unlikely to be realised with whatever incentives offered. Ultimately the conscription is likely to remain the solution to maintain a large standing force. Otherwise Vladimir Putin's intention to establish political administrative control over the military can only be achieved through retaining conscription that is contrary to the pre-requisite of a professional army in the 21st century. Therefore, core concerns for Russia's military reforms may remain unaddressed at least in the near future.

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Brief Biography



Colonel Mohammad Sheraf Uddin Khan, afwc, psc, psc(j) was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery of Bangladesh Army on 29 November 1995. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) and National Defence College (NDC), Mirpur. He is also a graduate of Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), UK. He obtained his M.Sc. in Military Studies from Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP) and received Masters of Business Administration degree from Southeast University, Bangladesh. He accomplished his M.A. in Defence Studies from King's College of London, UK. During his service career, he served in a good number of units and institutions of Bangladesh Army in different capacities. He commanded an Artillery Regiment for two years. Colonel Sheraf also worked as General Staff Officer Grade One at Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTDOC), Bangladesh Army. He also served as a Directing Staff at DSCSC, Mirpur. As a Major he served as the General Staff Officer Grade Two (Coordination) to the Commandant, NDC, Mirpur. Colonel Sheraf loves poetry and has two books of poem as a repertoire of his publications. He is married to Mrs. Firoza Parveen and blessed with one son and one daughter. Presently he is serving as Senior Instructor at DSCSC, Mirpur. He may be contacted at sherafarmy@yahoo.com.

ACCELERATING REGIONAL COOPERATION BY DRIVING AWAY MAJOR HINDRANCE – SAARC PERSPECTIVE

Captain A F M Ahsan Uddin, (C), NPP, BCGMS, psc, BN

Abstract

Regional cooperation is one of the prime tools for any region to develop as a whole. Realizing the effectiveness and benefit of it, member countries of South Asia formed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Though SAARC has already passed 35 years, yet it couldn't progress much. There are many reasons of it. Lack of political will, bilateral issues, lack of economic cooperation and lack of trust are to name few. Among these, mistrust between the states, to some extent, it is the core issue as other problems originate from this. Few of the member countries really do not believe each other and there is high amount of enmity between some of them especially between the two key players. This has stalled the progress of SAARC and it is considered a 'Paper Tiger' and an organization of verbal commitments only. There are not much quantifiable achievements so far in SAARC other than the meetings. This mistrust and lack of confidence between the states originated since inception of SAARC. Thereby, this predicament is to be addressed before SAARC could progress further. Conflicts between the states, lack of political will, fear of domination by India and Pakistan, lack of economic cooperation are few main reasons for mistrust. If major states change their attitude positively, take some bold and proactive steps, mass awareness can be grown highlighting the benefits of regional cooperation and a trust building model can be implemented, then mistrust can be driven out and regional cooperation can progress further.

Introduction

The world's geopolitics and concept of international relation is changing day by day. Today, states are aspiring for common ties and regional cooperation which they perceive will yield benefits in economic, political, cultural and security fields. This cooperation also facilitates the states to develop surpassing their hostilities, enmities and conflicts. A good example of this is European Union following which, South Asian countries integrated themselves under South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for better future.¹

Since its inception, SAARC has passed a long way in terms of time but has not yet achieved fully its desired goals. South Asia has some unique characteristics. No other

region in the world has a greater affinity and similarity in terms of culture, history, tradition, language and, above all, poverty, than South Asia. However, the region has a deeper history of mutual mistrust too.² In fact, SAARC had experienced deep mistrust at the very outset between the key player India and Pakistan.³ Among other hindrances, this mistrust, as a major one, has prevented cooperation to grow up among the region.⁴ Also, due to other reasons, SAARC seems less-effective to ensure peace and development in the region compared to other regional organizations like EU and ASEAN.⁵

In comparison to other regional groupings, SAARC has achieved comparatively few tangible successes till now.⁶ This is due to the weak political will, suspicion and less practical cooperation among the member states. However, SAARC's existence has enabled region's political leaders to meet somehow regularly and sit for informal talks to address their mutual problems.⁷ This is one of the few major achievements of the organization. But yet SAARC has not performed as expected and to fulfill the high aspirations of its people, it will need to adopt a new strategic vision.⁸

SAARC could not achieve much progress yet due to many problems. It is perceived that most of the programs and achievements of SAARC exist on paper.⁹ SAARC does face some serious problems but could still play a useful role in South Asia if driven properly. The organization is facing many problems and its members have shown little willingness to increase their contributions to the association to address those meaningfully.¹⁰ This paper seeks to ascertain whether mistrust among the members, besides other issues, is a major hindrance for accelerating regional cooperation.

The paper will initially provide a bird's eye view on SAARC followed by its evaluation. Thereafter, major hindrances for lack of progress, primarily mistrust and its facets will be explained. Finally, perceived ways ahead will be discussed followed by concluding remarks and few recommendations.

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SAARC

Regional Cooperation and South Asia

Former Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh once mentioned, 'Regional cooperation should mean an opportunity for a free movement of people, goods, services and ideas'.¹¹ As a region, South Asia has some unique characteristics. It has an age old historical

Map 1: SAARC Countries



bonding, common colonial past, religious and cultural traditions, linguistic affinities, values and social norms.¹² There are also some differences in cultures and social systems of people here but fundamental spiritual values and ethical norms are common.¹³ Though these commonalities should have provided a solid ground for strong regional cooperation among these countries, but the growth of regionalism and cooperation has notably been absent in the post-colonial period which make the region a conflict zone. The same is reflected in a comment by an observer about South Asia as “a region without regionalism.”¹⁴

The South Asia region is Indo-centric (see MAP: 1).¹⁵ It is dominated by one major economic power- India. It accounts for at least three-fifths of SAARC’s area, population, GDP, and armed forces.¹⁶ India shares a land/maritime boundary with all the SAARC countries which makes it a pre-eminent power and key player.¹⁷ India is also a constant factor in most of the inter-state disputes within the region.¹⁸ This feature is so unique in a sense that, no single nation, large or populous, dominates Europe or South East Asia as does India in South Asia.¹⁹

The South Asia region has also lot of potentials. Since a region has a distinct identity and a legitimate structure of decision-making capability, thereby, an effective regional cooperation and integration will lead to conflict resolution within the member states and enhance welfare, social security and regional balance.²⁰ Realizing this, the SAARC was conceptualized.

It is evident that SAARC had to cross lots of hurdles and obstacles till now in terms of its progression and achievements. Most of the meetings that are held so far have invariably ended in deep disappointment and recriminations.²¹ Even the routine meetings could not be held in time for many instances (twelve summits were not held) due to bilateral contentious issues and probably for lack of trust and cooperation. Therefore, SAARC’s achievements and progress need to be critically analyzed to find out causes and draw lessons.

EVALUATION OF SAARC

Achievements

SAARC has already passed almost 35 years since inception. The fact that SAARC has existed since 1985 is an achievement in itself.²² During this tenure, it has widened as number of its members and observers has increased. It has also deepened as its institutional network and activities have increased.²³ There have been regular meetings


and irregular summits. Despite extremely difficult political circumstances, it has managed to create situations, institutions and forums where Heads of the States shake each other's hands. These meetings can also be seen as one of the SAARC's greatest successes. There are also a range of activities that have been carried out by SAARC in various meetings. It is understood that in terms of meetings, commitments and agreements, SAARC has addressed quite a wide area in the region. However, how much effective are those- is a question.

Failures

The failure of SAARC is also quite evident. Since its origin, it has experienced only limited growth in terms of institutional developments and programs implementation.²⁴ The then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned that SAARC glass is half empty and challenged the members to cooperate more.²⁵ In a similar tone, former Foreign Secretary of Nepal, Mr Bishwa Pradhan said, "many of the decisions are just in papers in the form of protocols, conventions, reports and studies."²⁶ This is because none of these activities and initiatives has had any major direct impact on strengthening the regional cooperation and integration process in the region. There is an increasing feeling that many of these acts are just initiated as summit rituals. Thereby, an array of literatures call SAARC as "Ritualistic", describes it as 'Suffocatingly slow' and criticizes it as a "Magnificent paper tiger", "Political white elephant", "Talk shop of no consequence", "A regional pastime", "Bureaucratic den", and so on.²⁷ These are criticized because till today, the visible and tangible achievement of the organization is very less. So far, the summits could not address and discuss the most important and major issues like political disputes among the states, water sharing and other issues which are technically avoided claiming to be bilateral issues.²⁸

There is not enough achievement in terms of trades and economy too. The intra-regional trade (see Figure 1) has been an insignificant four percent of its total trade which was eighteen percent in 1948.²⁹ It is also observed that there is not much achievement in terms of people-to-people contact, nor has there been any notable advance in social sector cooperation.³⁰ Member countries have not yet been able to meaningfully share even the basic information regarding suppression of terrorism. There is absence of bilateral agreement on extradition. The initiative of SAARC Food Security Reserve has also remained notional.³¹ It is to be mentioned here that most of these issues should have been achieved to a greater degree according to the envisaged roles and objectives of SAARC.

Figure 1: Intra-Regional Trade Share - EU, ASEAN, and SAARC



Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) Integration Indicators Database. Available: <http://aric.adb.org/indicator.php>, accessed 01 Jan 2020

The above discussions and arguments imply that SAARC has not yet achieved its desired goals and perceived objectives. After crossing quite a long way, still it is limping and remaining within the same boundary of conflicts, commitments, meetings and verbose discussions without creating some tangible outcomes. There are many reasons attribute to this. It seems that the members of SAARC have some good intentions and pragmatic thinking. For example, SAARC adopted trade arrangements and signed agreement even before ASEAN which was established 18 years before SAARC. However, ASEAN has taken the lead in economic integration and advanced well ahead of SAARC. This indicates that there are some issues among the SAARC members- maybe some sorts of suspicion or mistrust and fear; which actually cause a major barrier for its progress.

MAJOR HINDRANCE FOR LACK OF PROGRESS

Mistrust among the members of this region, as a major hindrance of SAARC, was originated even before the start/inception of SAARC itself. The earlier attempts before eighties were not successful due to the mistrust and apprehensions among the states.³² Afterwards, while the proposal of Bangladesh was promptly endorsed by Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bhutan, India and Pakistan were skeptical initially. India's fear

was that the smaller neighbours may regionalize bilateral issues and jointly put pressure against India. Whereas, Pakistan assumed that it might be an Indian strategy to organize others against Pakistan and ensure India's regional dominance and hegemony.³³ This counter suspicion between the two major powers of the region caused the delay of formation of SAARC. Formation of this regional cooperation also could not obliterate the levels of suspicion and mistrust among the neighbours.³⁴ Still, this lack of trust exists and resulted in a stalled regional cooperation.

The mistrust exists in almost all dimensions of the relation between the members be it political, economic, military, social or cultural. Due to lack of trust, there is no mutual agreement between the members as to what would be the guiding force for regionalism. There are not much shared values and norms. These ultimately resulted in an unimpressive progress of SAARC.³⁵ The deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion between some of the member states for historical and other reasons have impeded the regional progress.³⁶ The major causes, effects and dimensions of mistrust and suspicion are mentioned below:

- a. The political leadership of the region remains with suspicion and mistrust. As such, they have not shown any strong role or preference for an effective and vibrant secretariat or secretary general of SAARC.³⁷ Thereby, the functioning of SAARC and practical implementation of various programs lack behind. This is one of the major issues as the 'driver' of the SAARC is less effective.
- b. The lack of trust is deep-rooted between India and Pakistan due to absence of strong political will. Their mistrust, as a prime issue in SAARC, has cost both the countries in particular and the region as a whole.³⁸
- c. Existing suspicion in bilateral relations prevents legitimate trade and economic channels from functioning and performing effectively.³⁹ The failure of few recent SAARC summits, again an example of mistrust, means that the economic integration and connectivity remains a distant dream in SAARC.⁴⁰ This suspicion hampers effective multilateral economic cooperation and compels states to resort to bilateral, sub-regional and extra-regional cooperation instead of intra-regional one.⁴¹ The BIMST-EC, BRICS and similar organizations are example of this.
- d. Overwhelming influence of a particular country in terms of geography, politics and economic might could be a cause of mistrust in a region. SAARC is predominantly driven by India's size, GDP, growth and other issues. Smaller

neighbours of India have a common feeling that India's policies and behavior are like big brother and hegemonic and her mighty economic strength would cripple their domestic industries.⁴²

e. The inter-country conflicts in South Asia like border issues, water sharing issues, Maoist issues, Tamil issue and many other including territorial disputes point towards the mistrust and suspicion between these countries.⁴³

f. The prevailing arms race and high military expenditure of the members also contribute towards lack of trust and apprehension. Most South Asian view India as 'aggressively militaristic'. Thereby, they have a fear of dominion by India.⁴⁴

g. The South Asians suffer from lack of solidarity and cohesiveness which resulted in weak South Asian Community feeling. This is primarily because the people have less friendship, trust, interaction and cooperation between them.⁴⁵

The mistrust and suspicion among the states in South Asia was and is prevailing since long. Presence of the regional organization has not yet been able to diminish the historical irritants, conflicts and level of mistrust between its members.⁴⁶ This suspicion and mistrust serve as a stumbling block for some tangible progress in regional cooperation and taking SAARC ahead towards its anticipated destination.⁴⁷

WAYS FORWARD

In order to make SAARC a success and accelerate regional cooperation, it is important to drive away mistrust which is prevailing among the member states. The various options as way forward to accelerate SAARC are briefly explained in subsequent paragraphs.

Changing Attitude of Major Powers

The two major powers, India and Pakistan can bring dramatic advancement to SAARC if they change their attitude positively. They have to realize that their bilateral enmity is somehow putting the overall progress of the regional cooperation in question. They need to have a strong and positive political will to forget their rivalries and look for common interest and common approach for resolving issues. If they change their political stance, rigid policy, blame game and inimical attitude towards each other, the region will find some ways out and dynamics of regional cooperation will change vividly.

Open and Broad-minded Proactive Actions by the Major States

Since smaller members of SAARC are somehow skeptical and fearful about domination by the major powers, thereby, they (major powers) have to take some drastic actions to minimize or drive away that fear. They need to take some pro-active stance and innocent positive steps through bilateral/multilateral interactions so that smaller members believe their good intentions. They might voluntarily approach to other members to acquire their confidence.

Sacrificing Attitudes by the Member States

The member states need to adopt sacrificing attitude towards each other for the overall benefit of the region. They need to forget their smaller losses or gains and think big. The members must realize that their small collective sacrifice of minor gains and acceptance of temporary losses will accrue larger benefit and build trust and bonding between them which is essential for accelerating regional cooperation.

Refrain from Misusing the Forum

The member states need to remove their hidden agenda (if any) of utilizing the SAARC forum for their own purpose under the canvas of regional cooperation. There are opinions that there were hidden agendas perceived by both India and Pakistan as the blame game of 'smaller states are being ganged up against them' started with the proposal of formation of SAARC. Since then, the members were cynic that both the major powers have their hidden agendas. Thereby, to build trust and confidence, both India and Pakistan need to remove the hidden agenda if they have any. Other member states also need to refrain from misusing the regional forum for their individual gain.

Pragmatic Thinking that no Single Nation can Really Dominate

Members of SAARC need to believe that in this present-day context, it is very difficult for a single nation to dominate over other independent nations. This belief will help them to build more trust and confidence among them. In the contemporary world, it is not possible for a single nation to take control of the other very easily. There can be mutual cooperation without dominating or threatening other nations.

Setting out Specific Terms for Economic Cooperation

Effective economic cooperation is one of the strongest tools for sustaining good regional cooperation. This will prevent other contentious issues to take lead and jeopardize

economic cooperation between nations. Lessons need to be learned from ASEAN, where members have contended their bilateral issues and increased their intra-trade and economic cooperation thinking for the overall benefit of the region.

Inclusion of Bilateral and Contentious Issues in Agenda

One of the core problems and reasons for mistrust is various bilateral and contentious issues among the members of which, problem between India and Pakistan is most prominent. Inclusion of these issues in the charter and agenda of SAARC will provide avenue for the other members to negotiate and act as a mediator. It is to be understood here that it is far better to sit and negotiate various issues and decide amicably within the regional context other than bringing someone outsider. Naturally, no outsider other than the members of the region will be in a better position to analyze and solve issues of the region effectively.

Growing Awareness

The region of SAARC had a glorious past when most of the countries were united. It is only after separation many inter-state conflicts and problems started/escalated as mutual suspicion became prominent. Members are not realizing that remaining as a regional entity, keeping the sanctity and sovereignty of each nation intact, can bring tremendous benefit and progress for the region as a whole and states in particular. A general awareness needs to be grown among the people of SAARC by mass campaign, advertising, education, seminar and symposium, workshop, films, social linkage, media campaign and other means highlighting the benefits of regionalization and detriments of its absence. The young generation of the region needs to be engaged to foster such sense of community.


Role of India

As the largest role player of SAARC in terms of economic might, political stability and military capability, India needs to play some proactive role to earn confidence and build trust with other members. It is true that many of the problems and issues in SAARC are somehow originated or linked with India. Thereby, only some broad, sacrificing, unconditional and positive actions by India can reduce the existence of mistrust and suspicion in the area and progress the regional cooperation further. India may act like 'Elder Brother', not 'Big Brother' in the region.

Adopting a SAARC Trust Building Model

A SAARC Trust Building Model (see Figure 2), can be adopted to drive away the mistrust among the members. To address the major hindrance, there will be five pillars for building trust among the members. The positive role playing by India will act as a tonic to this. Once these pillars are well accepted, positively perceived and meaningfully implemented by all the members, then mistrust among the nations will be reduced and cooperation will be increased which will ultimately lead SAARC towards a success. However, if these pillars are not perceived positively and implemented, then mistrust prevails and regional cooperation becomes poor. This will make SAARC a failure and member states will then look for extra-regional cooperation. A strong and effective SAARC secretariat will monitor the progress of the model and take corrective measures.

Figure 2: SAARC Trust Building Model



Source: Author's Construct

Conclusion

Regional cooperation is essential for a region to progress and get developed. As South Asia has some uniqueness as a region with many commonalities and potentials, SAARC was formed keeping this view. However, SAARC has not yet achieved much tangibly though many meetings have taken place. Most of the meetings ended with lots of commitments, treaties and agreements. But nothing much have been realized in true sense. A vivid example is that the trade among the SAARC states is far less than that of any other regional organizations like EU or ASEAN. Though the existence of SAARC is an achievement by itself but the expectations and reality are far away from each other. Apart from many other reasons, mistrust and suspicion among the members is one of the major hindrance for SAARC not being progressed well.

Mistrust among the members was prevailing even before the existence of SAARC. The proposal of SAARC by Bangladesh was not well accepted right away by India and Pakistan as they were skeptic that this forum may be used by the smaller states against them. Extremely poor relation between the two major states, India and Pakistan, various disputes and conflicts between the members (border crisis, river sharing, insurgency, political etc.), overwhelming influence of India are few of the facts and causes for mistrust. Due to these, member states are resorting to extra-regional cooperation and trades instead of intra-regional one. Thereby, the region is not progressing as expected. This mistrust needed to be driven away for the SAARC to be a success.

In order to accelerate regional cooperation through SAARC, mistrust and level of suspicion need to be removed and confidence need to be developed among the members. As India and Pakistan are the major powers in SAARC, they need to step forward, change their attitude positively, take some open and broad-minded actions, sacrifice their small gains and accept minor losses. In addition to them, other member states should also think regionally and not individualistic, remove their hidden agenda (if any) of using the forum for own purpose, be refrain from misusing the forum and think logically that it is not quite easy to dominate others. One of the important steps to reduce mistrust could be inclusion of bilateral issues in the SAARC charter. Other core issues to increase trust is enhancing intra-trade and growing mass awareness regarding the benefits of regional community. As the largest stakeholder, India can also play some vital role to help increase the level of trust. Overall, the proposed 'SAARC Trust Building Model' can be conceptualized and implemented for reducing mistrust and building confidence. Once this is done and mistrust is removed, the region will advance and progress towards greater cooperation and success. The anticipated objective of SAARC will then become real and fulfilled.

Recommendations

Following recommendations are made:

- a. The major players of SAARC, India and Pakistan may take some broad, bold, positive, and tangible steps by changing their attitude and sacrificing their minor gains and accepting losses (some disputes may be settled immediately).
- b. Economic cooperation through increasing intra-regional trade can be enhanced by specifying terms and sacrificing all issues for the sake of regional development. Then the members will be compelled to increase trust.
- c. Mass awareness may be grown among the citizen of SAARC through media campaign, seminar, movie, talk show, inclusion of subjects in study etc. regarding the benefits of regional community.
- d. Bilateral and contentious issues may be included in the SAARC charter so that the issues be solved by the members themselves amicably without inviting outsiders.
- e. As a largest member, India may play more vibrant, positive and sacrificing role alone to build confidence and trust.
- f. A 'SAARC Trust Building Model' can be perceived, conceptualized and implemented by the concerned authority in order to build confidence and enhance cooperation.

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Brief Biography



Captain A F M Ahsan Uddin, (C), NPP, BCGMS, psc, BN was commissioned on 01 Jan 1998 in Executive branch from Royal Malaysian Naval Academy. He completed his specialization on Communication from Signal School, Kochi, India. He served onboard various ships of Bangladesh Navy in different capacities. Some of his appointments include Commanding Officer of two fast attack craft and a LPC, Executive Officer of an Offshore Patrol Vessel, other smaller craft and a corvette. The officer also served in Bangladesh Coast Guard as Assistant Director and Staff Officer (Operation) and awarded with Bangladesh Coast Guard Medal for gallantry performance. He took part in the UN mission as a Military Police with Force Bangladesh MP (MONUC), D R Congo. He has done his first Staff Course in DSCSC, Mirpur, Bangladesh and second one in DSSC, Wellington, India. He served as Directing Staff in DSCSC, Mirpur. Presently, he is serving as Commanding Officer of BNS SOMUDRA AVIJAN. He was awarded with Nou Parodorshita Padak (NPP), a peacetime medal for his meritorious service in BN.

PREPAREDNESS FOR SUSTAINED BAF OPERATION IN CBRN (CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR) ENVIRONMENT

Squadron Leader KM Shaikh Bin Zaman, psc, Engg

Abstract

In recent years, the threat of use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapon by both state and non-state actors is indeed becoming a reality with the changing geopolitical environment. Moreover, the unpleasant relationship between regional nuclear powers with CBRN weapon engagement probability bears the risk for Bangladesh falling victim to CBRN fallout being in the geographic proximity. On the other hand, Bangladesh is exposed to chemical risks being a highly industrialized suburb. Additionally, Bangladesh emerging as a developing country is on the verge of operationalizing country's first own Nuclear Power Plant. Accidental explosion of such chemical/nuclear plants at the proximity brings possibility of CBRN catastrophe due to environmental degradation. Under such catastrophic environment, physical and psychological stress may affect operational efficiency of military forces. Therefore, survival and sustained BAF operation would be challenging due to the consequences of radiation, shock travel and contamination. Thus, plausible CBRN defence measures are necessary for BAF to operate in such high risk environment. Unfortunately, BAF is yet to attain any state of preparedness to survive-to-operate under such catastrophe due to lack of capacity in terms of training, infrastructure and equipment. Although there remain few challenges, BAF may build capacity through short term and long term planning to attain desired level of preparedness. Achieving desired CBRN defence capability through training, force protection, casualty management, passive defence, provisioning, equipment and TO&E for specialist team will ensure sustained BAF operations while maintaining operational efficiency with better survivability of BAF elements in CBRN environment.

Introduction

In the modern concept, warfare may be termed as a range of hostile actions designed to weaken a state by coherent execution of all means to bring about sufficient adherence to a nation's will. Modern strategists have speculated that this may take the form of global nuclear war, environmental degradation through spreading out chemical or radioactive agents, genetically engineered virus as biological weapons, or even pandemics. As British Astrophysicist Stephen Hawking aptly quips, "Life on Earth is at the ever-increasing risk

of being wiped out by a disaster, such as sudden global nuclear war, a genetically engineered virus or other dangers we have not yet thought of.”

In recent years, the threat of the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapon is indeed becoming a reality. These threats are evolving rapidly alongside changes in the geopolitical environment and developments in technology.¹

Although this awareness is recent, the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents dates back to the dawn of world war history. At times, their use has influenced the very outcome of a battle or even that of an entire war, like nuclear bombing over Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII. For more than two decades after the end of cold war, CWC in 1997 with agreement on BWC suggested that the world might have put the issue of CBRN weapons behind. But, in recent years, the use of CBRN weapons by both state and non-state actors has underlined how complex the challenge of achieving the permanent elimination of CBRN threat would be. Presently, many states possessing CBRN arsenals are modernizing them to exert global or regional influence. Several recent attacks using toxic chemicals and radioactive materials by non-state actors or terrorism suggested a new concern. The accidental explosion of nuclear power plant or chemical stockpile in the recent days also posted significant CBRN proliferation threat due to environmental degradation.²

The unresolved regional issues and unpleasant relationship between nuclear powers like India, Pakistan and China raise the possibility of engaging nuclear weapons in case of desperate attempts to solve their disputes, albeit ‘no first use’ policy. The region would be also at the severe risk of environmental degradation due to CBRN proliferation and its fallout. Being in the geographic proximity, Bangladesh may fall victim of collateral damage and aftermath of such catastrophe. On the other hand, uranium exploration and allegation of building chemical weapons production facility by the southeast neighbour, Myanmar generates a significant CBRN threat in the form of at least non-state actors. Additionally, Bangladesh being on the verge of operationalizing country’s first Nuclear Power Plant at Ruppur cannot rule out the possibilities of CBRN catastrophe due to accidental propagation.

The consequences of CBRN emergencies may stretch over a wider area than expected. Under such catastrophic and highly unpredictable environment, sustained military operation would be challenging for any forces. Therefore, survival and sustained operation of Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) would be challenging due to physical and psychological distress, denial of the use of fixed sites such as airbases and staging areas, or massive casualties resulting force withdrawal by the consequences of radiation, shock

travel and contamination. Unfortunately, BAF is yet to develop any sort of preparation due to non-availability of adequate awareness, knowledge, training, equipment and infrastructure to sustain under CBRN environment.

Sustained operation is the capability to conduct smooth operation under any circumstances. For achieving this, a certain level of preparedness in CBRN defence is desirable. This desired level for BAF as an organization must ensure survive-to-operate in case CBRN catastrophe by CBRN defence capability. In such scenario, BAF needs to provide a coordinated response to maintain operational effectiveness while ensuring a plausible CBRN defence measures for survival and sustained operation in a high risk CBRN environment.

PERCEIVED CBRN THREATS, PROBABILITY AND IMPACT ON SUSTAINED BAF OPERATIONS

Regional Threat

The proliferation of NBC weapons programs began in the third world since 1960s. These programs reached maturity in the 1980s when chemical and toxin weapons were used on the battlefields in Middle East and Southeast Asia. These programs were expanded with the increase in production and stockpiling of chemical warfare agents and the establishment of biological warfare programs all over the world in 1990s. So, these factors increase the possibility of CBRN weapons use in conflicts between Third World states.³

India's rivalries with China and Pakistan have been the driving forces behind CBRN proliferation in South Asia. All these countries maintain a considerable stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile material to build additional nuclear weapons in time of need. This bears enough possibilities of using nuclear weapons to solve their disputes. In case of such escalation, the region would be at the severe risk of environmental degradation due to CBRN proliferation and its aftermath. Although Myanmar is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, undertaking uranium exploration and interest towards nuclear energy pose a foreseeable regional threat in future.⁴

China signed the BWC in 1984, but has possibly continued its BW program to produce infectious agents. China's CW program includes a wide variety of agents and delivery systems. China is also a significant supplier of nuclear, chemical, and missile related technology to the third world, particularly to Pakistan.⁵

Non Traditional Threat

Terrorists have always been targeting the Military forces, as well as the civilians. However, in March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway is a well-known example. These non-state groups are most likely to use CBRN weapons with selected membership and non-mainstream ideologies.⁶ Military operations, especially air operations are more difficult when a CBRN capable enemy can deny the use of staging areas or force the personnel into protective gears. Movement, communications, maintenance, flying activities or even the simplest jobs become immensely difficult in a CBRN environment. As such, nontraditional engagement of CBRN weapon by sponsored or non-state actors may hinder operational efficiency to a great extent if intended.


Accidental Proliferation

CBRN incidents are inherently multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional. Any natural calamity or artificial emergency situation may occur any time to bring emergencies affecting lives, property and the environment. The rapidly industrializing developing nations supposedly having number of Chemical and Nuclear Plants pose a significant risk of CBRN catastrophe due to accidental explosion, artificial or natural disaster at those areas.

The Expanding CBRN Threats

The scope of CBRN threats is expanding responding to changes in the form of direct attack, terrorism, accidental and other forms with significant development of scientific technologies (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Multidimensional Nature of Expanding CBRN Threats



Source: Institute for Defense Studies, 2015

Analysis on CBRN Threat Perspective for BAF

Direct Attack from State Actors: In future war scenario, a nuclear power state may not use any nuclear weapon against non-nuclear Bangladesh. However, in case of war near situation with an aggressor own forces may have to operate under the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, CBRN potential aggressors also have modern delivery means includes aircraft, missiles, rockets and artillery canons with nuclear capability with high range. BAF personnel, assets and infrastructures such as Ops room, runway, airfield, depot, fuel storage etc are lucrative targets for the potential adversary, which are not out of the ranges of a CBRN attack by state actors due to modern weapon like ICBM, ALCM, CM or SSM by virtue of their strategic reach with CBRN warhead.

Direct Attack from Non-State Actors: Besides the state actors CBRN weapon employment by the non-state actors such as terrorists, criminal organizations or individuals with motivation of harming Bangladesh's national interest cannot be completely overruled. Air Bases near populated area are also well within the reach of any improvised mortar or rocket projectiles by any non-state actor's indigenous employment of CBRN warhead. Also, clandestine method through IED, postal mail etc may pose more CBRN hazard considering fatality and effect on personnel.

CBRN Fallout due to Warring Neighbours: Bangladesh lives in a region where two countries are declared nuclear power states, and maintains a considerable stockpile of nuclear warheads and are generally credited with having sufficient fissile materials to build additional nuclear weapons in time of need. They also maintain enormous technical and industrial capabilities to produce Chemical and Biological weapon at short notice if the situation demands. Thus, BAF may have to operate in CBRN environment due to the indirect threat of CBRN fallout because of geographic proximity if these two nuclear power states in the region are involved in any major war and eventually escalates into CBRN weapon engagement.

Accidental CBRN Fallout in the Proximity: BAF Base Zahurul Haque at Patenga, Chattogram may suffer environmental degradation due to chemical fallout in the area due to its location in the adjacent areas of existing Chemical plants and industries. Moreover, in future any unwanted calamity at the Nuclear Power Plant at Ruppur may lead to severe environmental degradation. This dreadful condition may be spread by shock wave, wind travel or downstream river flow towards operation areas in BAF Bases depending on the strength and volume of emergency. This may ultimately lead to national emergency where BAF may also need to provide air operation support in that area too.

Impact on BAF Sustained Operation

CBRN emergencies occur as a result of occupational exposure, fire, explosion and release of toxicants. BAF is yet to prepare against any kind of CBRN catastrophe. In case of any CBRN proliferation, BAF operations may suffer depending on the intensity of catastrophe. A disastrous situation implies severe disruption, contamination, environmental degradation and survivability of personnel. This may ultimately lead to cause serious injury or death by CBRN exposures and aftermath of a catastrophe. The added psychological and physical stress will affect flying, maintenance and logistic activities. It would normally hinder day to day operation of BAF when the survivability as a force is at stake.⁷ The situation would further worsen with resource constraints and lack of preparation. As a whole, operational efficiency and sustainment would be jeopardized. BAF has to look for the best ways to mitigate the potential impact of mass casualty and CBRN emergencies.

PREPAREDNESS FOR SUSTAINED BAF OPERATIONS IN CBRN ENVIRONMENT

Importance of Developing Preparedness: While considering the geo-strategic environment, BAF must not only be prepared to survive, but also be able to operate in such an environment for a considerable period of time. Along with this, BAF must also maintain effective and sustained C3I to accomplish her missions. CBRN attacks or incidents may deny the use of fixed sites such as BAF Bases, or inflict massive casualties and force withdrawal. The risk of catastrophic consequences to BAF personnel and infrastructure further with CBRN proliferation is far reaching by the effect of radiation, shock travel and contamination. Additionally, BAF may need to operate in high risk environment, where the CBRN fall out affect will exist. BAF need to build capacity to combat CBRN emergencies to continue operations while maintaining operational efficiency and sustainability by ensuring survival.

Existing Preparedness of BAF: BAF is yet to develop any sort of CBRN combat capability in any of the Bases or Units. No step has been taken to carry out any study to assess the requirement for a suitable CBRN defence. No basic knowledge, training or equipment is provided to the BAF personnel at any level regarding survival or carrying out normal operation in a CBRN hazard break out. BAF is yet to develop appropriate measures for detection, decontamination, damage control, or take any protection measures for personnel safety to ensure CBRN defence. There is no separate entity even to deal with CBRN hazards for BAF. Thus, BAF is still not well prepared and sure to defend or deal with such threat or incident. Considering security of a developing air force, some sorts of preparation is required based on probable risk outcome.

SWOT Analysis: The SWOT analysis is carried out to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to develop the proposal for achieving the desired level of CBRN defence capability to sustain operation. The model is given below: -

Table 1: SWOT Matrix

SWOT Matrix	Strengths	Weaknesses
Opportunities	<u>S-O Strategies.</u> - Force Structure - Operational Efficiency - Survivability - Sustained Operation (Non-nuclear environment)	<u>W-O Strategies.</u> - Awareness, Knowledge - Training, Doctrine - Infrastructure (Avoidance, Protection and decontamination facilities) - CBRN Response Team/TO&E
Threats	<u>S-T Strategies.</u> Adversary's CBRN employment	<u>W-T Strategies.</u> - Financial Allocation - Planning, Priority

Source: Author's Construct

The BAF CBRN capability development SWOT analysis is as follows:

- a. **Strengths:** BAF is a well-established organization which has a force structure capable of maintaining its operational efficiency, survivability in non-nuclear combat environment. So, BAF has a firm base to develop CBRN defence capability.
- b. **Weakness:** In a CBRN environment, BAF does not have capability to protect her elements. BAF is not aware and knowledgeable enough to combat any CBRN emergencies. Personnel and equipment are also vulnerable to CBRN catastrophe due to lack of infrastructure, shielding, decontamination and medical facilities as well as absence of well-trained CBRN response team.
- c. **Opportunities:** By setting the priority and accepting the CBRN occurrence probability, BAF may develop the CBRN defence capability by provisioning necessary manpower and equipment, conducting training, recruiting specialist, and building infrastructure.
- d. **Threats:** CBRN offensive capability of potential adversary poses significant threat with medium or low probability. Although CBRN equipment

and infrastructure development involve high cost, BAF needs to prioritize to build effective CBRN defence to counter such threat.

Desired Level of Preparedness for Sustained Operation

Nuclear weapons cause casualties through blast, heat, and radiation effects. Biological and chemical weapons cause serious injury or death and restrict the use of affected area or equipment. To counter these effects, CBRN Preparedness in respect of BAF may be in the form of CBRN defence. CBRN defence requires cognizance of the principles of CBRN defence, i.e. avoidance, protection, and decontamination.⁸

Keeping these principles in mind, the existing capability of BAF and suggests suitable measures to develop her own CBRN defence. Thus, BAF should have following CBRN defence capability to combat CBRN emergency and sustain operations.⁹:-

- a. Specially trained CBRN response team.
- b. Risk assessment, warning, hazard prediction, detection and reporting.
- c. EMP hardening and survivability.
- d. CBRN defence equipment.
- e. Force protection and passive measures.
- f. Collective protection.
- g. Decontamination of personnel and equipment.
- h. Medical countermeasures and casualty management.
- j. Coordination with other agencies .

This desired level of CBRN defence once achieved will enable BAF and its personnel to survive under direct localized CBRN attack and indirect effect of CBRN fallout. BAF will be able to react immediately and will not be caught unprepared by any sudden employment of CBRN weapon. Thus, the survivability and subsequent CBRN combat actions will contribute to sustained BAF operation.

CHALLENGES, MITIGATION AND WAYS FORWARD

The desired level of CBRN defence preparedness and operations in a CBRN environment place great demands on the leadership at all level. Once Bases/Units have survived a CBRN attack, they may have to operate under CBRN conditions for an extended period. Reducing CBRN casualties, performing combat tasks with minimum degradation of personnel and equipment and operating under the threat of or use of such weapons pose major constraints and challenges for BAF.

Challenges

Priority: Keeping many developments in focus for Forces Goal -2030, BAF has not yet planned to develop CBRN defence capability. Due to low threat probability and priority, BAF has not given due importance on this issue. This low threat probability may give a false indication on the requirement of preparedness. However, this issue needs to be brought into picture. This unpreparedness may inspire potential adversary that even a small attack can cause considerable amount of damage. The personnel may suffer a complete shock and undergo panic situation due to lack of knowledge and near zero preparedness of CBRN. Thus, the operational effectiveness may be severely affected. To avoid such situation, due priority has to be given.

Doctrine: A time tested war fighting doctrine provides definitive guidelines to the forces for successful planning and execution of operations. BAF's operational Draft Doctrine does not have any guidelines regarding CBRN issues. An appropriate doctrine is essential to meet the added challenges of such operations in CBRN environment. The doctrine should provide the necessary guidelines on survive-to-operate for BAF in a CBRN catastrophe.

Training: It is fact that, there is lack of knowledge on CBRN defence actions prevailing amongst all the members of BAF due to less exposure to this topic. BAF's training system focuses on planning and execution of operations in conventional non-nuclear environment. No formal training is also provided at any level of the training on CBRN. Maintaining military preparedness in peacetime for potential operations in CBRN environment demands training requirement of forces.

Infrastructure and Equipment: Operations in CBRN environments place unique demands on military infrastructure and equipment requirements. Planning for BAF sustained operations at all Bases/Units will inherently include provisions for manpower, specialized equipment, shield rooms, CBRN safe rooms in the Base/Units, personal

protection gears, medical and health service support facilities, decontamination equipment etc. Presently, BAF does not have any such facilities.


External Support: In Bangladesh, Fire Service and Civil Defence is responsible to handle any sort of disaster. But their capability to fight CBRN emergency is limited to chemical disaster only. Moreover, support from the organization to BAF in CBRN catastrophe is unlikely or limited due to their resource constraints.

Budget: The requirement for capacity building through training, establishment of specialized entity and development of infrastructure against CBRN attack places significant burdens on the budget due to high cost. However, commanders at all levels will have to include CBRN aspects in planning in the conduct of operations and support for sustained operations.

Mitigation and Ways Forward to Desired CBRN Defence Capability

The mitigation of challenges to materialize capacity building for sustained BAF operation in CBRN environment can be achieved through proper planning step by step. Realizing the threat spectrum and probability, BAF should develop capability to combat CBRN emergency and sustain operations. CBRN defence capability for BAF may be developed through short term and long term planning.

Figure 2: Short and Long Term Plan for CBRN Defence Capacity Building



Source: JP 3-11, 2018 and Interviews at Air Headquarters, 2020

a. **Short Term Planning:**

(1) Building awareness and local training on preliminary detection, survival and evasive actions in CBRN catastrophe may be carried out through lectures, seminar, symposium, introducing theory and practical demonstration in training curriculum at different levels for BAF Officers and Airmen. This will instill confidence in personnel and equipment, before equipping the personnel with costly CBRN gears.

(2) A specially trained CBRN Response Team of 31-35 personnel with necessary equipment may be formulated who will be located centrally for giving support to all Bases/Units in case of CBRN emergency. The structure of the team may be as follows:-

(a) Command Team: 03 Persons (Commander, Doctor and Runner)

(b) Recce Team: 04 Persons (CBRN/CEA detector, Medical/First Aid person and Photographer/Sketcher of the scene)

(c) Sample Collection Team: 04 Persons (Leader, Clean Man, Dirty Man, Photographer and Video recorder)

(d) Decontamination: 14 Persons (Leader, CBRN Decon, Sample Decon, Responders Decon, Non ambulatory Decon and Mass Decon)

(e) Triage: 2-4 Persons (Medical personnel)

(f) Transfer: 4-6 Persons (As per situation)

(3) Provost and Armament personnel detailed for Bomb Disposal may be provided with special training locally.

(4) Medical personnel may be specially trained, provided with adequate medicines and treatment facilities at the Base Hospitals

(5) By avoiding contamination, BAF can eliminate or reduce the need for CBRN protection and decontamination. However,

decontamination equipment and drugs may be provided for patient decontamination and stabilization treatment. Special attention is to be given for aeromedical evacuation capabilities for contagious casualties. Specific helicopters may be designated and modified for medical movement of contaminated patients.

(6) Doctrine may be formulated covering necessary guidelines for force protection, passive measures, redundancy, health protection and exposure to such environment to ensure survivability and subsequent sustained operations of BAF in CBRN environment (FGD-1, 2020).

b. Long Term Planning:

(1) A separate training school may be established for basic and advanced training on CBRN. BAF personnel may be sent abroad for regular specialized and equipment based training on CBRN defence to build proficiency.

(2) TO&E may be established for separate CBRN Response Team with necessary training and equipment for all the Bases with a central coordination cell.

(3) A designated isolation ward for treatment of CBRN affected patient may be established with necessary medical equipment and medicines with specially trained doctors and medical assistants.

(4) Decontamination capability may be increased for decontamination of aircraft, equipment and fixed sites:

(a) Aircraft decontamination can be done during pre-flight, thru-flight or post-flight inspections by spot decontamination as an immediate measure to mitigate unintentional transfer or spread on aircraft.

(b) Sensitive equipment (avionics and/or electrical, electronic, and environmental systems) of aircraft/vehicle interiors and some weapon systems decontamination is to be avoided due to the corrosive properties of most decontamination solutions.

(c) Fixed-site decontamination may be carried out on fixed facilities, such as Base Ops room, flight lines, maintenance hangar, supply or ammunition depots, airports and medical facilities.

(5) Specialized shield rooms, CBRN safe rooms, EMP hardening facilities, Hardened Aircraft Shelter may be constructed in the Base/Units for damage control to ensure protection from CBRN attack.

The CBRN effect upon personnel and unit operations will range from limited to severe. The greatest challenge BAF will face will be the physiological and psychological impacts. The best means at the disposal of commanders to lessen these impacts are: knowledge of the soldiers; knowledge of the threat; and stressful, realistic training under CBRN conditions on a repetitive basis. With the CBRN Defence capability, Bases and Units will be prepared enough to perform their primary mission with minimum degradation in a CBRN environment. Realistic training to operate in a CBRN environment will boost morale and confidence. This will pay dividend in sustaining operations for BAF.

Conclusion

In recent years, the use of CBRN weapon by both state and non-state actors has underlined how complex the global scenario is likely to be in future. Despite multiple conventions or treaties, the increasing threat due to possession and emergence of nuclear powers could not be controlled. Countries are using this capability as deterrence to their potential aggressor. Some countries developing nuclear plant for non-military purpose also pose significant threat to the environment and population. India, Pakistan and China are declared nuclear powers. The regional rivalries of neighbours put Bangladesh at the risk of CBRN proliferation in case of any escalation towards conflict between them. On the other hand, Myanmar is exploring the opportunities to build nuclear facilities. Despite less chances of a direct CBRN attack by a state, possibilities by non-traditional method cannot be overruled. Moreover, indirect effect due to accidental fall out in the proximity may have devastating effect on environmental degradation.

The effect from a CBRN catastrophe is far reaching and long lasting. Although, the research identifies such threat occurrence probability on BAF is medium or low, the direct or indirect effect may hamper BAF operation. CBRN emergencies will cause environmental degradation and affect the survivability of personnel. The overall impact will be on the sustainment of operations as BAF is yet to develop any sort of

preparedness to combat CBRN catastrophe. BAF must consider such threat to maintain a minimum level of preparedness to enable 'survive to operate'.

The desired level of preparedness for BAF will be to attain initial survival by reducing vulnerabilities from a CBRN emergency. BAF should be able to deal with such cases by ensuring force protection, decontamination, passive measures and casualty management for CBRN defence. For this, firstly, BAF need to realize the threat by setting priority and raising awareness. Subsequently, BAF may build capacity step by step by proving training, formulating doctrine and CBRN response team, decontamination and medical facilities with necessary equipment as well as establishing infrastructure by dealing with the associated challenges that comes along.

Recommendations

Following are the recommendations made for developing CBRN defence capability for sustained operation in CBRN environment:

a. **Short Term Plan:**

- (1) BAF personnel may be trained on the basic survival and CBRN combat activities.
- (2) A specially trained central CBRN Response Team comprising 31 to 35 personnel may be formed with necessary equipment and training for giving support to all the Bases/Units in case of CBRN emergency.
- (3) Necessary decontamination equipment, drugs and medical facilities may be ensured at the Base level to provide casualty management along with CASEVAC/MEDEVAC arrangement.
- (4) Steps may be taken to formulate doctrine for sustained operations of BAF in CBRN environment.

b. **Long Term Plan:**

- (1) A separate training school may be established for basic and advanced training on CBRN.

- (2) TO&E may be established for separate CBRN Response Team with necessary training and equipment for all the Bases with a central coordination cell.
- (3) Necessary medical and decontamination facilities may be established at the Base level.
- (4) Specialized shield rooms, CBRN safe rooms, EMP hardening facilities, Hardened Aircraft Shelter may be constructed.

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Brief Biography



Squadron Leader KM Shaikh Bin Zaman, psc, Engg was commissioned in Bangladesh Air Force on 14 January 2005. He obtained BSc Engineering (Electrical Electronic and Communication Engineering) from Military Institute of Science and Technology in 2006. He has done various professional courses at home and abroad. Some of the mentionable courses are Armament and Photo Technology Course; Engineering Branch Integration Conversion Course in BAF; Officers' Bomb, Explosive and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Course in BA; Advance EOD/IED Disposal Course in PAF; Aeronautical Engineering (M) Course in IAF; and Junior Command and Staff Course at BAF and SLAF. Squadron Leader KM Shaikh Bin Zaman, during his service career served in different appointments such as OIC Flight Line and OIC R&I of F-7BG, OIC AB Armament Flight, Adjutant Maintenance Wing, OIC MT Squadron, OIC Control Squadron and OIC Armament Squadron at different BAF Bases/Units. He also served in MONUSCO, DR Congo as Airfield Technical Officer from August 2012 to October 2013. Prior to joining Staff College, he served as Officer Commanding at 203 Maintenance Unit, Bangladesh Air Force.

CAPACITY BUILDING THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING FOR ENHANCED PARTICIPATION OF BANGLADESH NAVY IN UN MISSION

Commander S M Abdullah Woise, (ND), psc, BN

Abstract

Since the beginning of Bangladesh's participation in UN Missions, Bangladesh Armed Forces and Bangladesh Police have completed 54 deployments in 40 countries. Statistically, total 1,56,409 Bangladeshi peacekeepers took part in the Contingent and Observer Missions till 2018. BN started active participation in the UN Mission in UNIKOM during post-Gulf War-I in 1997. But the next independent contingent Mission came after eight years. In global context, there is a sheer lack of maritime forces requirement in UNPKO. However, the UN requirement is not the only reason for a smaller number of BN integration. From the assessment of ongoing deployments, it was found that BN needs improvements in the training of troops, assets, technology, liaison and infrastructure to support the challenging arena of various Missions. Moreover, in 2015, the UN has published UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) guidelines which may bring new challenges for BN. A research was carried out before writing this paper to reveal the underlying issues for stagnant BN participation ratio in UN Mission. The research identified that capacity building through infrastructure development and training can enhance BN participation in UN Mission. Finally, it is anticipated that study in the sector of capacity building will significantly contribute to opening new avenues for BN participation in UN Mission.

Introduction

On March 2020, the United Nations (UN) had a total of 83,268 peacekeepers deployed in varied capacity all over the conflict and post-conflict zones of the world.¹ A total of 115 nations are currently contributing this force to the UN. Bangladesh is also a significant Troops Contributing Country (TCC) in the UN. Bangladesh Army (BA), Bangladesh Navy (BN), Bangladesh Airforce (BAF) and Bangladesh Police deploy troops, vehicles and assets, i.e. Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), patrol boats, ships, helicopters, construction vehicles and machinery for peacekeeping and peacebuilding Missions in UN. Technically, the UN requirements and nations' capacity to fulfil the criteria dictate the TCC's participation in the Mission. Since 1988 Bangladesh Armed Forces are participating in UN Missions with great success and increasing numbers. However, BN participation in UN Missions has not been at par with other services.

Since the beginning of Bangladesh's participation in UN missions, Bangladesh Armed Forces and Bangladesh Police have completed 54 deployments in 40 countries. Statistically, a total of 1,56,409 Bangladeshi peacekeepers took part in the Contingent and Observer Missions until 2018. A statistic in BN's official website shows, till April 2018, total 5,090 naval officers and sailors have participated in UN Mission in contrast to BA's 127086, BAF's 6134 and Police's 18099 personnel.² The ratio is just above 3.2% in comparison to the total force contribution. So, why BN had been falling back despite BA and BAF's success story in UN Mission?

BN started active participation in the UN Mission by sending first independent BN contingent in UNIKOM during post-Gulf War-I in 1997. But it took next eight years to find the next independent Mission in UNAMID, Sudan. Understandably, there is a sheer lack of maritime forces requirement in UN Peace Keeping Operation (UNPKO). For instance, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) in Lebanon is the only naval operations-oriented Mission globally. However, the UN requirement may not be the only reason for a smaller number of BN integration. Moreover, in 2015, the UN has published UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), which is likely to strain BN's ongoing and future UN deployment efforts. Therefore, a careful study is required to determine the grey areas that are impediments to BN's increased UN mission involvement.

There was a minimal study on the opportunities and challenges for increased BN participation in UN. As a result, no significant changes came in the UN Mission policy of BN in recent past. This paper intends to determine the scope of increasing BN participation in UN Mission through training and infrastructure development.

Concept of UN Peacekeeping Mission

Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter give the UN power to deploy a peacekeeping force. In one definition, William J. Durch stated, "Peacekeeping supplements the self-help system of international politics with an element of disinterested outside assistance that can help the parties to a conflict disengage themselves from it."³ Peacekeeping Mission may involve a wide range of complex military actions such as:

- a. Monitoring of border or buffer zones after the armistice agreement has been signed.
- b. Verification of agreed-upon force disengagements or withdrawals.
- c. Supervision of the disarming and demobilisation of local forces.


- d. Maintenance of security conditions essential to the conduct of elections and temporary transitional administration of countries.

For accomplishing a UN mandate, peacekeepers, may be armed, but only for self-defence. The appropriate Rule of Engagement (ROE) for self-defence also vary by Mission. Nevertheless, the UN Peacekeeping operation aims to monitor, localise and defuse the conflict rather than escalating violence. So, a tailored and mission capable force remains the prerequisite for successful UNPKO.

Evolution of UN Mission


The extent of BN's increased participation in Mission is related to the broader issue of UN peacekeeping's changing nature. Since the first Mission started in 1948, the concept of peacekeeping has evolved a lot. "Traditional" peacekeeping involves implementing cease-fire or peace agreements. However, in recent years, the UN Security Council has authorised several operations in complex and insecure environments where peace operations are hard to continue. Some experts argue that UN peacekeeping's current funding process cannot adequately support some of the broad mandates authorised by the Council.⁴ As a result, deployment trend in UN peacekeeping is also changing. Figure 1 and 2 shows the trend of troops deployment in UNMISS and UNIFIL, where naval forces are operating.

Figure 1: Trend of Uniformed Personnel Deployment in UNMISS, South Sudan



Source: UNPKO Official Website, as on 15 November 2020

Figure 2: Trend of Uniformed Personnel Deployment in UNIFIL, Lebanon



Source: UNPKO Official Website, as on 15 November 2020

Present BN Deployment in UN Mission

BN started force contribution in UN since 1993. So far, a total of 5909 BN peacekeepers have participated in UNPKO. Presently, 356 officers and sailors are deployed in six different missions around the globe. Table-1 given below shows the present participation of BN in the UN mission. BN is now conducting two independent contingent Mission, namely UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNMISS in South Sudan.


Table 1: Present UN Mission Deployment- Bangladesh Navy

Ser	Name of the Mission	Participating Members			Total
		UNMO/MLO	Staff	Others	
1.	MINURSO (Western Sahara)	01	-	-	01
2.	MINUSMA (Mali)	01	03	-	04
3.	MONUSCO (D R Congo)	01	03	09	13
4.	MINUSCA (Central African Republic)	03	03	-	06
5.	UNMISS (South Sudan)	01	03	211	215
6.	UNAMID (Darfur)	-	01	-	01
7.	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	-	03	112	115
8.	UNDPO (UNHQ)	-	01	-	01
Total =		07	17	332	356

Source: DONO, NHQ as on 19 August 2020

Prospects and Opportunities of BN - General

From the starting of the UN Mission, BN has maintained a steady curve of participation. BN's Mission deployment rate increased substantially after sending two ships in UNIFIL, Lebanon in 2010. Similarly, there is only one Force Marine Unit (FMU) deployed in UNMISS Sudan to support the land operations. So, inherently BN's deployment scope remains scarce in the UN arena compared to BA and BAF. A comparative yearly statistic of BA, BN and BAF deployed in Mission is projected in Table 2 given below:

Table 2: Yearly State of Armed Forces Personnel Deployed in UN Mission

Source: DONO, NHQ (as on 19 August 2020)

Prospects of BN Deployment in UN Mission

Geopolitics: The security dimension in the ocean is changing day by day. The example of conflict in the East Mediterranean between Israel and Arab nations (which was the reason for the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF)) are now visible in many parts of the world. A survey carried out in this regard shows, in the present geopolitical situation, 55.5% BN officers opined that naval Missions are likely to increase in future.

International Image of Bangladesh: Since independence Bangladesh has maintained a friendly relation with all countries of the world except Israel. The foreign policy “friendship to all and malice to none” has given the country’s military a wide acceptance in the UN. On the other hand, the parties in Africa and the Middle East also consider Bangladeshi troops as non-inclined. The factor is likely to boost the probability of deploying BN personnel in future maritime Missions.

Deployment Experience: The deployment experience of BN in the Mission area is invaluable for future operation. For the last ten years, BN ships operating in the Mediterranean for Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) are a convincing example of force deployment capability. Understandably, force deployment experience would influence the future deployment BN.

Willingness of Government: The political parties of the country acknowledge the contribution of UN deployment by Armed Forces. As a result, both major parties of the country have promoted UNPKO. Moreover, Bangladesh's UN involvement can be termed as the 'soft power' proponent. In short, BN prospect for UN deployment will remain unhindered due to the government's will to contribute to world peace.

What Opportunities Lies for BN?

Low-cost Troops: The UN reimburses TCC's military personnel at a standard rate, approved by the General Assembly (US\$1,428 per soldier per month as of 01 July 2019). The payment is overwhelming for BN troops considering Bangladesh's socio-economic condition. Willam J. Durch mentioned that the lower cost of troops is a significant determinant of TCC. So, BN would be able to exploit this inherent opportunity for enhanced participation in future.

Mission Oriented Capability: BN receives reimbursement for ships/craft, boats, and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). These reimbursements come as a significant source of USD to government. For example, BN ship in UNIFIL sources 6.2 million USD for the government every year. Lowering the rate of reimbursement and increasing the Mission-oriented capability BN can create an opportunity for more deployment.

Female Participation: UN heavily focuses on gender equality in its operation. As per the UN peacekeeping official website, by 2028, the target for women serving in military contingents is 15% and 25% for military observers and staff officers.⁵ However, female participation is still below the targeted level. BN has an opportunity to fill this vacuum by employing more female officers and troops in UNPKO.

UN Reserve Force: According to the UN PCRS guidelines, TCCs maintain a reserve force with an appropriate readiness level for deployment. During the interview, Deputy Director of DONO at Naval Headquarters mentioned that BN is holding a 'Level 2' ship and a 'special force unit' ready for UN Mission.

Special Force: The scope of a deploying special force in the UN is still an undiscovered area for BN. However, according to the PCRS guidelines Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) Command has already started preparing a unit as per the UN requirement.

Liaison at Various Level: Liaison at Government, Armed Forces Division and UNHQ level can also create new opportunities for increasing BN's participation. During the

survey, 72.2% of BN officers opined that liaison could create a new Mission post for BN at various levels.

UN Mission Requirements

In 2015, the UN had given a set of PCRS guidelines to maintain a mission tailored force for TCCs. These guidelines are now the backbone for selecting troops for the UNPKO. As a result, BN needs to keep a trained group for future deployment. Subsequent paragraphs will discuss the specific needs of the naval contingent as per the PCRS guidelines.

UN PCRS Guidelines

The PCRS guidelines work as a tool for the UN to keep a maritime force mission ready for quick deployment. For naval forces, the policy comes in three manuals which are as follows:

- a. Military Maritime Task Force Manual.
- b. Military Riverine Unit Manual.
- c. Military Special Forces Manual.

As per the UN PCRS guidelines, TCCs need to maintain a UN reserve force for deployment in UN MTF. This reserve force ranges from 'Level 1' to 'Ready for Deployment Level' (RDL) depending on their preparedness. When needed, the UN will select RDL unit for maritime Mission as per the response of the TCC. The same is applicable for Riverine and Special Forces unit.

Contingent Owned Equipment

Before deploying troops, the agreed MOU is signed between TCCs and the UN specifying the troops and equipment of the Mission. The MOU identify the personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment services which will be provided by the TCCs. The MOU of COE covers the following areas:-

- a. Contribution of personnel and their equipment.
- b. Equipment (major and minor), maintenance, and consumables.
- c. Services and standards.
- d. Loss or damage.

- e. Transportation of equipment and personnel.
- f. Inspections and Verification.
- g. Reimbursement rates.

COE in each Mission is verified, inspected and reported by a representative from the Department of Field Support (DFS) staff. They also guide the logistics aspects of the COE/MOU system, including Reconnaissance visits, Pre-deployment visits (PDVs), Quarterly Inspections, and Operational Readiness Inspections. COE inspection team can suspend inefficient and unfit equipment from reimbursement.

Requirements for Maritime Task Force

UN Maritime Task Force (MTF) staff organisation can be of two types based on the operation “In Support of Land Operations” or “Stand-Alone.” Again, rather than focus on specific types of maritime vessels needed for a UN Maritime Task Force, these two organisational structures more appropriately focus on capabilities required. Actual vessels with the desired capabilities are identified during the force generation process in response to specific Mission mandates, requirements and offers from the UN Member States wishing to participate in a particular maritime operation.

Requirements for Military Riverine Unit

Military Riverine Unit performs a challenging task in the Mission area as there are little or no logistics and repair facility in remote places. Composition of UN Military Riverine Unit depends on the size and physical characteristics of the area of operations. BN is already familiar with riverine operations in UNMISS, South Sudan.

The manual defines the employment, capabilities, organisation, support, training and evaluation procedure for Military Riverine unit. Boat operation is the primary activity of the riverine operations.

Requirements for Special Force

The PCRS manual has outlined a company-size contingent for UN Special Forces. Moreover, a battalion-equivalent UN Special Forces provisions have been kept for more demanding operations in future. Reasonably, the PCRS guidelines included a high standard of preparedness for each readiness level of special forces. BN has pledged for one battalion special forces for upgrading to 'RDL'. However, after AAV team visit in 2019, the SWADS unit was placed in 'Level 2.'⁶ During a discussion, SWADS authority

mentioned special forces requiring some new equipment and land Mine training to gain full capacity.

Shortfalls of BN

There are some other areas of limitations for BN, which require due concern for the UN Mission's expected acceleration. Those are as follows:

- a. Mission-oriented training for the officers and troops.
- b. Availability of required standard of Contingent Owned Equipment.
- c. Land operation capability by special forces.
- d. Availability of technology (i.e. IFF, 3D Radar, Helicopter, Drones).
- e. Suitable Riverine Craft.
- f. Vehicle suitable for Mission area.
- g. Troops selection policy to meet specific UN operations.
- h. Liaison at various level (i.e. AFD, UNHQ, PMBNY, MoD et cetera).

Limitations in Infrastructure

Presently, BN conducts the UN operation under Directorate of Overseas Naval Operations (DONO) at Naval headquarters. The Directorate performs all administrative work for deployment of BN personnel. The Directorate is manned by one deputy director, one staff officer and four staffs in an average. In comparison, the naval operations in Bangladesh are aided by Operation Branch, operations directorate and command structure at the area command level. So, it is evident that UN operations by BN contingents and ships did not get due importance due to lack of adequate infrastructure within BN.

Limitations in Training


Training remains a pivotal factor for mission success for any military force. Again, if the military cannot draw success or the desired outcome in a Mission, there will be hardly any justification to deploy the force. For example, A navy contingent cannot fulfil a task on land as army troops can. A survey on the BN officers shows significant share has done Mission in naval contingent. On the other hand, only 26.3% of officers did the pre-

deployment training from BIPSOT. It indicates that BN needs a training centre for conducting pre-deployment mission-specific training.

UN Deployment Process of BN

Presently, the majority of BN deployment in UN is limited within UNIFIL and UNMISS. The contingent deployment is done under the DONO Directorate at NHQ. DONO also coordinates all tasks related to UN Mission deployment except for the selection of officers and sailors. The selected personnel form up the contingent before 1-2 months in general. Subsequent training and administrative preparation are completed under BNS HAJI MOHSIN or BNS ISSA KHAN. The whole contingent then deploys in the Mission area as per the scheduled time. A flow chart of the UN Mission deployment process of BN is given in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: UN Mission Deployment Process of BN



Source: Author's Construct based on Secondary Data Collection

Effectiveness of BIPSOT Training for BN

BIPSOT provides PDT on UN matters to all Armed Forces and Police personnel before deployment. The training includes theoretical subjects related to UN operations and practical training on specific Mission. Although BIPSOT training is beneficial for BA, the case is not the same for BN. The training syllabus for BN contingent in BIPSOT only covers the essential topics of UN deployment. Moreover, there is no facility in BIPSOT to conduct the Mission specific training for BN contingent or ship.

Positive Impact of BN's Infrastructure Development and Training

Despite many limitations, BN is successfully conducting two overseas UN Mission in the troubled area over the last ten years. Through the construction of infrastructure and imparting quality training BN will be able to ensure quality force generation. As such, the deployment curve of BN in the UN Mission is likely to go up. The positive impact of infrastructure development and training are as follows:


- a. Under the infrastructure development, the procurement of ships/crafts and technology for UN operation can substantially increase BN capability. By incorporating the UN Mission-oriented technology within the Forces Goal, BN can ensure economy of effort.
- b. BN can pledge new contingents for deployment as the infrastructure would facilitate training for new categories of units such as Special Forces, Bangladesh Military Police (BANMP), UAV units, Fast Boat Units, Riverine Unit etcetera.
- c. BN can maintain a trained and 'Level 3' Mission capable force for yearly rotation. At the same time, new changes in UN policy would be easy to adapt.
- d. Research and Development (R&D) and knowledge-based force generation need the establishment of an academic institution. Such an institution can generate goodwill for BN in UNPKO and ensure the exchange of knowledge with national and international peacekeeping academic think tanks.
- e. Inherently, the Navy is designed to operate beyond its waters. An overseas deployment infrastructure can assist BN further to undertake large scale overseas operation in future.
- f. BN always took a lead role in women empowerment within the armed forces. A separate woman enrolment policy and dedicated training system for women peacekeepers can boost BN's image in the international arena.
- g. Integration of BN's peacekeeping training academy with other maritime academic platforms can open window for the naval and civilian professional to pursue UN job as a career.

Case Studies - Different TCCs Model

Ethiopian Model: In 2015, Ethiopia established the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Coordination Center under the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence. It was responsible for the designing and conduct of pre-deployment training for UN operations. The centre significantly assisted in training troop and police from Ethiopia and other African countries to meet peacekeeping missions' challenges. The centre teaches on conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict recovery issues.

Indonesian Model: Indonesia's first contribution to UN peacekeeping started in 1950. Presently, a total of 1,800 troops are deployed in UN Mission from Indonesia. Indonesia aspires to become one of the top 10 TCC for the UN. As such, the Indonesian Armed Forces has separated the forces for deployment from the traditional Indonesian military. Indonesia assigns 70% of their UN troops from the army and rests 30% from the navy. Average deployment number of Indonesian troops in UNPKO is 4,000.⁷ The training centre aims to train at least 4,000 personnel a year to meet the UN need.

Figure 4: Development Concept for Increased Participation of BN in the UN Mission



Source: Researcher's Construct

Proposed Development Model for BN

There are two practical ways of developing a deployment strategy for BN. Firstly, BN may completely reorganise the UN operations procedure and expand infrastructure, focusing on UN operation. Secondly, a phase-wise development of training and infrastructure can minimise the shortfalls of BN. Subsequent paragraphs discuss the phase-wise development plan.

Procurement of Ships and Crafts with Required Technology: BN faced difficulties with fulfilling the requirement COE and technology in the past. In some cases, BN could not pledge for deployment due to lack of technology such as ship-borne helicopters, drone etcetera. Future BN procurement of ships/crafts and technology need to consider the PCRS requirements.

Rotation of Units with Mission Ready Force: As naval contingents are highly technical and technology-oriented; all staff requires a certain amount of orientation training. However, the current crew selection policy for BN personnel cannot address this requirement. Deputy Director of DONO Directorate, NHQ mentioned that the selected troops are often not drafted to the contingents in time, which hinders mission-specific training.

Training of Peacekeepers: The present training module of BN needs improvement in various aspect. Firstly, all peacekeepers need to undergo the pre-deployment training. The same level of activity can ensure a steady force generation under UN PCRS guideline.⁸ Secondly, there is an institution like BIPSOT and Bangladesh Peacebuilding Centre (BPC) for training essential of UNPKO. These organisations are focused on providing infantry training to BA and civilian staff. But BN needs Mission specific training on MTF and Force Riverine Unit. As a result, BN needs a Maritime Peace Academy for training the troops. Moreover, BN is one of the prime TCC in UN maritime operations. Thereby, a Maritime Peace Academy will increase professionalism for BN personnel and expand the scope of liaison with various UN organisations.

Institutionalised Approach: It will be wrong to mention that BN's current deployment strategy is not institutionalised. However, there are few areas where infrastructure and training can ensure a more institutionalised approach for BN.

- a. **Dedicated Directorate:** The DONO Directorate handles a large volume of work for UN Mission. Although a separate directorate is already established, it remains understaffed as per the approved TO&E. As a result, development works are challenging to undertake.

b. **Support Unit:** Absence of dedicated support unit for UN Mission creates impediments to an institutionalised approach to UN deployment. Officers and sailors selected for UN Mission often find it challenging to accommodate and prepare themselves for Mission. A dedicated support unit for UN Mission can mitigate such challenges.

c. **Training Curriculum:** Training curriculum for the BN personnel is often made on an ad-hoc basis. Mission specific training is conducted based on Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) from the previous contingent experience. In a changing Mission environment, these SOPs may be insufficient and incomplete. To institutionalise the training system, BN needs to integrate the elementary mission training part within the officers' and sailors' training system.

Gender Equality in UN Mission: Gender equality is a buzz word for the UN to ensure more women peacekeeper deployment. Many countries, including Bangladesh, do not fulfil the targeted women participation in UNPKO. BN can increase involvement in UN Mission by deploying women peacekeepers.⁹ To meet the UN target, BN will require a revised recruitment policy for female officers and sailors.

Conclusion

Since 1988, Bangladesh Armed Forces are participating in UN Missions with great success and increasing numbers. However, BN participation in UN Missions has not been at par with other services. The ratio is just above 3.2% in comparison to the total force contribution. Presently, BN is operating two contingent Mission, namely UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNMISS in South Sudan.

The changing nature of conflict demands a more robust UN mandate and deployment of forces capable of undertaking the task. Despite the shrinking budget and less employment of maritime forces in UN Mission, many envisaged that UN Mission for maritime forces would increase in future. BN needs to capitalise on the prospect and opportunities offered by the given situation.

In 2015, the UN had given a set of PCRS guidelines to maintain a mission tailored force for TCCs. These guidelines are now the backbone for selecting troops for the UNPKO. Among the PCRS manuals, MTF, Riverine Unit and Special forces manuals are of importance for BN. The UN requirements and evaluation process as per UN PCRS guideline have surfaced some shortfalls in BN capabilities. The primary limitation areas are in the infrastructure and training. For example, only 26% of the officers receive

training from BIPSOT. In contrast, BIPSOT is the only recognised training centre for UN peacekeepers.

Introduction of adequate infrastructure and training can influence the UN deployment in manifolds. Establishing a training facility for UN forces was a requirement from UNHQ under General assembly resolution 49/37 of 1994. Moreover, The PCRS guidelines have enforced a very high standard of preparedness to meet new Mission area challenges. Unlike earlier, future UN Mission's mandate will be robust and conflict engaging. Under such an environment, any force deployed for UN operations needs familiarisation in the academic platform.

Case studies on different TCCs unveiled that all major TCCs have formulated a strategy to increase their UN mission participation. However, none of the naval forces has its training facility. Finally, BN's development concept has been proposed suggesting appropriate assets, knowledge-based force, and institution for UN operations. The establishment of the UN Mission support unit and Maritime Peace Academy remains in the heart of the development proposals.

Recommendations

Followings are recommended for increased participation of BN in UN Mission:

- a. **Procurement of Ships and Craft with Required Technology:** BN's future ship procurement should consider incorporating equipment mentioned in the COE list (Air Search Radar, IFF and Data Link). In a short term plan, procurement may include organic helicopter, surveillance drone, fast boat and landing craft to meet the UN PCRS requirements.
- b. **Train Personnel to Maintain a Mission Ready Force:** BN may establish Maritime Peace Academy to train naval personnel on UN operations. During the intermediate period, NHQ may conduct pool training on the specific equipment to prepare the crew for selection and rotation in the existing BN contingents.
- c. **Institutionalised Approach:** A dedicated Mission support unit at Chattogram Naval Area may be established to administer pre-deployment and post Mission activity. NHQ may include UN Mission-related topics in officers' syllabus and sailors' professional courses. Finally, the UN Mission's selection process may consist of a physical test and a written examination on topics mentioned in UN PCRS evaluation criteria.

- d. **Deployment of Pledged Units:** GoB and NHQ may intensify persuasion at UNHQ and various international organisation to assign BN's pledged units to the UNPKO.
- e. **Special Force Unit's Capability:** SWADS may enhance the capability of the Special Forces Unit to conduct/participate in UN Mission.
- f. **Modification of Naval Provost Training:** Naval Provost training to be modified to meet the requirements of BANMP.
- g. **Preparation of Naval Aviation:** Naval Aviation may prepare personnel and organic helicopter with the required facility to undertake UN operations.
- h. **Gender Equality in UN Mission:** NHQ may recruit female officers and sailors to increase women participation in the UN. BN's initiative may be highlighted to the UNHQ through the staff officers at UNHQ, PMBNY and AAV team of UN.

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Brief Biography



Commander S M Abdullah Woise, (ND), psc, BN was commissioned on 01 June 2004 in the Executive Branch of Bangladesh Navy. He has undergone several professional courses both at home and abroad. He attended Basic Submarine Orientation Course in India and Long Specialisation Course on Navigation & Direction (ND) in BNS ISSA KHAN. The officer underwent Air Defense Artillery Familiarization Course (ADAF) in Artillery Center and School, Chattogram and Air Search Radar Course in Italy. He served various ships of Bangladesh Navy in different capacities. As Commanding Officer, he commanded a Missile Boat and a Patrol Craft. The officer contributed significantly for the induction of the newly built Corvettes of Bangladesh Navy. In 2014, he was appointed as a peacekeeper in UNIFIL, Lebanon onboard BNS NIRMUL. Commander Woise is happily married and blessed with one son.

CHANGE MANAGEMENT: AN INTROSPECTION IN BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES PERSPECTIVE

Lieutenant Colonel Md Kamrul Hassan, psc, G, Arty

Abstract

Military often needs to implement changes within the organization to keep pace with technological advancement and societal changes. Bangladesh Armed Forces is no exception; as such, implementation of changes remains as a regular activity for its command echelon. Changes implemented in the military are identified through in-depth analysis of the foreseeable future battlefield environment. Societal changes also play an important role to guide the military leaders in identifying requirements of change in its culture, values and practices. For sustainable development of Bangladesh Armed Forces, changes need to be incorporated through farsighted and comprehensive planning. It is to be remembered that, implementation of changes is a difficult task. Comprehensive and elaborate planning is a must to achieve sustainable success in this regard. Today, change management has become a science and many literatures are available on this subject. Command echelon at every level of Bangladesh Armed Forces is very frequently entrusted with the responsibility of implementing changes, and they need workable knowledge on change management to smoothly implement the changes. This article may help the command echelon to have elementary theoretical knowledge and understanding on change management which can be further enriched through study of different related reference materials.

Introduction

Bangladesh Armed Forces was born in the battlefield during the glorious historic event of Liberation War (26 March-16 December 1971). Born through an unprecedented success story, Bangladesh Armed Forces endured a divine position in the heart of the people of Bangladesh since inception. The first gift of Bangladesh Armed Forces to the people was liberation, presumably the most munificent gift for any nation. Since then many years have passed and now Bangladesh Armed Forces is renowned in the international arena for gallantry, sincerity and professionalism. Like all other armed forces of the world, Bangladesh Armed Forces also focuses its activities to protect and defend the state and people from internal instability and external threats. However, Bangladesh Armed Forces does not only focus on maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also provides support in various nation building activities. Frequent and whole-hearted participation in various nation building activities helped Bangladesh Armed Forces to become a symbol of hope and confidence to the people. Diversification of role and increased involvement

in different types of activities often demand changes and modernization of Bangladesh Armed Forces.

Society is changing and military forms a small segment of the society. It would be unwise to consider that military is immune to societal changes. Top leadership of Bangladesh Armed Forces is well aware of the fact. Accordingly, in order to remain competitive enough to meet the foreseeable challenges of future battlefield, Bangladesh Armed Forces does not hesitate to implement or accommodate necessary changes. The overall aim of the changes is to produce an able and agile, physically fit and mentally robust, confident and well-disciplined combat ready force. It is to be remembered that, change is a regular phenomenon in any society or organisation. Ability to change and adopt is an important factor for any organisation to sustain and develop. Bangladesh Armed Forces implements changes after having prudent analysis of existing socio- cultural environment and foreseeable future battlefield dynamics. Therefore, all members of the Armed Forces need to have workable knowledge on change management so that changes are implemented smoothly and timely.

Today, change management has become a science. There are more than 1,800 books available on amazon.com under the category of “Organizational Changes”. The field has developed to the extent that courses dedicated specifically to managing changes are now part of the curriculum in many Masters in Business Administration programs.¹ This is because, it is very difficult to materialise changes in any organisation. Members of most of the organizations perceive that change is inconvenient and brings about uneasiness and discomfort.² So far, many researches were conducted to understand why change management efforts very often fail to have the desired impact. Bangladesh Armed Forces may take advantage from the outcome of those researches to identify a pragmatic approach to implement necessary changes so that those become sustainable. This essay begins with a short glimpse of the perspective of the members of Bangladesh Armed Forces about change and its management. This will be followed by a discussion on few theoretical aspects of change management which could be useful for the command echelon of Bangladesh Armed Forces. This paper will end suggesting few measures that might be adopted at different levels to implement changes in various areas.


CHANGE MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVE OF THE MEMBERS OF BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES

Changes in Bangladesh Armed Forces: Possible Areas

Military is a very dynamic organisation which needs to remain prepared to fight the contemporary traditional and non-traditional security threats. As such, it needs to

modernize its training, equipment etc. taking advantage of latest technological advancement to remain fit to fight in current battlefield environment. Recently “change” has become a buzz word in Bangladesh Armed Forces. Many changes are taking place in different sectors to keep pace with technological advancement. Huge infrastructural development is underway to implement the changes smoothly. Policies are amended and awareness programs are conducted regularly to keep everybody informed of the changes. In military, changes may take place in many sectors. Figure 1 given below shows few possible broad areas where changes are normally implemented in military.

Figure 1: Changes in Military: Possible Areas



Source: Author's Construct


Training is the most important activity for any military during peacetime. Militaries need to regularly evaluate effectiveness of their training system to remain prepared to fight in expected future battlefield environment. Every effort should be taken to derive maximum benefits from modern gadgets and facilities to make training more interesting and effective. Priority of human needs shifts with changes in the socio-cultural environment. Military needs to formulate its **welfare policies** to meet the expectations of its members. Every commander will have his/her own way of doing things which he/she develops over the years. As such, with the change in command of the unit/establishment, there will be a few changes in the way of doing/performing routine activities. Culture and traditions of an organisation also need to be changed to keep pace with technological advancement and societal changes to remain relevant to latest trends and practices.

Change Management Through Commander's Lens

Military officers assume different responsibilities throughout their service life. However, command remains as the most cherished and desired role for any military officer.

Everybody wants to command in his/her way basing on the perspective developed through experiences at different stages of the military carrier. This perspective varies between individuals due to obvious reasons. That is why change of command often brings changes in the areas mentioned in Figure 1. According to a survey, 67% of the participants (see Figure 2 below) having command experience feel that implementation of change is highly difficult in Bangladesh Armed Forces.

Figure 2: Perspective of the Commanders Regarding Implementation of Change



Source: Author's Construct


An interesting dimension was also revealed during the survey. Most of the officers, while interacting with their under commands, found that a significant portion of the changes implemented during their command were not upheld by their successor. More importantly, few of the changes were reversed by the new Commanding Officer within 15-20 days of talking over the organization. Such a trend among the command echelon certainly augments soldiers' uncertainty about sustainability of the changes in a military unit. This, in turn, is likely to discourage them to put in their best effort in support of the implementation of any change.

According to the response of the participants, in an average, only 44% of their ventures to bring change were successful. Since the participants did not carry out any analysis to find out the possible reasons for failure, therefore, their perspective in this regard could not be ascertained. However, an effort was taken to find out the views of the subordinates for not accepting change gracefully or failing to adopt to change. This is illustrated below: -

According to B. H. Liddell Hart "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out".³ Military is traditionally a rigid organisation. Generally, it does not embrace change spontaneously. Bangladesh Armed Forces is no

exception. A survey was conducted among the subordinates to identify few significant reasons for not embracing changes positively. During the survey, the participants were exposed to few reasons available in different literatures. The respondents had to tick any five reasons from the list which inhibits them to accept change spontaneously. The result of the survey is shown in see Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Perspective of the Subordinates for not Accepting Change Spontaneously



Source: Author's Construct


Human being needs to be convinced about necessity of the change before gracefully accepting it. A soldier serves under many Commanding Officers in his/her military life. Every time, a new Commanding Officer comes, soldiers face changes. As such, at certain point of time, soldiers take the change as a routine and consider any change to be a temporary one. This bars the soldiers from whole-heartedly owning the change. Change may need new knowledge or skills, and the soldiers often remain in quagmire about their ability to cope up with the change. Most of them also lack initiative to come out of their comfort zone to take a bit extra pain/hardship to acquire required skills. Every human being has few core values. It is difficult to implement a change which affects individual's core values. In order to enhance possibility of success, above mentioned aspects need to be addressed. This demands reasonable knowledge on the prerequisites of successful and sustainable change management, which are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

PRE-REQUISITES FOR SUSTAINABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGES

Apparently implementation of changes seems to be a difficult and challenging task. But, it may be made little methodical to increase probability of success by following a systematic approach. There are many theories and literatures available on change management, but application of these theories depends on prevailing environment. Customisation of these theories to fit the context is a must to get desired output. In the subsequent paragraphs few theoretical aspects will be discussed to enhance readers' knowledge on change management. Application of these theories would demand prudent analysis and understanding of the people through whom the changes will be materialised. Any attempt to implement changes without deliberate and comprehensive planning is likely to result failure. Even if the attempt is successful, it is not likely to sustain in long run. Therefore, commanders at all levels need to have deliberate understanding of theoretical dimensions of change management.⁴

In any organisation, there will be three groups of people: one group will not like to see changes, one group will try to resist changes and the third group will enjoy and embrace changes. The paradigm, “we do it this way, because that is the way we do it”, may inhibit people from unleashing their maximum talents. Accepting changes demands courage, and desire to accept risk. It also demands trust between the members of the organisation or society.⁵ However, recent study identified that possibility of success can be improved through modifying or adjusting the approaches. This should be based on in-depth understanding of irrational but predictable nature of human being through which they interpret their environment and choose to act.⁶

Figure 4: Four Basic Conditions Required to Encourage Subordinates to Change Behaviour



Source: Price Colin and Lawson Emily, 2003


Basic Conditions

Colin Price and Emily Lawson⁷ provided a holistic perspective which suggests that four basic conditions have to be met to convince subordinates to change their behaviour. These factors, as shown in Figure 4, are well-acknowledged and applicable to all types of organizations. The figure also includes military explanation/examples of those basic conditions. People need a **compelling story** which justifies requirement of changes. They must realize that the colleagues they consider as **role model** in the organization are practicing the desired behaviour. A **reinforcement system** indicates that surrounding structures, systems, processes and incentives must be in tune with the new behaviour. People need to have the **required skills** to do what is required of them to do after implementation of the proposed changes.

Systematic Approach

Change management needs a systematic approach for successful and sustainable implementation. John Kotter in his famous book “Leading Changes” suggested an eight-step process to evade rudimentary glitches that is likely to beleaguer even minor change efforts. According to the writer; skipping a step, making a critical mistake within a step, or jumping ahead prematurely can have a cascading effect on the success of the change initiative.⁸ The writer also emphasized on requirements of quality leadership. Leaders can motivate and inspire people to change their old behaviours and ultimately anchor the new behaviours and thoughts. The eight steps in Kotter’s Model are shown below in Figure 5. Eight steps can again be grouped into three categories. First three steps will contribute to creating a favourable environment for implementing changes. Next three steps will enable the organization’s environment to effectively accept the changes. It will also encourage the members to dedicatedly engage with the process. Final two steps are planned to ensure smooth implementation of the changes and ensure its sustenance.

Figure 5: John Kotter’s Eight-Stage Model for Implementing Changes⁹



It is very difficult to give a detailed explanation of Kotter's Model within the scope of this essay. Little explanation of eight steps, which could help the readers to have preliminary understanding of the theory, is included in subsequent paragraphs:¹⁰

a. **Establishing a Sense of Urgency:** A sense of urgency is to be created to convince subordinates about the need for changes. If the sense of urgency is not cautiously created, subordinates may not have their heart in the overall process.

b. **Creating a Guiding Coalition:** Command echelon should perform this responsibility. They should be capable of developing visions, introduce new ideas and speak for the changes since nobody will accept changes on their own. Commanders must have enough motivational power in the form of leadership to move the changes forward.

c. **Developing a Vision and Strategy:** Implementation of changes necessitates a vision that will assist in formulating right strategies. It must be easy to communicate to subordinates, attainable and understandable. Strategy should include values that are central to changes. It should also clarify how the future will differ from past.

d. **Communicating the Changed Vision:** Vision must be communicated through appropriate media.

e. **Empowering Broad-based Action:** Necessary policy amendment and infrastructural development has to be done to facilitate implementation of the changes.

f. **Generating Short time Wins:** At the very outset, few visible and unambiguous successes need to be recognised and celebrated. Command echelon needs to plan few changes which can be implemented within a short time. Subordinates, who will be successful in embracing those changes, should be rewarded to show that the subordinates who are sacrificing to accept changes are being paid off.

g. **Consolidating Gains and Produce More Changes:** Momentum in implementing changes can easily be lost due to various internal and external factors. This is where leadership is particularly important to build on changes, adding more people and projects to realise and embody the vision.

h. **Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture:** This step will begin when success is visible and cultural change is materialised. Subordinates have accepted the changes and changed system is proved to be a better option. In order to make it sustainable, regular evaluation should continue to find out what is going right and what is going wrong to strive for persistent excellence.

For Bangladesh Armed Forces, first three steps are meticulously done at services headquarters level. Commanders at unit level need to play important role in step 4 and 6. For step 5, most of the actions will have to be taken at organizational level. Step 7 and 8 demand joint efforts by the commanders at different levels.

Bottom-up Approach

Changes imposed from top leadership are likely to face lot of challenges during implementation. If necessity of change is felt by the people on the ground, change management becomes easier. Sometimes, commanders select few issues at their own and try to implement changes. It becomes difficult for the subordinates to visualise necessity of such changes. As such, they do not put sincere effort for implementing those changes.

Theoretical aspects of change management are discussed in the preceding paragraphs to help the readers to develop a workable knowledge base. It is well understood that command echelon needs to create appropriate environment and address concerns of the subordinates to implement any change smoothly. In the subsequent paragraphs, an effort is taken to discuss few ways that might be adopted to facilitate change management.

WAYS TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGES

Implementation of changes always remains as a challenge for the command echelon. Coordinated and well-conceived plan at every level is a must for smooth implementation or enforcement of the changes. All commanders need to analyze their respective under commands and evolve suitable plan for smooth implementation of the changes. In order to do so, they need to understand the complexities and difficulties involved in implementing changes. Pragmatic approach along with prudent analysis of under command's psychology would help to a great extent in implementing changes.


Convince Under Command to Gracefully Accept the Change

Every commander must convince his/her under commands to accept any proposed change positively. A model having three tools is developed to assist the commanders in this regard. It is shown below in Figure 6. Tools shown in the model represent few

elements which are very commonly used in military for implementing any policy or regulation. The model includes three tools: convince/motivate, inspire, and develop. These tools need not to be applied in sequence; rather the tools might be applied as demanded by existing situation without any rigid sequence. In the model, against each tool, two more aspects are shown: specific concerns of the soldiers (shown in Figure 3) it addresses and basic conditions for developing a favourable situation (discussed in paragraph 13) it creates.

Effective motivation demands a compelling story. Story needs to be fact based and must fit to existing social environment. Inspiration will need role models within the unit. Officers of the unit have to play primary role and set example to inspire their under commands. Development plan should target to train the soldiers on skills that are required by them to perform in the changed system.

Figure 6: Tools to Convince Under Command to Gracefully Accept Change



Source: Prepared by the Author


Adopt Systematic Approach

Implementation of changes might be apparently easy for short time, but it is more important to make changes sustainable. This is possible, if the changes are implemented through a systematic approach as discussed in the previous paragraphs. Everybody should

follow a systematic approach to implement any change. The approach should ensure two aspects: take necessary steps to address the concerns of subordinates shown in Figure 6 and fulfill basic requirements to create a favourable situation discussed in paragraph 13. This can be done following the John Kotter's model as shown in Figure 5. It is to be noted that, the list of the concerns shown in Figure 3 is not exhaustive; commanders need to find out concerns of their subordinates through in-depth study to address those at different steps.

Commanders may follow the model shown in Figure 7 to implement any change. This Figure shows the specific concern of the subordinates to be addressed in each step. It also shows the specific basic condition fulfilled as the process goes on. During the implementation of these steps, every possible measure must be taken to fulfill the prerequisites of a favourable environment. A sense of urgency needs to be created before initiating a change. It can be created through a compelling story. Implementation of the change needs team effort. This has to be created in the second step. Articulation of a dynamic vision statement is required to convince the subordinates about sustainability of the change. Once these are done, change should be implemented and at the same time subordinates need to be trained on required skills to acquire ability to cope up with the change. However, it is better to train the subordinates on required skills before initiating the change. During the process, subordinates should be also encouraged through role modeling.

Figure 7: Suggested Approach to Implement Change



Source: Author's Construct


Measures to Make the Changes Sustainable

The key aspect for implementing any change remains sustainability. Implementation process should focus on long term sustainability of the changes. It would be very difficult to conceive a model which would guarantee sustainability of changes, but few factors as discussed below, if taken care of, may facilitate the process:

- a. **Fits to Context and Environment:** Perceived changes must fit to prevailing context and environment. This is required to convince people about the requirement of the changes, who will play a key role during implementation.
- b. **Focused on Quality not Quantity:** Any attempt to change should focus on maintaining quality rather than increasing quantity. For example, presently efforts are taken to encourage military personnel to pursue higher studies. Accordingly, necessary policy amendment is done to facilitate their access to higher studies. However, during implementation of this strategy, focus should remain on ensuring quality education for the members of the Armed Forces. It is to be remembered that, improvement in education standard does not only mean increase in number of higher degree holders, rather it should focus on attaining quality education. Otherwise, people will only possess lot of certificates, but will not be of any use to the organisation.
- c. **Implemented through Motivation not Compulsion:** If people are motivated to accept change, they are likely to follow it from the core of their heart. Through compulsion and punishment, they may be compelled to accept the changes, but at the first available opportunity they will get rid of it. For example, any attempt to encourage soldiers for higher education through putting it as a prerequisite for promotion to higher ranks may not fulfill ultimate aim. In that case, soldiers will try to earn a certificate in any way without caring for the quality of education. It may remain as prerequisite for promotion to different ranks, but that should not be considered as the only motivating tool. If importance and benefits of higher education for their post-retirement employment is deliberately highlighted to the subordinates, then they will automatically be encouraged to pursue quality higher education.

There could be many more factors which may assist to ensure sustainability of any change. People responsible for implementing changes need to have in-depth understanding of psychology of the target audience and follow appropriate approach.

Figure 8: Diagrammatic Representation of an Environment for Sustainable Changes



Source: Author's Construct

Conclusion

Command echelon at different levels of Bangladesh Armed Forces is entrusted with the responsibility of implementing changes at different times. Changes are taking place in every sphere of Armed Forces and a very well-conceived plan would be required to implement these changes. The ultimate aim of these changes is to develop professionally competent and operationally fit armed forces. Because, it is expected that it would be able to perform desired role in the future battlefield environment which is likely to be highly complex, fluid and dynamic. Soldiers are expected to be physically fit and well build, attuned with latest technological development and professionally competent.

History indicates that, implementation of changes is a difficult task. It is even more difficult to ensure sustainability of any change. Pragmatic and elaborate planning is needed to implement any sustainable change. In order to do so, people responsible for planning need to have an in-depth understanding of different aspects of change management. There are many literatures and theories available on change management. John Kotter's Eight-Step Model for implementing changes is decidedly applauded amongst the scholars of change management. Implementation of changes needs an appropriate environment. Favourable environment may be created through various efforts. However, few factors such as existence of a compelling story and role model, appropriate infrastructures/process and skill development programs can contribute significantly in creating favourable environment. It is to be remembered that, changes take time and demand deliberate planning. Plan should include various steps and for every step specific organisation/person/directorate should be assigned as lead role player. Time frame for implementing every step should also be included.

Unit is the most important platform for implementing changes. Situation varies between various units due to differences in type and composition. Commanders responsible for implementing changes will have to analyse various aspects of his/her unit and develop appropriate tools. A few tools, which are equally applicable for all types of units, are motivation, inspiration and development. Relative importance of these tools will vary for different units. Analysis of psychological and professional maturity of the soldiers will guide the commanders to decide on relative emphasis he/she should put on these factors to materialise proposed changes in the unit.

Changes must be time-tested and fit to the existing context. During implementation of changes, focus should remain on maintaining quality. Quality should not be compromised to increase quantity. Sometimes, changes are implemented without farsightedness and ultimately those cannot sustain in the long-run. In order to make changes sustainable, people need to be motivated through compelling story to feel necessity of the changes. Changes forced upon the members of any organisation are not likely to be continued in the absence of initiating authority. But, changes fitting to the existing environment and focused on maintaining quality during implementation are likely to sustain.

Changes implemented in Bangladesh Armed Forces are always perceived through detailed research of the foreseeable future battlefield environment and technological advancement. These are the need of time and therefore convincing people about necessity of these changes remains as an unraveled issue. Concern remains about maintaining quality. Commanders at different levels must remain focused on maintaining quality while endeavouring to improve statistical figures. Units will then be really benefitted, otherwise the development will only help to have lucrative statistics for formal briefing and will fall back to start point again within a very short time. Bangladesh Armed Forces has launched an all-out effort to undertake many required changes and it is expected that everybody will put their sincere effort to implement the changes smoothly and effectively. Commanders at all levels should acquire required theoretical knowledge on change management to conceive appropriate plan. Changes are needed and authority has prudently visualised and initiated required efforts. Now, it is the responsibility of the members of Bangladesh Armed Forces to direct the wave of changes to the right direction, so that organisation achieves sustainable and quality growth.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Colonel Md Kamrul Hassan, psc, G, Arty was commissioned in Artillery in 1997. He held various appointments in number of Artillery Regiments. He has served as General Staff Officer Grade-III (Operations) in an infantry brigade, General Staff Officer Grade-II in Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and General Staff Officer Grade-I in Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTDOC). He participated in UNMIL as a Staff Officer at Force Headquarters and in MONUSCO as the Chief Operations Officer (COO) of BANBAT 1/20. He has commanded two Artillery units. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and Nepal Army Command and Staff College. He obtained Masters in Strategic Studies from Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu and Masters in Business Administration (Executive) from Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Dhaka University. Presently he is serving as Directing Staff in Defence Services Command and Staff College.

THE ROHINGYA: SAGA OF DELIBERATE DENATURALIZATION¹

Brigadier General Mohammad Asadullah Minhazul Alam, ndu, psc

Abstract

From an eye witness perspective, this write up underscores a crucial concern: the Rohingya Issue is gradually getting normalized and forgotten by Myanmar's delay and denial. It was written a while ago, fairly before the development concerning ICJ trial and hearing on Myanmar Rohingya occurred. Meanwhile things moved along, following a case filed by the African nation Gambia under the gamut of Organization of Islamic Cooperation. An ICJ ruling came in place, at The Hague on 23 January 20, a 'justice' was served. We were pleased and the Rohingyas became delighted. But Myanmar is unmoved; they defiantly rejected the ICJ ruling immediately after. Almost a year after the ruling, an inept global conscience merely watches how appeasement and ratification by powerful states allow Myanmar orchestrating a planned denaturalization. And they were doing the same repeatedly in the past. Disregarding all types of global pledges, criticism and condemnation, Myanmar was successful with a strategy of procrastination – 'doing nothing and waiting for things getting 'normalized' with time'.

Photo 1: Rohingya baby Mohammed Shohayet (left) and Syrian baby Aylan Kurdi



Source: Author's Collection

Inept Empathy

On a fateful morning of January 2017, 16 months old Mohammad Shohayet's lifeless body was discovered on the bank of river Naf. He was washed ashore, when the boat carrying his fleeing family had capsized.² With him, his mother, brother and uncle died too, leaving his father Zafar Alam the lone survivor. They were escaping from dreadful persecution by the Myanmar Tatmadaw who were carrying out 'clearance operation' in Rakhine. Shohayet's in print image reminded Aylan Kurdi and their photomontage (above) first appeared in *India Today's* 5th January 2017 issue. Yes, there were resemblances. Both were laying face down, one on the bank of Naf in 2017 and the other on the Turkish beach in 2015. Both happened while escaping violence and persecution. And both were definite shame on humanity, exposing empty rhetoric brags on 'justice'.

But there is a stark dissimilarity too. The 2015 picture made it to capture huge attention and shook global conscience. The 2017 picture did not, and remained less-focused.

The picture of Shohayet soon lost its appeal in the later events of August 2017, when more than seven lakh Rohingyas had fled to Bangladesh following extreme violence and brutality. They had to flee, following a systemically orchestrated persecution, massacre, rape, looting and getting burned alive. They were eventually forced to accept a living condition cramped in a tiny 44 square kilometre area of Ukhia And Teknaf, with one of the highest population density ever (in Kutupalong its 46000 per sq km). They had no other choice but to accept surviving with all kinds of threats and vulnerabilities: natural disaster, pandemic, extremism, uncertainty, all kinds of 'trafficking' crime and provocation. With the Corona outbreak, many considered and compared them 'sitting on a time bomb'. Fortunately, nothing serious happened. But by now, the fateful Rohingyas have become good subjects for talk shows, aid collections, symposiums and research. Their status, though, remained unchanged, hanging and uncertain since last three years. Taking advantage of inadequate 'pressure' from the world community, Myanmar adopted a strategy to procrastinate as much as possible. Meanwhile, as they would expect, there could be several things happening; the issue would eventually be forgotten or lose focus, the Rohingyas would disperse all over or 'dilute' with the mainstream Bangladesh citizens. Without a doubt, the entire population is being tactfully 'de-naturalized' by their own government. Such thing happened with the Native Americans in the USA. There in 1790, the US Naturalization Act allowed only '*Free White Persons of Good Character*' for citizenship. That act barred Native Americans (American 'Indians'), slaves, free blacks and others from becoming US citizen. The situation improved later, following the American Civil War, the 14th Amendment in 1868 granted citizenship to people 'born within the United States',³ but still excluded 'untaxed Indians'.⁴ These unfortunate

‘natives’ had to wait for almost one and a half century (until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) to be the citizens of their own land. America kept their ‘natural-native-indigenous’ citizens de-naturalized for almost one and a half century!⁵ Myanmar did the same thing with the Rohingya population by 1982 citizenship law. Firstly, it excluded them as one of the ‘recognized’ ethnic group to be included in the status of citizen. Then it enforced a ‘burden of proof’ for them to get recognized as ‘naturalized citizen’⁶ demanding to provide “conclusive evidence” that they entered and resided in Myanmar prior to 4 January 1948. Despite repeated international call to ‘abolish its over-burdensome requirements’, Myanmar never showed any interest to review those clauses. The international efforts so far looked ‘compassionate but inept’ against stubborn stance of Myanmar.

Why is Myanmar so obstinate to affect forced de-naturalization of this community? What is the real truth about the legitimate right of the Rohingya?

A Historic Identity: Tracing Back their Earliest Settlement

Historically, Rohingya community claims older ancestry than the Barmars in Arakan. The Kingdom of Arakan was captured and annexed to ‘Burma’ only after 1784, before which it shined and prospered even better than many of its neighbouring kingdoms. But it would be wise to start from present and then trail back into the history pages. The exodus of Rohingya or Ruáingga⁷ (now officially called as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Citizen) from their ancestral homeland to Bangladesh occurred several times in the past: notably in the years of 1942, 1978, 1991, 2012, 2016 and in 2017. However, they are not the only community to be pushed into our country from Myanmar or erstwhile Burma. The Rakhines are the other group that endured brutal persecution and sufferings on several occasions. The one occurred in 1784, following Bamar occupation of Arakan capital Mrauk U by Burmese King Bodawpaya, made tens of thousands of Rakhine crossing the border. To settle these huge refugees, Captain Hiram Cox was sent to Palongkee (present day Cox’s Bazaar) in 1899 by East India Company. It is needless to mention that those Rakhines were eventually ‘naturalized’ in the local community. Likewise, in almost all the instances of the deliberate Rohingya persecutions and forceful displacement in the past, a large number got ‘auto-diluted’ or assimilated into the local Bangladeshi population.

But the identity and rights of the Arakanese Muslims (that include Rohingya as the major group) are historically confirmed beyond debates. Their lawful claims are well-proven by the accounts of Burmese historians (like Dr. Than Tun),⁸ European missionaries (i.e. Fray Sebastien Manrique in 1629-1643), Dutch traders and doctors (i.e. Surgeon Wouter

Schouten in 1666), British officials (Francis Buchanan in 1798, Sir A. P. Phayre ⁹ in 1862-67, G E Harvey in 1824), eminent poets in Rosang or Arakan (Alaol, Doulat Kazi in mid 17th Century), court chronicle of Rakhine(Rakhine Razawin, compiled in 18th/19th century), international diplomat(Moshe Yegar) etc.¹⁰ In 1795, Francis Buchanan Hamilton - an extensive traveller of colonized India and a member of the British emissary to King Bodawpaya - spent nine months (February to October) in Amrapura (former Burmese Capital). He clearly mentioned about one Muslim community, “who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga or natives of Arakan”.¹¹ Regarded as a masterwork, surgeon-surveyor-botanist Francis Buchanan’s comprehensive report of 1799 included the whole lot from geography to agriculture, forestry, ethnicity, demography, culture, religion, commerce and many more about the Chittagong-Arakan region. His findings were available within fifteen years after Burmese occupation of Mrauk U and it proved that regardless of extreme brutality that displaced so many Arakanese, the Rohingyas were still maintaining their existence in Arakan.

Medieval era Bengalee poet Alaol (1607-73) made elaborate references about the *Rosang* in his works. Together with many other Muslim ministers, generals, elites and noblemen in the Arakanese court (including Magan Thakur, Prime Minister of King Sanda Thudhamma of the Mrauk-U), Alaol also mentioned vividly about more than thirty different ethnicities ‘sheltered’ under the ‘umbrella of Rosang Royalty’. He was also there when in August 1660, Mughal Prince Shah Shuja sought asylum after being pursued by his brother’s forces. While Shuja was later killed with his family members, his soldiers and guards settled down and were taken into the Royal Army. They were later known as Kamanchi (special archers unit. From the Persian word *Kaman* or bow, bowman or *kamanchi*).¹² Likewise, as rightly observed in Banglapedia, ‘the Muslims coming outside in the medieval period began settling in Arakan ... divided in to five distinct communities, namely Roayingya, Jamboyika, Kamanchi, Zerbadi and Dinnet’.¹³ Needless to mention, there are phenomenal works by eminent Bengali historians like Dr Abdul Karim, Abdul Haq Choudhury which substantiate how the Rohingya identity was built upon the cornerstones of historical continuity. Their existence was well accepted, absorbed and integrated with Rohingya personalities contributing immensely during Burma’s transition to independence. Some of them were influential Ministers (i.e. M A Gaffar, Sultan Mahmud)¹⁴ and MPs in Burmese National Assembly. The locals of Chattogram have long been using the term *Ruainga* to denote the Muslim communities of the *Rosang* Kingdom of the Kaladan valley.

Thereby Rohingyas are an intermingled community coming from all different sources and contexts over a period of more than one thousand years : shipwrecked Arab traders at the coast of Akyab (in 8th-9th century), descendants of the 30,000 army sent by Sultan

of Bengal Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah to reinstate Meng Soamun or Narmeikhla (in 1434), successors of captured and enslaved humans by the Mog–Portuguese Pirates(16th-17th Century), surviving companions of Shah Shuja(1660), permanently settled farmers and labourers by the British rulers(19th-early 20th century) etc.

Their identity as ‘Rohingya’ is not based on classical anthropological/ethnological/racial antiquity, rather a geographic character that came from the name of the Arakan’s capital city Mro Hong - Rohong - Roainga . Initially, it was a casual colloquial term mostly used by the people in the southern Chattogram and Arakan. But over a period of few hundred years, it gained ground to have own linguistic, cultural uniqueness tested by time. Thus the collective ‘Roainga’ identity has been formed through ‘continuity, uniqueness and affiliation’. And the Rohingyas obtained several centuries of ancestral claims in Arakan. They have been living in the Kaladan Valley even before the Burmans came to capture it first time in 1406, and finally in 1876. Their rights of the land can claim greater antiquity than the settler colonialists in North America and Oceania, or many other similar communities across the world.

Forced De-naturalization

There are political, economic, social, ethnic dimensions of the present day Rohingya crisis that had evolved over a period of few centuries. These dimensions have overlapping and interconnected factors. Once their rights were denied, and they were facing existential threat and identity crisis, Rohingyas sought ways through ‘identity politics’.

Rohingyas were living comfortably during sovereign Mrauk U era, even until the Burmese occupation took place in 1784. Led by King Bodawpaya’s General Moha Bandula, that shocking saga led to the annexation of the Kingdom of Arakan, initiating the foremost experience of facing persecution as a community. But that came together with the Arakanese natives (commonly known as Magh) who were the primary targets of Bandula. However, the Rohingyas never had experienced the xenophobic hatred before the end of WW II. While the British rulers left, the conflict between the local Buddhist and the Rohingya surfaced. The British colonial era created divisions between the Bamars and minority ethnic groups. It was evident during World War II, the Bamars were with the Japanese during the initial stages, and the ethnic minority groups, such as the Karen (Christian), the Kachin, and the Rohingya, were supporting the British.

After the independence in 1948, Buddhist nationalism rose in Burma. It was fuelled by factors like propagated Islamophobia, growth of Rohingya community, Rohingya’s control of economic activities etc. Religion was used to transmit hatred and

misinformation; narratives were created using numerology to show that in 21st century Muslims would take control of the Burma. The 969 Movement led by the extreme Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu spread that rapid growth and high fertility rates of the Rohingya would overtake local Buddhist populations, and in future, Muslims would dominate in Myanmar.

In 1962 General Ne Win came to power through a military coup, and the systematic denial began. The Rohingyas were denied the right to vote and lost their status as citizens. In 1977 Operation Nagamin or Dragon King was launched to screen the population from foreigners. More than 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, amid allegations of army abuses. Since 1970s the Rohingya people have been persecuted on a regular basis by the government and nationalist Buddhists. The tensions between the various religious groups in the country were often exploited by past military rulers of Myanmar. They were officially denied Burmese citizenship since 1982, by not being recognized as one of the 135 naturalized ethnic groups.

Systematic persecution, ethnic cleansing effort continued leading to 2012 riot. In 2016 so called ARSA attacked security forces, Tatmadaw found an 'excuse' they needed and the Rohingyas were driven out. Many firmly believe that the 'excuse' was created to substantiate the persecution. Till today, the so called ARSA prevailed only in papers and Myanmar's routine accusations. Nobody ever heard of the names of their leaders; their existence could never be found the camps as well.

Long Wait for Justice: Genuine Concerns

Rohingya commoners in general do not want to continue living here in Bangladesh, despite going through indescribable horrible brutal experiences in Rakhine. They left their homes, lands and farms in Maungdaw, Buthidoung, Rathidoung, Foiraz Bazar, Akyab and elsewhere in Rakhine. Their ancestors and forefathers are buried there in the Kaladan Valley; that's where they belong to, not here in Ukhia. Almost all of them want just some assurance of believable security commitment by the Myanmar Government. All they want is justice.

But there have been hardly any progress so far. International efforts and urges were repulsed back from the dormant doorway of Myanmar. Rhetoric's have been dominant in meetings, seminars and research papers. Meanwhile more than eighty thousand new children were born in shanties; almost three years were lost from the education calendar, and the Rohingya villages in Rakhine were turned into military camps or Buddhist settlement.¹⁵

Is the Rohingya issue losing focus? Apart from sporadic UN moves, filing cases and ICJ rulings, are there major efforts and initiatives? In responding to these queries, many would be sceptical. In the same way, a local from Cox's Bazaar once expressed, 'what the world is waiting for, you know? Waiting to have them diluted among us and solve the problem'. His frustrated concerns could be valid. In the Kutupalong and Noyapara *registered camps*, still there are almost forty four thousand 'old' Rohingyas; they came during past influxes, in 1995, 1997 and in other times. Many of them got married here, started new lives and had children. They never went back.

For Bangladesh, it's a serious concern of national security. Whatever may be named: merging, diluting, incorporation, absorption, and assimilation - the possibilities of Rohingyas getting into our mainstream society looms large. For the moment, the assurance of food, shelter, security and a dim hope of return keep the fateful Rohingyas connected with the camps. If there are better opportunities elsewhere, maybe a desperate lookout for secured future will drive them going out. By now many of them were able to sneak past the camp perimeter, some managed to get Bangladeshi identity and many attempted to spread out wherever they thought opportunity prevailed. The community turned out to be lucrative illicit business opportunity for human traffickers. According to IOM (International Organization for Migration), in only seven months between December 2018 to June 2019, there were 420 identified cases of human trafficking.¹⁶ Most of these identified cases were reported from nearby and Cox's Bazar where men were made to work in factories, construction sites and the fishing industry while women were forced into domestic servitude'.¹⁷ Needless to mention that the unidentified numbers spread all over the country could be few times more. Very often, they security and law enforcing forces struggle to send back Rohingyas attempting to get past the check posts. Despite heavy presence of the security and the law enforcing agencies, Rohingyas were found in different corners of the country; on numerous occasions many of them were rescued from sea bound trawlers and boats.

In all those thirty plus camps of Cox's Bazar, Rohingyas live inadequately governed, relatively less accounted for (unlike a 'citizen'), uneducated and unemployed. They are being fed and taken care of by international/ national NGOs and humanitarian organizations. But there is no employment opportunities, no education for their children and nothing for a youth to dream for. Their world has been limited within 44 sq kilometres. Their general psyche is constructed upon uncertainty of their lives and future. Their out of work youths are exposed to drug and human trafficking business, criminal gang culture, extremism and similar exploitations. With a future picture that does not give much to hope for, these people are bound to look for better opportunities. This trend will increase. Once they try to get out, they are perhaps out with unidentified HIV cases

(as on December 2019 identified cases were 316), probably some brainwashed by extremist groups and many others with unknown intention. This way, while the rest of the world procrastinates and we continue to worry, the fear of the Rohingyas getting auto-naturalized in our country could actually happen!

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4. American natives living in ‘reservations’ (dedicated areas with some autonomy).
5. During a field practicum of American Studies in Montana, USA as part of the study curriculum offered a basic learning on US Naturalization Act of 1790. It laid down the initial policies for granting of US national citizenship. It was later replaced by Naturalization Acts of 1795, 1798, 1802, 1870. These days US ‘naturalization’ involves either a statutory approval, or by application and motion of approval. Nevertheless, today’s USA sets clear policies regarding naturalization and immigration. Both are distinct; the former is about political right, and the latter may be about ‘property right’, in layman terms.
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Brief Biography



Brigadier General Mohammad Asadaullah Minhazul Alam, ndu, psc holds an ongoing 29 years plus long career. His wide experience includes working as UNMO (UNTAET), serving at the CHTs on five alternate terms including commanding a battalion, serving as Directing Staff in DSCSC, commanding a contingent in Kuwait, founding Army War Game Centre etc. Brigadier General Minhaz commanded 2 Infantry Brigade in Ramu that was deeply involved in dealing with security management of Rohingya (FDMN) affairs. Brigadier General Minhaz obtained MDS from DSCSC, Mirpur; he is also a graduate from Singapore Command and Staff College. In 2018, He obtained MSC in National Security Strategy from National Defence University (NDU), USA. Brigadier General Minhaz is married to Syeda Marzia Begum and father of two daughters. His write-ups have been published in number of military journals and national dailies. His first book titled, *Band of Brothers and the Societal Debt* was published in 2010. Currently he is commanding a sector in MINUSCA.

REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA: A HOLISTIC APPROACH

Major Mohamad Manzur Hasan, psc, ASC

Abstract

World politics seems to be a paradox to many. Interest is the only determinant of maintaining relations with other countries. From the outset of military rule, Myanmar Army has been striving to subjugate the country by the Buddhists. They reckoned the Rohingya Muslims as a threat to their subsistence. So, they started injecting the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Total 16 states around the globe have been affected by the influx of Rohingya who are unhinging the harmony of those countries. Fact is that Myanmar has insinuated the poison to quell the chapter of Rohingya once for all. Being the developing nations with almost 17 crore population, Bangladesh is not in a state to shoulder the burden of an additional 1.1 million Rohingya who bemuse both traditional and non-traditional security threat. It is Bangladesh which is lamenting most for the presence of Rohingya. At the backdrop, it is much pertinent to unravel the Rohingya issue to ensure their rights and citizenship at Myanmar as well as to ensure the internal stability of Bangladesh. Initially, the strategy adopted by Bangladesh has been illustrated focusing mainly on soft power strategy. Then, the progress so far made for the safe and dignified return of Rohingya has been cogitated. Later, the paper has diagnosed the impediments which have induced hedge for repatriation. Confessing the intricacy of Rohingya issue which cannot be corkscrewed in the blink of an eye, the paper then advocates adopting smart power strategy for the smooth repatriation of Rohingya. Eventually, the inquest is haled to a close with some feasible recommendations.

Introduction

Human civilization has seen many wax and wane since the age of stone. From Alexander's age to the United States of America's age, the usurpation of land has been a common phenomenon. Nobody in the world has ever wanted to leave their motherland even after tremendous suppression and prosecution. People of many nations oppugned to rack up independence to establish their rights. There are rare occasions when a country finds to disavow its citizens. Myanmar is one of the countries which maltreats her citizens, especially the Rohingya. The ethnic group settled in Arakan in the 7th century was ignobly scorned by Myanmar. This story of maltreatment with the Rohingya started in 1784 when Burmese King Bodawpaya conquered independent Arakan.¹ The story of refrainment on the Rohingya remains the same till today.

Myanmar recognized the Rohingya as the legal citizen under the Union Citizenship Act 1948.² But Citizenship Law of 1982 has coerced them to be stateless in the land of their ancestors. Thus the Rohingya are bereaved of rights and basic needs of a citizen. They were devoid of pursuing higher education, reaping a job, moving freely within the country, and getting medical treatment. Because of the tremendous duress catalyzed by the Myanmar government, Rohingya started extricating to many parts of the world from 1978. From 1978 till today, 2.6 million Rohingya have forsaken Myanmar due to widespread victimization.

For Operation King Dragon by the Burmese Army, the first wave of Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh in 1978.³ The second wave of Rohingya refugees was pushed into Bangladesh in 1991 due to the post-election operation. In the name of cleansing Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Myanmar Army started clearance operations, which has initiated the highest number of Rohingya refugees pouring into Bangladesh from August 2017 to the mid of 2018. Bangladesh had never refuted to assist the Rohingya refugees when their fate was undecided. Sheikh Hasina, Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh, says, “It is a responsibility of every human being to stand beside the distressed humanity. It would be inhumane if we do not stand beside the Rohingyas at the time of their distress.” From the very incipency, Bangladesh is trying to unriddle the issue utilizing soft power strategy. Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a repatriation deal on 23 November 2017. Even after pursuing soft power strategy, the repatriation process has not yet commenced. There are legion impediments that need extirpation for the smooth repatriation of Rohingya refugees. At this backdrop, it is very much peremptory to identify and adopt appropriate strategy by Bangladesh for ensuring the repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

STRATEGY ADOPTED BY BANGLADESH FOR THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA

The problem originated in 1978 and cannot be cracked in the blink of an eye. Pushing the Rohingya inside Bangladesh is a well-organized Myanmar plan, which was crafted in the 1980s.⁴ Sensing Myanmar’s evil design, Bangladesh is also stepping forward with great circumspection utilizing soft power strategy involving international organizations, friendly countries, and superpowers.⁵

Involvement of International Organizations, Superpowers and Friendly Countries:

Bangladesh government has correctly diagnosed the key to unlock the Rohingya issue by involving international Organizations.⁶ Rohingya issue has been mooted in various international forums by Bangladesh government. The superpowers are bifurcated in

Rohingya issue where the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France are in favour of Rohingya. On the other hand, Russia and China are in favour of Myanmar. Besides involving superpowers, involving friendly countries was also a precise Bangladesh government decision. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina held a meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe on 29 May 2019 to descry early solutions to the Rohingya crisis.⁷ Bangladesh has also sent a parliamentary delegation team to Thailand and Singapore to entice those countries.

Treating the Rohingya as Refugee: The Rohingya, who evanesced from Myanmar to Bangladesh, are termed ‘Refugee’ by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations.⁸ The government has iced all required rights of the Rohingya such as habitation, food, health, and education with international partners’ backing.⁹ Various basic needs ensured by Bangladesh government for the Rohingya are shown below in Table 1.


Table 1: Basic Needs Provided to the Rohingya

Serial	Subject	Present State	Remarks
1.	Total Allotted land	6,500 acres	Includes the area of various camps at Teknaf and Ukhia Upazila
2.	Construction of houses	2,12,607	Prepared as temporary shelter
3.	Food and other essential relief	8,67,019	Under general food distribution 4,62,533 and electronic voucher 4,04,486
4.	Learning centres	3271	1,77,725x boys and girls (14 years and below) are getting education on English and Myanmar language
5.	Establishment of hospitals	7	In addition of field hospital, 162x primary medical treatment centres have been established

Source: Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner Office Report

Adaptation and Confinement: Adaptation of the Rohingya with the environment and confinement within the camps has been a phenomenal verdict of the Bangladesh government. Bangladesh government has circumscribed the Rohingya within the camps to avoid merging with the mass population of Bangladesh.¹⁰ Figure 1 validates the above statement.

Figure 1: Necessity of Confinement of Rohingya



Source: Survey by the Author

Strengthening the Armed Forces: Due to threat, Bangladesh government has fortified 10 Infantry Division in terms of manpower, armaments, and resources.¹¹ Bangladesh Navy purchased 2x Submarines, 2x Frigates, and 2x Corvettes to dissuade Myanmar's maritime threat. It has also furnished its ships with latest armaments and weapon system.¹² Bangladesh Air Force has also hardened its Base Zahur located at Chattogram with additional fighter squadron and air defence radar.¹³

PROGRESS MADE FOR THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA

Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina remarks, "I don't want to fight with anybody. I want a peaceful solution because they (Myanmar) are my next-door neighbour".¹⁴ Bangladesh government has done her best to effectuate pressure on Myanmar, entailing the global community utilizing soft power strategy.

Signing of Agreements: Bangladesh and Myanmar inked a Memorandum of Understanding on 23 November 2017 regarding the repatriation of Rohingya refugees. According to Memorandum, the repatriation was supposed to begin on 23 January 2018. Myanmar government consented to repatriate only 374 Rohingya refugees out of a list of over 8,000 advocated by Bangladesh on 14 March 2018. Bangladesh signed another Memorandum of Understanding with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the voluntary returns of Rohingya refugees on 13 April 2018.¹⁵

Trial of Genocide at International Court of Justice: Gambia filed a case at the International Court of Justice on 11 November 2019 alleging Myanmar's brutalities against the Rohingya. Gambia claimed the transgression of 'Genocide Convention' by Myanmar and filed the case under article 9 of the convention. The International Court of

Justice gave a verdict on 23 January 2020 ordaining Myanmar to terminate genocide which has created considerable amount of global pressure on Myanmar.¹⁶

Support of International Organizations: International Organizations responded incontinently on Rohingya issue upon the call of Bangladesh. Total 15 international organizations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Organization for Migration, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank etcetera are operating along with Bangladesh government to back the Rohingya refugees.¹⁷ A table showing the state of the fund raised by international organizations to support the Rohingya is given below in Table 2.


Diplomatic Initiative: Bangladesh government has integrated all available international and regional forums, which can create compulsion on Myanmar.¹⁸ Even after pursuing all accessible diplomatic means, the repatriation has not commenced on 23 January 2018. It seems that it will be sinewy to begin the repatriation process only by soft power strategy.

Table 2: Total Fund Raised by International Organizations

Serial	Name of Organization	Duration	Total Fund Raised (in million \$)
1.	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Up to 27 January 2021	1871
2.	International Organization for Migration		156.2
3.	United Nations Children’s Fund		24.2
4.	World Bank		594
5.	Asian Development Bank		209

Source: Official Websites of the Organizations

Figure 2: Possibility of Repatriation of Rohingya by Diplomacy



Source: Focus Group Discussion by the Author

Creation of Pressure on Myanmar

The global pressure begot on Myanmar seems very asthenic. The United States of America has imposed sanctions on Myanmar's top general and three senior officers, accusing them of contravening human rights against Rohingya Muslims.¹⁹ Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have also imposed sanctions on Myanmar's military leaders for human rights' trespass against the Rohingya.

IMPEDIMENTS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA

Despite the expedients of Bangladesh government, coveted precipitate has not been notched up. The impediments are standing like the Great Wall of China in front of the repatriation process. Barriers are mostly erected by Myanmar and to some extent by superpowers and regional powers.²⁰

Absence of Long Term Political Stability: Absence of long term political stability of Myanmar is forsooth amenable for not allowing the repatriation. The political parties were never concerted after the independence of Myanmar.²¹ When the country began to flourish, political government was thrown from the power by the Myanmar Army. Myanmar Military was in power for 49 years within 72 years of their independence. Myanmar military is still in power after 2011 under the disguise of democracy.

Lack of Conducive Environment: The Rohingya seem to be unwilling as they are aghast about the dearth of conducive environment in Myanmar.²² Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina says, "We have seen that Myanmar could not win Rohingyas' trust in creating a conducive situation in Rakhine state for their dignified return." The genocide took place against the Rohingya in 2017. More than 7,00,000 Rohingya evanescenced abroad since August 2017. Burning of properties, arbitrary arrest, brutalities against civilians, and looting were also compassed to yield a menacing situation. Sheikh Hasina, Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh very rightly observes, "It's an issue solely between Myanmar and its own people, the Rohingyas. They themselves have to resolve it."

Historical Suppression on Rohingya: Tension betwixt the Rohingya and the Buddhists in Rakhine state has existed for centuries.²³ Despite their immanent local roots, successive governments have refuted the historical claim of the Rohingya. They are devoid of fundamental human rights with no gateway to education, health, or other government services. They are not even accredited to move willingly or maroon their settlements without the concurrence of the government.


Feeble Bilateral Relations: Although Myanmar recognized the independence of Bangladesh as 6th nation on 13 January 1972, the bilateral relationship has not blossomed as coveted.²⁴ The amount of trade exchange between Bangladesh-India is \$8,893 million annually, where Bangladesh-Myanmar has reached only \$700 million annually. Due to various bones of contention, bilateral diplomatic relations could not touch the peak; instead, it has been exacerbated. Bangladesh and Myanmar do not exchange any military training since 2015.²⁵

Lack of Role of Superpowers and Stubbornness of Regional Powers: Due to strategic catbird seat, the superpowers are more captivated towards Myanmar. The United States of America imposed economic and military sanctions on Myanmar in 1988, military embargo in 1993, economic sanction in 1997 and 2008, and military sanction in 2019.²⁶ China has been a devout crony of Myanmar since her independence. Whenever the United Nations Security Council repined for taking any action, China vetoed and backstopped Myanmar to elude various stringent sanctions.²⁷ Myanmar has budged her immersion towards India to invigorate strategic relations in recent years. India is the closest sympathizers of Bangladesh which has also remained dumb in Rohingya issue.

ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE STRATEGY FOR REPATRIATION

As there has not been revelatory furtherance for last three years, so it is high time to cling to appropriate strategy to ensure the repatriation of Rohingya. If the felicitous strategy cannot be goose-stepped, it will take more 7-10 years to ice the repatriation.²⁸ Adoption of smart power will forsooth induce better fruit for the repatriation of Rohingya.

Figure 3: Strategy to be Adopted by Bangladesh



Source: Author's Construct

Involvement of Superpowers and Regional Powers: Time has come to take rigorous drive against Myanmar by the superpowers. Sanction on import and export of weaponry, expropriation of property and congealing of bank accounts of all top military and political leaders and embargo on their travel will put Myanmar into quagmire. Bangladesh should schematize international dialogues, seminars, and protests portraying the ghastliness of holocaust to attract the enthrallment of civil society of Japan and India. Thus the civil society will catalyze pressure on their govt to recede the abetment from Myanmar. Concurrently, Bangladesh should strive for diplomatic manoeuvre both with India and China to shelve their investment from Myanmar until they resolve the Rohingya issue.²⁹

Involvement of International Organizations: Bangladesh should moot the Rohingya genocide issue to all United Nations bodies. The United Nations Security Council should be furnished with all relevant proofs and statistics of Rohingya carnage so that they remain unanimous in taking drastic economic and military sanction against Myanmar.³⁰ This issue should also be elaborately canvassed in the United Nations General Assembly so that all member states curb themselves in continuing political, diplomatic, and military relations with Myanmar.

Improvement of Bilateral Relations: Bangladesh has always been prescient to maintain salubrious bilateral relations with Myanmar. Bangladesh government should italicize on meliorating the diplomatic relations by the head of the state's visit, organizing bilateral talks, and signing of agreements on the unresolved issues. Formal trade with Myanmar necessitates being amplified and felonious items coming from Myanmar require to be stopped. Frequent goodwill visits of high military leaders, joint training and exercises, and allowing officers and men's training in both the states' military institution will enrich bilateral military relations.³¹

Involvement of Rohingya Influx Affected States: Bangladesh should integrate all sixteen states as they are also shouldering the burden of Rohingya. Name of the hosting states with total number of Rohingya residing is appended below in Table 3:

Table 3: Name of Rohingya Hosting States with Number of Rohingya

Serial	Name of the State	Number of Rohingya	Remarks
1.	BD	16,00000	Around 1.4 million registered and 200,000 unregistered
2.	Saudi Arabia	4,70,000	Around 2,70,000 registered and 2,00000 unregistered
3.	Pakistan	4,50,000	

Serial	Name of the State	Number of Rohingya	Remarks
4.	Malaysia	2,00,000	Around 100,000 registered and 100,000 unregistered
5.	India	50,000	
6.	United Arab Emirates	50,000	
7.	Thailand	5,000	
8.	Australia	5,000	
9.	USA	5,000	
10.	EU	3,000	
11.	Jordan	1,300	
12.	Indonesia	1,200	
13.	Canada	1,100	
14.	Nepal	800	
15.	Sri Lanka	650	
16.	Japan	560	

Source: Anadolu Agency Website

All these states should be emboldened to take brassbound action against Myanmar. Forming of an alliance will be an excellent option to expedite the avouch of Rohingya hosting states. Concurrently, Bangladesh government should also appoint one special envoy for visiting Rohingya hosting states.³²

Raising Global Awareness: The first and foremost approach to raise global awareness by Bangladesh should include regular visit at Rohingya camps by notable international leaders, human rights workers, and civil society members to understand their woes. Social, print, and electronic media should be consistently harnessed by Bangladesh to blazon the woes and griefs of the Rohingya refugees exemplifying the grisliness of massacre.³³

Strengthening of Armed Forces: A stringent message should be transmitted to Myanmar that Bangladesh Armed Forces are alacritous to bulwark its sovereignty. Bangladesh Armed Forces should restructure herself in terms of doctrine, equipment, training, and manpower keeping the view of Myanmar. Bangladesh Army should be equipped with new artillery guns with long-range, latest air defence system, anti-tank weapon, and modern obstacle system. Bangladesh Navy should be equipped with modern Frigates and Submarines. Bangladesh Air Force should be furnished with the latest Multi Role Combat Aircraft, air defence system, and surface to air missile unit.³⁴

Hardening of Border Security: Bangladesh should harden the border security so that

no further influx of Rohingya refugees can be poured. Border Guard Bangladesh should respond to any act of further push in of Rohingya with valiant effort. In doing so, the border security system of Border Guard Bangladesh needs to be restructured in terms of equipment and manpower. Bangladesh should pronto consummate the border fencing with a smart detection system and searchlight.³⁵

Conclusion

The Rohingya, who were settled in Arakan in the 7th century was initially recognized by Myanmar government in 1948. To materialize the blueprint, they conducted several military operations and thus the influxes of Rohingya were poured into Bangladesh consecutively in 1978, 1991 and 2017. Among them, the influx of Rohingya of 2017 is the most catastrophic event of humanity in the 21st century. Repatriation seems to be the ultimate solution of the Rohingya issue. There have been eloquent achievements for following soft power strategy. But it has not been fruitful to create enough global pressure on Myanmar which in turn will compel for the dignified and safe return of the Rohingya.

The strategy of Bangladesh to unriddle the Rohingya issue has been swivelling around the soft power strategy. The issue has been internationalized utilizing the United Nations, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Commonwealth, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Superpowers have also recognized the act as genocide. The progress has been evolved mainly on soft power strategy. Repatriation agreement has been an important success of Bangladesh government. The interim verdict of International Court of Justice is a historic step against Myanmar.

There lies some cactus like impediments which are not being uprooted even after meticulous and planned diplomacy. Internal problems of Myanmar, bilateral issues between Bangladesh-Myanmar, and extra-regional problems are posing threat to the repatriation process. Lack of role of superpowers and regional powers have been responsible for slackening the repatriation.

It is monumental to adopt the appropriate strategy by Bangladesh for ensuring the repatriation of Rohingya. It seems that smart power will be prolific in cinching the repatriation of Rohingya. The overriding and premier steps in smart power are integrating international organizations, superpowers, and regional powers which can impose strict economic and military sanction on Myanmar. Besides these, the border security needs to be fortified and Bangladesh Armed Forces needs to be strengthened.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for ensuring the repatriation of Rohingya:

- a. Bangladesh government should appoint one special envoy (preferably any former permanent representative of Bangladesh in United Nations) within next six months for visiting the Rohingya hosting states to gain favour on Rohingya issue.
- b. Bangladesh government should endeavour to form an alliance taking all Rohingya hosting states on board within next one year to expedite the safe and dignified return of the Rohingya.
- c. Bangladesh government should evoke notable international leaders, human rights workers, and civil society members to inspect the Rohingya camps at an interval of every three months to show them the affliction the Rohingya experienced during the genocide.
- d. Bangladesh Army should incorporate new doctrine (especially fighting in hilly and jungle terrain) within next one year focusing Myanmar and task 10 and 24 Infantry Division to implement the doctrine in yearly Summer and Winter Training to find out the feasibility with its opportunities and limitations.
- e. Bangladesh Navy should procure two Ming class Submarines and two Ulsan class Frigates within next three years.
- f. Bangladesh Air Force should procure two squadron of Sukhoi Su-57 fighter aircraft/ equivalent from Russia/other countries within next eight years.

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Brief Biography



Major Mohamad Manzur Hasan, psc, ASC was born on 26 July 1986 at Chandpur Sadar. He passed Secondary School Certificate examination from Satarkul High School and Higher Secondary Certificate examination from Notre Dame College. He was commissioned with 57th BMA Long Course in Army Services Corps on 13 Dec 2007. He served in different units and held all the regimental appointments within his capacity. He has served as General Staff Officer-2(Coordination) in Army Service Corps Centre and School and Officer Commanding at Station Supply Depot Quadirabad Cantonment. Besides mandatory courses, he attended Potential Platoon Commander Course, Officer Military Police Course, and Mid-Career Course at Pakistan. The officer completed Executive Masters in Business Administration from Independent University. He has participated in United Nations Peace keeping Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo as Mechanical Transport Officer. He has graduated from Defence Services Command and Staff College Course in 2020-2021 at Mirpur Cantonment. He is married and blessed with a daughter.

BANGLADESH IN UN PEACEKEEPING – SECRET BEHIND THE SUCCESS AND THE PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE IN VIEW OF CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT AND THE ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES

Colonel Md Shazzad Hossain, BSP, afwc, psc

Abstract

Bangladesh started its journey of UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) under the banner of Blue Helmet in 1988 and by now the country has earned the reputation as one of the most trusted partners of UN with the successful completion of 54 peacekeeping missions in 40 countries. Bangladesh is presently the highest Troops Contributing Country (TCC) in the world. But this success did not come easily. In pursuit of global peace, so far, 153 Bangladeshi peacekeepers made supreme sacrifice. Besides, there remains tremendous hard work, dedications and other preparations which all together brought this great success. Operating under the Blue Helmet at present days has become more challenging due to changing nature of the UNPKO. This paper gives an account on the reasons for the success of Bangladesh and suggest broad measures for future preparedness. During the study, it is identified that today's operational environment of UN significantly differs from the past due to the changing nature of the conflict and the challenges emanating from this. The paper broadly discusses various challenges of future peacekeeping with particular emphasis to challenges pertinent to Bangladesh. Basing on the identified challenges, the paper suggests the measures required to address the future challenges and continue the success as the leading TCC under the banner of UN.

Introduction

Bangladesh started its journey under the banner of Blue Helmet in 1988 with 15 peacekeepers joining in United Nations Iran - Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). Subsequently in 1989, Bangladesh police peacekeepers and in 1993 peacekeepers from Bangladesh Navy and Air Force joined various UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Since 1988, Bangladeshi peacekeepers have successfully accomplished 54 peacekeeping missions in 40 countries around the globe where total 174,550 peacekeepers participated. Out of this, 141,584 were from Bangladesh Army, 5,989 peacekeepers from Navy, 7,115 peacekeepers from Air Force and 19,862 peacekeepers from Bangladesh Police. At present 6,858 Bangladeshi peacekeepers are deployed in 7 different countries. Amongst them 5,281 are from Army, 343 are from BD Navy, 583 are from BD Air Force and 651 are from BD Police (Overseas Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters, 2020).

Bangladesh is presently the highest Troops Contributing Country (TCC) in the world and regained the top position (The Daily Observer, 13 September 2020). Over the years, Bangladesh has proved herself as one of the most trusted partners of the UN. This is not only in terms of contributing the greater number of peacekeepers but also in terms of successful handling of many challenging situations in different field missions having diversified culture. Today Bangladesh is a 'Brand Name' by itself in the field of UNPKO. But this success did not come easily. In pursuit of global peace, so far, 153 Bangladeshi peacekeepers made supreme sacrifice and 237 sustained major injuries which bears its testimony of the commitment towards the global peace.¹ Besides, there remains tremendous hard work, dedications and other preparations which all together brought this great success for this small country. However, at present operating under the Blue Helmet has become more challenging due to the changing nature of the UNPKO. This paper gives an account on the reasons for the success of Bangladesh and suggest broad measures as the preparedness for future in view of changing nature of the conflict and the associated challenges.

Secret Behind the Success Story of Bangladesh

The success story of Bangladesh is a combined effort from all elements of national power. Bangladesh's commitment of promoting peace and humanity is inherited from the political wisdom of the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In relation to the world peace he remarked, "we want peace everywhere in the world, and to strengthen it."² On the other hand, for supporting the humanity, his great statement says is, "The world is divided into two parts - oppressors and oppressed. And I am with the oppressed."³

This coupled with the farsighted guidance of the present political leadership, pursuance for a peaceful Foreign Policy and the commitment of the Armed Forces are the driving forces for Bangladesh for the success in the UN peace keeping. Some of the key factors behind the success story is as under:

- a. **Constitutional Commitment:** The vow for establishing peace and security emanates from the principles enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The preamble to the Constitution reads "we may prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind". The constitutional obligation of Bangladesh and its national policy for the commitment for global peace had never been changed. The matter was never politicized. Committing assets for the peaceful and constructive purpose for a global need under UN

umbrella has always been one of the consistent parts of our Foreign Policy.⁴ This also acts as one of the sources of our inspiration and key factor for the success.

b. **Favourable Foreign Policy:** With the statement “Friendship to all, malice towards none” Bangladesh pursuit for a peaceful foreign policy. Bangladesh also formulated “World Peace” as one of the basic principles of her foreign policy. There is enormous significance of these principles such as Bangladesh believes in culture of cooperation over culture of conflict, peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful changes in international arena.⁵ This encourages us to participate in the effort towards the global peace.

c. **Strict Adherence to UN Requirements/Policy:** Bangladesh has always been very keen to adhere to the requirements and policies laid down by the UN. Few of the examples are: initiatives in adopting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 for Women, Peace and Security (WPS), preparation of National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in accordance with UNSCR 1325, contribution to the UN Peace building fund and SEA victim support fund, implementation of the aspects of Cruz Report and increased participation of female peacekeepers.⁶ This adherence to the UN policies has made us more credible in UN and as such Bangladesh in most cases are considered in top priority for troops contribution.

d. **Dedicated Effort by Armed Forces:** Taking the strategic directives from the foreign policy, Bangladesh Armed Forces has prepared themselves accordingly and evolved a comprehensive system for the conduct of peace operations as per the requirement of the UN. Individual services like Army, Navy and Air Force have established dedicated branches in their Headquarters for selection, training, preparation, evaluation and assessment of their peacekeepers. This whole hearted effort and commitment has enabled in responding quickly to contribute troops for any request from the UN.

e. **Institutional Capacity Building:** Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations and Training (BIPSOT) was established in 2002 to ensure effective training of the peacekeeper prior to the deployment. Over the time, it has become a world class training facility and center of excellence in UN training. This institute fulfills the requirement of UNDPKO as per General Assembly resolution which outlines ‘the necessity and responsibility of every nation to train their armed forces before any deployment.’⁷ Besides, Bangladesh Peace Building Centre (BPC) also started its journey in 2016 to impart training

for developing skilled, experienced and quickly deployable professionals and to conduct research on peace building.⁸ Moreover, collaboration with other similar regional and global institutions and UN organs help us to remain current and relevant about the ongoing and future requirement. Training at such world class institutions have helped our troops to handle the challenging situations in most of the mission area maintaining a high degree of credibility.

f. **Modernization of Training System:** Bangladesh has modernized the training system with a comprehensive training program to prepare her peacekeepers. Mission specific training lessons have been incorporated in the syllabus as per mission mandate. Special emphasis is given on the training on protection of civilians, robust peacekeeping, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), conduct and discipline aspects and improvement on workable language. Besides, different seminar and workshops including international events are also conducted in frequent interval which helps learning from each other's experience. The theoretical lessons in most of the cases are augmented with relevant practical lessons including Situational Training Exercises (STX) as required which increases the confidence of the troops before the deployment.⁹

g. **Forecast and Early Preparation:** Bangladesh has required focus on preparing her troops for potential deployment. All the services have forward planning to prepare their units for possible UN deployment. Bangladesh has also responded to United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (UNPCRS) to attend any further call for troops from UN. Accordingly, number of units are kept ready for deployment and few are in Rapid Deployment Level (can be deployed within 60 to 90 days in mission area (Overseas Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters, 2020). Bangladesh also ensures early procurement of Country Owned Equipment (COE) and marshalling of self-sustained equipment for the pledged contingents.

h. **Impartiality:** Bangladesh follows a policy of impartiality while participating in UNPKO. The troops in the field missions are strictly controlled so that there is no act of discrimination based on the religion, race or class while dealing with the people. Besides, policy of impartiality is also maintained while dealing with different tribes/clans and political/armed groups of the host nation. This is why Bangladeshi peacekeepers are accepted by the stakeholders in most of the missions.

j. **Humane Attitude:** Bangladeshi peacekeepers are well reputed due to their human attitude. The contingents deployed in the field missions go far beyond their limit in terms of humanitarian activities and social wellbeing projects are concerned. Feeding the poor people, providing medical treatment in the form of medical camp, offering technical training as a means of living, building schools and providing basic education etc. to uplift the socio-economic condition of the remote areas are some of the common aspect which all the contingents are performing. Human attitudes are also displayed in case of conflict resolution in a peaceful way when possible. This is one of the most important factors behind the success of the Bangladesh.

Peacekeeping – Transformation and Changing Nature

Change in Peacekeeping Concept and the Nature of the Conflict: In last two decades, there has been a big transformation in the UN Peace Keeping Mission. In 90's UN Mission used to be launched with consent of contesting parties/groups agreed to peace and UN used was to act as neutral actor and mediator to keep peace. Today's UN Mission is launched in areas where there is no agreed consent for keeping peace. At present the mission scenario have changed from conflict to violence and turned the mission environment from conflict zone to war zone. Today's conflicts are not only more deadly, they are also proving to be more intractable as factors like transnational organized crime, globally-linked terrorist networks, and regional meddling in internal conflicts have made lasting political solutions more elusive.¹⁰

Asymmetric Threat Scenario and Increased Trend of Targeting UN: From the experience of UN missions like Mali and Central African Republic (CAR), it is observed that today's adversary is often a non-state groups, harder to identify and use asymmetric tactics. There is increasing trend of attack using IED/ Vehicle Born IED (VBIED) including the use of indirect fire weapon. More so, there is an alarming trend of targeting UN by the terrorist armed groups. For example, MINUSMA is one of the burning examples where nearly 200 peacekeepers were killed by the armed groups using IED, Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive device (RCIED), VBIED, Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device (VOIED) including ambush/complex attack using Mortars and Improvised Rockets.¹¹ This has turned MINUSMA as the UN's deadliest peacekeeping mission.

Change in Mission Mandate towards Robust Peacekeeping: With the change of the nature of conflict and the mission environment, there was a need for changing the Mission Mandates. There were instances where UN peacekeeping missions displayed

inability to deal with armed rebels and fighters due to absence of clear and strong UN Mandates. This ultimately brought the concept of Robust Peacekeeping as a follow up of a thorough review by a panel led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi and the report is commonly known as “Brahimi Report”. Robust Peacekeeping allowed peacekeepers to use force at tactical level and protect the civilian in violent conflict.¹² Study on the UN Mandate since last three decades shows that it has been changed from Peacemaking to Peacekeeping, from Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcing and from Peace Enforcing to almost Counter Terrorism/Counter Insurgency in recent days.

Increasing Regional Dominance: In recent years, the UN has been facing financial constraint due to budget cuts and late payments by member states. With peacekeeping taking up the largest portion of the UN budget, UN is facing difficulties to continue with large peacekeeping operations. Due to the financial challenges of UN, regional and subregional organizations, like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) or coalitions of member states, like the G5 (Group of Five), are taking over various peacemaking and peacekeeping roles.¹³ To manage the resource constraints, UN also needs to build more strategic partnerships with regional organizations. Specially, majority of the ongoing missions being in Africa, role of AU is likely to be more vibrant day by day.

Challenges in view of the Changing Nature of UNPKO

In view of transformation and the changing nature of the UNPKO, UN is facing multifaceted challenges to continue the momentum of the PKO maintaining the image and the credibility to the world community. The recent transformations despite being the outcome of a systematic analysis, is not beyond the criticism. For example, many of the scholars argues that UN needs to review the decision of engaging in large scale missions under the concept of Robust Peacekeeping considering the requirement of huge resources and capabilities. This concept faced challenges due to insufficient capabilities and resources as well as for the lack of political and strategic direction from the beginning. Peacekeeping contingents generally do not possess high-tech capabilities like air transport capability, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets required for robust operations. For example, MINUSCA was accused of inaction by Amnesty International when more than 75 civilians were killed in CAR during an outbreak of violence in September 2016. The Mission was also blamed raising the issue of poor training and lack of resources to adequately protect the civilians.¹⁴ It needs to be remembered that due to the budgetary constraint, accumulating adequate resources for supporting Robust Mission concept is becoming difficult day by day. This will be more

challenging in coming days due to the effect of COVID-19 pandemic as all the major donors are facing challenges to manage their own economic crisis.

Again, leaving the initiative more towards the Regional Organizations is likely to question the credibility of UN as those organizations will have the scope to support their respective agenda. Besides, the division among the major stakeholders and their long-term interest has become a burning concern and thus maintaining a balanced approach is another challenging affair for the UN. It may be worth mentioning that following are the three major challenges at strategic level as highlighted by previous Secretary General Ban Ki-moon:

- a. Supporting complex political processes and protecting civilians.
- b. Training and equipment requirement to address new threats and operating in increasingly difficult environments.
- c. Maintaining the commitment and unity of UN constituencies.

Apart from the challenges at strategic level, there are some critical challenges at operational level from the member states' point of view that are equally appropriate to Bangladesh. Operating in the framework of multifarious forces having different command channel, agenda and different training system; upgrading the force posture in terms of organization, equipment and training; maintaining sharp motivation in the face of higher casualties, balancing the expectations from peacekeepers vis-a-vis the ground reality etc. are few of the common challenges.¹⁵

Bangladesh as a TCC has some additional challenges like maintaining the troops contribution in competitive environment, operating under adverse terrain and weather condition, huge wear and tear of Country Owned Equipment (COE) for long distance transportation as most missions are in landlock countries, language barrier and lack of adequate military interpreters.¹⁶ Besides, lack of adequate influence in the UN decision making process is another challenge for Bangladesh. Above all, Bangladesh is yet to prepare a National Peacekeeping Policy.¹⁷ Lack of a policy may lead to decisions without proper assessment and cost-benefit analysis which at times may be inconsistent with the national interest and Foreign Policy of the country.

Suggested Measures for Bangladesh as a means of Future Preparedness

Adaptation with Change and Identifying Priority for Shared Commitment:

Consistent shift in global security situation and the challenges emanating from the changing nature of the UNPKO demand necessary preparations for Bangladesh to continue its success. This will need quick adaptation with the changing scenario and fulfilling the shared commitment initiative launched by the UNSG in the form of 'Action

for Peacekeeping (A4P)' in 2018. A4P focuses on 45 shared commitments that calls for strong and collective actions by the member states to make peacekeeping more effective. The implementation goals are centered on eight priority commitment areas as under (Action for Peacekeeping, 2021):

- a. Advancing Political Solution to conflict.
- b. Implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda by ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process.
- c. Protection of Civilians emphasizing the protection of women and children.
- d. Improving the safety and security of Peacekeepers.
- e. Support effective performance and accountability by all peacekeeping components.
- f. Strengthen the impact of Peacekeeping on Sustaining Peace.
- g. Improving Peacekeeping Partnerships.
- h. Strengthen Conduct of Peacekeepers and Peacekeeping Operations.

Bangladesh as the leading TCC has the obligation to fulfill all the shared commitment. However, as an immediate measure, there is a need to make the priority of the important ones and give necessary attention on those. Out of these eight priority commitments, Bangladesh needs special focus on issues like ensuring greater participation of woman and protection of civilians which are two of the most important aspects for assessing the commitment and the performance of a TCC in any field mission.¹⁸ Besides, Bangladesh should also take required measures for improving the safety and security of Peacekeepers as an immediate priority issue.

Formulation of National Peacekeeping Policy: UN peace operation being one of the major priorities of the country, Bangladesh needs to formulate a National Peacekeeping Policy so that clear guidelines are available regarding major decision-making issues. This is required for the proper assessment of the mission environment including a cost-benefit analysis before taking the decision of committing troops on ground. The policy should also specify the appropriate decision-making forum at different tiers like for national level there may be a Task Force taking the relevant stakeholders like Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, Home Ministry, Bangladesh Armed Forces and Bangladesh Police. This will be a coordinating body to supervise the implementation of the National Policy and suggest the necessary review /update as per the need of the time.

Strengthening Diplomatic Effort: Presently being the top TCC, Bangladesh needs to utilize its bargaining power and strengthen the diplomatic efforts to secure some key

position in the decision-making level of UN. This will act as a symbol of recognition and give greater credibility in the world community. Besides, it will also help the country in long run to ensure the greater troops contribution in more favourable terms. Foreign Ministry being the lead agency in this regard needs to work closely with the office of the Permanent Mission at New York. Efforts should also be taken to enhance greater cooperation with the Regional Organizations specially with AU being the dominant stakeholder as most of the present missions are in Africa. Besides, few more Embassies may be opened in African countries to strengthen the diplomatic relations. Moreover, all the officers working in DPKO, New York and in important appointments in the field missions should work as a Military Diplomat to promote the country and the Armed Forces wherever the opportunity exists.

Greater Institutional Capacity Building: More emphasis needs to be given on Institutional capacity building to facilitate the required research and analysis on various policy options related to peace and security. This is required to assess the commitments and priorities set by the UN, analyze the Mission Mandates and then formulate the required training doctrine for the country. This will ultimately lead to set the appropriate training curricula to face the multidimensional requirement and challenges of future. Institutions like BPC and BIPSOT should have adequate resources for this purpose. Peace Building Center, the premiere institute of Bangladesh started the journey in 2016, but yet to have his official inauguration and functioning. Presently Director General, BIIS is working as acting Director General.¹⁹ Government needs to take adequate measures to make it functional with required resources so that it can undertake necessary research work and conduct required subject matter development programs at strategic and operational level in coordination with similar Regional/International institution. BIPSOT should focus more on operational/tactical level training like skill development on negotiation and mediation, language proficiency to create more military interpreters, and technical knowledge enhancement programs on equipment/gadgets like MRAP, UAV, CIED etc. required for ongoing PKO. Besides, joint training/STX/Role Play exercises etc. may be more focused to increase the level of confidence and interoperability among the services operating in same mission.

Review and Updating the Training Curricula as per the Identified Priority Commitment: Necessary measures needs to be taken to regularly update the training curricula basing on the identified priority commitment (A4P) and the feedback from field missions/UN Headquarters. Training on issues like Protection of Civilians being one of the top priority commitments, should have get special focus. Both pre-deployment and in-mission training must have sufficient curricula on this subject highlighting issues like local cultural sensitivities, early warning indicators, gender dynamics, etc. of the specific

mission area including mission-specific scenario-based simulation/exercise. Threat based training like training on IED, CIED, and other specialized equipment must be ensured before sending the troops to the mission area. This will help in improving the safety and security of peacekeepers which is also a priority commitment issue. Overall, planning and execution of the tactical training should be rigorous with proper motivation aiming at required confidence building so that troops can grow resilience and acclimatize in difficult weather condition in the face of increased casualties. For example: FTX/STX with Armour Personnel Carrier (APC) and Light Armour Vehicle (LAV) mounted maneuvers for prolonged period in a long distance can be a good example of training related to the confidence building.²⁰ This sort of training will change the mindset of troops regarding UN Mission from a perspective of welfare to an operational outlook. During planning and conducting training special attention should be given to conduct training for adequate number of female members on their specialized task. This will facilitate in seizing greater opportunities in the context of 'ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process' which is one of the important priority commitments as per A4P initiative of UNSG.

Effective Supply Chain Management: Comprehensive logistic plan and staff work is necessary for an effective supply chain management system to support the force maintenance and huge wear and tear of COEs specially in landlocked countries. In doing so, efforts like cost reduction by sending/replacing equipment directly in mission area when possible should be given more priority. At the same time, Contingents should also be given flexibility so that critical spares needed for some particular equipment can be procured from local sources. Newly raised Overseas Operation Logistic Depot is a positive step to facilitate the logistic requirement of the mission units. However, necessary steps should be taken to make this outfit fully functional with greater capacity as soon as possible through required staffing and resources. Finally, the supply system needs to be supported by an effective maintenance system so that the equipment remains functional to support the troops during the need.

Conclusion

Bangladesh is one of the most successful countries in the history of UNPKO. Highlighting the success of Bangladesh in UNPKO, Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary General very justifiably remarks, "I am fascinated by the role of Bangladeshi peacekeepers in protecting human rights as well as establishing lasting peace in troubled areas. ... whenever I go on a mission, I mention the Bangladesh Army as an example." Taking lessons from the glorious Liberation War, this country has always put herself in the forefront to help the distressed people/nations. The bold decision of Honourable

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina by sheltering millions of forcibly displaced Rohingya population of Myanmar bears the testimony of this fact. Constitutional commitment, favourable foreign policy, adherence to the rules and regulations, support from all relevant stakeholders and overall, the humane attitude of Bangladeshi peacekeepers are some of the contributing factors behind the success in peacekeeping. But there is no scope of being complacent with this success. About three decades of UN Peacekeeping experience has taught many important lessons and the best ways to adapt with the changing situation.

Today's operational environment of UN significantly differs from the past. Issues like asymmetric threat, predominance of IED and suicidal attack, diversified agenda of stakeholders, presence of diversified armed groups and the need for operation under difficult weather condition have made the operational environment very challenging. These challenges demand reforms/changes at different levels starting from the strategic level policy reforms at UN Headquarters to the tactical level like increasing greater operational readiness of the Peacekeepers of all the members states. Being the leading TTC and trusted partner, Bangladesh has more obligation to take greater preparation to make the peacekeepers more trained, qualified and resilient to sustain the future challenges. Bangladesh needs to maintain its momentum in peace keeping by following the existing proven practices. Besides, with the formulation of a comprehensive National Peacekeeping Policy, required political guidance, extensive diplomatic effort, and greater operational readiness through required training, Bangladesh will certainly mitigate the future challenges and continue the success story under the banner of UN by upholding its position as the leading TCC.

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Brief Biography



Colonel Md Shazzad Hossain, BSP, afwc, psc was commissioned with 33 BMA Long Course in the Corps of Infantry in 1995. He is a graduate from National Defence College and Defense Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur. He also holds a Master's in Business Administration (MBA) from University of Dhaka. His duties and appointment include Regimental Staff Officer in infantry units and Division Support Battalion, Grade-II Staff officer in Directorate General Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Brigade Major in an Infantry Brigade Headquarters, Deputy Director in Special Security Forces and Grade-I Staff Officer in Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters and in Headquarters, Army Training and Doctrine Command. He commanded an Infantry Battalion (16 Bangladesh Infantry Regiment) at Chattogram Hill Tracts as Zone Commander in Rangamati Zone. He was also a Detachment Commander in Detachment Army Security Unit, Dhaka. He served in United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as a contingent member and in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as Staff Officer, at Mission Headquarters. Presently the officer is serving in Directorate General Defence Purchase as Deputy Director and undergoing M Phil (Part-2) under National Defence College, Mirpur.

RECURRENT RELOCATION OF OFFICERS OF BANGLADESH ARMY: PARENTS' ROLE IN PRE-TEENAGERS' ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT

Major Riaz Mahmud, psc, Engrs

Abstract

Recurrent relocation of officers is believed to have far-reaching effects on pre-teenagers' academic development. As frequent relocation cannot be solved shortly, there is an ardent need to acclimatise with it. If pre-teenagers' academic growth is not attended prudently, relocation's adverse impacts is likely to foil the future generation's pathway. Nevertheless, frequent posting sometimes infuses a few positive attributes among preteenagers. At this context, the problem arises as to how parents can utilise the positive implications of recurrent relocation to subdue the adverse effects on pre-teenagers' academic growth. At first, attempts are taken in this paper to identify the likely reasons and trend of recurrent relocation. After that, positive attributes, induced by frequent postings are explored. Subsequently, the paper investigates how relocation affects pre-teenagers' academic performance. Finally, the paper derives how parents can mitigate the adverse impacts capitalising the positive attributes. Besides, parents' 'action plan' on recurrent relocation is proposed as an amicable solution.

Introduction

Residential relocation due to parents' profession has a multi-dimensional impact on children. For military children, the situation is more pronounced as they have to move each after two years on an average. The usual transfer an officer undergoes in his career, spanning 20 years, is twelve to fifteen times. In the Bangladesh Army context, officers' posting often occurs before two years, which is shorter than the minimum expected duration. This recurrent relocation is seemingly unavoidable; it happens due to organisational requirement and sometimes individual obligation. Whatever is the reason, the fallout of frequent posting has a far-reaching impact on children's academic development. Besides, relocation puts a strain on learning and extra-curricular activities, essential for educational progress. These predicaments are intensified for the children of dual-serving parents.¹

On the other hand, frequent relocation has some silver linings. Few children were found to adapt quickly to the environment, adjust social behaviour, assists rapid learning, etcetera due to frequent posting. Nevertheless, both positive and negative impacts

significantly vary according to children's age and individual characteristics. Among the different age groups, pre-teenagers, aged between 9-14 years, are the most vulnerable due to the frequent relocation. Children of this age group are more psychologically affected than others. As such, pre-teenagers demand more attention to personnel around them—parents, peers, and teachers. Nonetheless, after the relocation, all other contributors change except parents. Hence the role of parents in acclimatising preteenagers with recurrent relocation is the most instrumental.

At this backdrop, this paper aims to investigate both the effects of relocation on pre-teenagers to derive parents' role. At first, the present trend and reasons of relocations are highlighted along with its positive impacts. After that, it is examined how recurrent posting affects pre-teenagers academic development. Finally, the paper will delve into the conceivable parents' role to capitalise the positive and minimise the negative impacts of recurrent relocation. In all the cases, the study is limited to the military pre-teenagers reading in Class IV-VIII.²

Causes of Recurrent Relocation

There are a few reasons for recurrent relocation, identified by officers working in the Military Secretary's Branch. Firstly, organisational requirements like selection for missions, courses, deputation, adjustment on promotion, service exigency, and Extra Regimental Employment (ERE) demand officers posting before the desired duration. Secondly, in a few exceptional cases, officers' requirements, like treatment of family members and couple adjustment, result in recurrent posting. On the other hand, there is a shortage of officers due to the Bangladesh Army's rapid expansion. It has also contributed to the recurrent relocation.

Recurrent Relocation's Trend

From the experience of the officers of the Military Secretary's Branch, a reasonable trend of relocation is identified as follows:

- a. Relocation is not frequent up to six years of service; it is ostensibly more observed within officers who have served for more than 15 years. Among frequently relocated officers, more than 50% has to relocate during the middle of the year. The present rate of frequent posting is assumed to be between 25-30% of the total posting.
- b. Children's academic background is not considered while posting. However, few cases are considered like special children, necessary medical treatment of the family members, etcetera.

c. The average duration of a serving couple in the same garrison is mostly less than two years. It is also evident that the frequency of posting for dual-serving parents is more than single-serving parents.

d. The recurrent relocation is likely to linger for a few years. However, astute planning and freedom of actions of the Military Secretary's Branch are likely to reduce the recurrent posting.

Positive Impacts of Relocation on Pre-teenagers

Resilience and Adaptability: Children grow resilience over time through recurrent relocation. As a result, they acclimatise themselves with the changed situation. Moreover, adaptability infuses self-confidence among preteenagers to endure new experiences. Due to the children's experience of dealing with several transitions, the relocation related challenges subdue with age. This adaptation expedites with the support of parents.³

Quick Learning: Besides adaptation, acquaintance with assorted social milieu can make children progressive towards learning. They, with several exposures, are likely to learn quickly. Moreover, diverse teaching methods, learning environment, and feelings of a 'new start' often yield quick learning. Children habitually concentrate more on learning to keep them updated with the new academic environment after the relocation. Besides, quick learning, pre-teenagers are seen to have few social qualities due to relocation.

Strong Social Skill: Frequent posting acquaints military children with various elements of society. Sometimes, interaction with new peers, environment, teachers, schools, neighbours, etcetera make the relocated children more social. As a result, children often participate in extra-curricular activities spontaneously in school. Principal's interview of seven schools substantiates this claim. Furthermore, effective communication, active listening, mutual respect, etcetera are observed among the relocated children.

Judgement Capability: Besides social skill, relocation, more often than not, generates improved perception among the preteenagers. This perception can infuse a better judgement capability among the relocated children. Exposure to the newer behaviour, environment, peers, neighbours, and school enables a child to judge things from a more ubiquitous perspective. As the number of relocations increases at the secondary education level, children become more confident in their judgement capability.⁴

Enhanced Psychological Development: As the judgement capability matures, the relocated preteenagers experience accelerated maturity and mental growth. This growth

eventually leads to psychological development. Nevertheless, this attribute is dependent on prior preparation, motivation, and upbringing by parents. Psychological development is equally noticed in the children during their academic training in schools. Often, children who shifted educational institutions before two years are more psychologically resilient.

Deeper Appreciation for Cultural Differences: Relocation orients pre-teenagers with diverse culture. As the children transfer from one location to other, they embrace the alterations of various culture. Moreover, customs, traditions, and social practice of different environment encourage children to appreciate the cultural divergence. Pre-teenagers could often adjust within a variety of cultures for recurrent relocation. It is also evident from the officers' view during the author's survey, where 80.69% acknowledge this positive impact.

Effects of Relocation the Academic Development

Change of School & Forced Transition Between English and Bangla Medium: Recurring shifting deteriorates academic growth because the academic link needs re-establishment every time after a posting. 62% of officers, during the survey, opined that a child typically shifts school four and more times up to class VIII. Sometimes admission during mid-year is not possible due to shortage of vacancies in a particular class. Furthermore, the English version or medium is not available in all the remote garrisons. As such, children have to forcefully transit from one medium to another. In extreme cases, children face year loss, especially towards the end of the year.⁵

Deteriorating Academic Results: Pre-teenagers' examination results sometimes deteriorate after a posting. Psychological impacts of relocation, moreover, aggravate the academic results. School's environment also plays a decisive role in regulating students' academic results. Furthermore, instability and failure to cope with the new school curriculum may yield unsatisfactory academic results. Analysis of final exam marks for 2019 from Class IV to VIII substantiates the deterioration of average marks of children who are reading for less than two years (see Table 1). However, Academic results largely depend on the individual child and the attention of the parents. As such, there are examples of better results after the relocation.

Table 1: Final Exam Result of Class IV-VIII of Selected Schools in 2019

Ser	Class	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	Total
1.	Total students	59	166	129	108	85	547
2.	<i>Exam Marks (%) of all students</i>	77.4	82.3	79	77.3	80.7	79.34
3.	Officers' Children	34	40	23	25	30	152
4.	<i>Exam Marks (%) -Officers Children</i>	77.4	81.8	65	79.8	79	76.6
5.	Officers children reading for less than two years of duration	21	25	14	16	18	94
6.	<i>Exam Marks (%) of children (ser 5)</i>	70.3	82.17	64	77.5	76.8	73.35
7.	Officers children reading for more than two years of duration	13	15	9	9	12	58
8.	<i>Exam Marks (%) of children (ser 7)</i>	76.2	81.71	66.4	81.5	81	76.08

Source: Adamjee Cantonment Public School, Bangladesh International School, and Cantonment Public School and College, Parbotipur


Change of Teachers and Absence of Preferred Tutors: Due to recurrent relocation, children need to change their preferred teachers and tutors abruptly. The interruption of the academic link with teachers often acts as a barrier to academic development. Sometimes, adequate tutors are also not available after a relocation. It creates an impediment for the parents— primarily serving couple. Furthermore, 86% of officer acclaims for 'change of teachers and tutors' as an adverse impact of relocation.⁶

Challenges in Peer Building: Besides teachers, peers are also changed due to relocation. Frequent relocation causes short-spanned peer bonding. Though friendship initiation takes lesser time during the preteen period, enduring peer relations mandate substantial time. Therefore, a child typically struggles to discover new peers continuously after a posting. Moreover, peers' impact on academic progression is noteworthy for preteenagers. The short-lived peer bonding and stress of developing new peer are the barriers to the academic journey.⁷

Lack of Parents' Quality Time: For the adaptation of preteenagers, parents' attention is more obligatory after a relocation. Usually, military children are deprived of their parents'

quality time. It is more deteriorated after a relocation, as the officer needs to adjust to the new working environment. The case is the same for military mothers, where they need to involve in post-relocation management. As a result, parents struggle to give time to children for attending their academic and psychological issues. 86% of 156 officers, who have preteenagers, opined that they could not give quality time after a relocation (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Response Showing Parents' Ability to Give Quality Time to Pre-teenagers after Relocation



Source: Author's Construct based on Survey

Discontinuation of Extra-curricular Training: Frequent posting creates a discontinuity in children's extra-curricular training. A posting in a remote garrison often terminates former extra-curricular training due to absence of the qualified instructors. Although the children club offers such training, re-establishing the chain and frequent instructor change act as barriers to nurturing extra-curricular activities. Furthermore, these activities are essential for preteenagers' mental growth, which contribute to their academic enhancement. Therefore, academic progress is often impaired by the discontinuation of extra-curricular activities.⁸

Intricacies for Dual-serving Parents: During different garrison posting, military couples would like to keep pre-teens with their mother and take children in a place that offers good schooling. The absence of father/ mother hampers the emotional growth and cognitive thinking, which hinders academic development. The situation further wanes when no relatives stay in the family, and maids take care of children. The academic progress of pre-teenagers of dual-serving couple thus faces more significant obstruction for the recurrent posting. A highest 92.67% of officers, in the survey, underscored the intricacies as one of the impediments towards academic development of preteenagers.⁹

Parents' Role in Pre-teenagers' Academic Development

Quality Time to Children for Exploiting their Adaptability: Parent's adequate quality time can prepare children psychologically, which is crucial for acclimatising with the new environment. Mothers can play an important role here, as officers typically remain committed after the relocation. Nevertheless, children need the support of their father also. A healthy parent-child relationship is also mandatory for the implementation of quality time. Resilience and adaptability, social skill, and psychological development due to the relocation can be capitalised by parents' quality time to mitigate almost all the adverse impacts.¹⁰ Besides, the following measures can be taken by parents to ensure quality time:

- a. Schedule and target time can be set for a minimum of six months after the relocation. A minimum of two hours should be allotted to attend children. 66.7% of the guardians during survey opined for 2-3 hours daily, especially in the evening.
- b. Quality time to be utilised to ask children about the new school, environment, peers, challenges, likings, and feelings. Quality time should also include accompanying children during their leisure activities. Evening games, outing in weekend and enjoying televisions, etcetera should get due share in the allotted time.¹¹

Revamping Academic Chain in the House: While the parents ensure quality time, a significant portion needs to be utilised to re-establish the academic chain in the house. When the same medium of education is not available in the new location, parents need to admit children in the non-military school or continue the study as home-schooling. Hence, parents need to perform the role of teachers at home. Due to failure of admission and change of medium, year loss can also be tackled by parents with revitalised educational chain. Following steps can be adopted by parents while doing so:¹²

- a. Compare previous and present academic syllabus. Routine and events of the new school should be explored early. Inquire updates of daily progress in the school, prepare children for the next day, assist in assignments, and maintain a study time.
- b. Prioritise subjects among 12-13 subjects for class IV-VIII. Parents should emphasise English, Bangla, and Mathematics, primarily for the mentioned class.
- c. Continue family teaching on values and customs as 70-80% of learning stems from family. Children learn the values from the family, which is the root of all learning.¹³

Managing Tutors for Educational Progress: Besides parents' involvement, tutors can be invaluable contributors to subdue specific weaknesses in any subject. Tutors can also supplement home-education if pre-teenagers are not admitted in school, particularly at the end of the year. Therefore, tutors can manage the year-loss in few cases. They can also be employed for developing extra-curricular activities like singing, dancing, Arabic learning, etcetera. Parents can capitalise pre-teenagers' resilience, adaptability, and quick learning by managing tutors.

Involving Children in the Community and Extra-curricular Activities: After relocation, parents need to involve their children in the community and promote extra-curricular activities. It can reduce the discontinuation of extra-curricular training and challenges in peer building. Moreover, Children's social traits and enhanced judgemental capability can be utilised, which are the positive results of relocation. In this regard, parents need to drive out fear of the unknown and formally inform the school regarding previous extra-curricular activities. Parents may take the assistance of children club or local tutors. Besides, parents need to assist children to know neighbours and any same-aged children who can be potential peers.¹⁴

Psychological Counselling and Prepare Children Beforehand: Besides community involvement, children need psychological counselling to adapt to the changed scenario. Parents can highlight children's looming opportunities in the new school, peers, house, and atmosphere. Furthermore, syllabus from the new school can be collected by parents and consulted with children beforehand to induce interest among them. Parents can follow a checklist (see Figure 2) for preparing their children before relocation.

Figure 2: Parents' Checklist for Psychological Preparation of Preteenagers

- Highlight arrangement for continuation of present peer bonding
- Inform about known peers, course mate's children, or relatives staying at the new location
- Inform the tentative schooling date, syllabus, exams of new school
- Highlight children's potentials for doing good in the next school
- Brief about the future school, teachers, and positive sides of the institution
- Underscore the various facilities of newly posted place and possibilities of learning from that area
- Highlight places that will be interesting for preteenagers to visit
- Describe the tentative timing of relocation, new accommodation facilities, playing opportunities, and recreational facilities

Source: Author's Construct based on Findings of Survey

Coordination with School and Teacher-Parents Association: Teachers can evaluate children's capability and limitations from parents' feedback. As a result, teachers can take the necessary steps against pre-teenagers' strength and weakness. During a survey, 60.3% views acclaim that a list of strengths and weaknesses may be collected from parents and previous schools to inform the new school. Additionally, school authority can give special attention to frequently relocated children. It may include welcoming children in class by all students and consulting with the guardian on children's attributes. More so, teacher-parents coordination can exploit children's potential after transfer to a new school.¹⁵


Assisting Peer Building for Effective Learning: Parents can contribute to post-relocation peer building. Firstly, parents can keep communication with children's previous peers' guardian. It will help pre-teenagers to continue existing peer bonding as well as will accelerate peer building. Secondly, coordination with the parents of new peers is essential. It is necessary as the parental involvement in peer relationships can monitor the positive outcome and keep the negative influence away. In doing so, parents and pre-teenagers can cautiously utilise social media.

Adoption of Joint Family and Relatives' Support: The absence of the father or mother put additional strain on relocation-sufferings for dual-serving parents. As such, family members and relatives can assist parents to guide pre-teenagers during post-relocation adjustments. The presence of a grandfather or uncle/ aunt ensures the required care for pre-teenagers. Moreover, a joint-family can reduce the complications of dual-serving parents. 91.02% of parents acclaimed that pre-teenagers' academic challenges are less in a joint family or where relatives live with pre-teenagers.¹⁶

Dealing Own Stress Aside from Children: Parents must cope with their relocation-related stress without affecting children. Otherwise, parents' stress may psychologically hamper pre-teenagers. Therefore, parents must carefully act and deal with their stress during any relocation. Parents should not discuss the adverse effects before the children. More so, they should project recurrent relocation in a favourable manner considering their child's psychology. This positive attitude is likely to keep children free from stress.¹⁷

Parents' Action Plan: Considering the findings, the author has formulated an 'action plan' for parents to attend their pre-teenagers (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Parents' Action Plan



Source: Author's Construct

Organisational Role to Enhance Parents' Attention: Apart from teachers' and school's contribution, parents' roles are influenced by the organisation. Army plays an essential role in shaping the attitude of parents towards children before and after the relocation. Parents can provide the required attention and quality time once the organisation will promote the importance of child care due to frequent relocation. Following organisational measures can be adopted to assist parents:¹⁸

- Formations can promote the awareness of attending pre-teenagers before and after relocation among officers. It may be conducted as a form of seminars or lectures by psychologists, experts, or senior officers. Additionally, experts can be invited from outside to provide essential acumen to officers. Ladies club may also promote the role of parents and conduct the same program.
- Army-run schools may be advised to attend the officer's children with additional care due to recurrent posting. Moreover, clinical psychologists may be employed for army-run schools following the directives of the education ministry.

- c. Military Secretary's Branch can have considerations for the officers whose children will appear public exams in that particular year.¹⁹

Conclusion

Relocation, an inevitable part of military service, occurs typically after a designated period. However, there are instances where relocation takes place frequently before the expected period. Frequent relocation affects military children, especially pre-teenagers, in diverse ways. Academic development is considered as one of the significant factors which often decay due to frequent shifting. In contrast, there are few positive traits exhibited among the pre-teenagers due to frequent shifting. Furthermore, the recurrent posting is likely to continue in future. Therefore, there is an ardent need to utilise the positive impacts and reduce the adverse effects of relocation for preteenagers' smooth academic growth.²⁰

Frequent relocation takes place due to the organisational and sometimes personal requirement. Although the Military Secretary's Branch attempts to keep recurrent relocation to a minimum, the present trend is 25-35% of the total posting. Furthermore, the frequent posting is extensively observed for the officers with more than 15 years of service. At present, more than 60% of frequent posting is carried out during the mid-year where the children's education is not considered. On the other hand, relocation induces a few attributes to the pre-teenagers. Adaptability, quick learning, strong social skill, improved judgement capability, enhanced psychological development, and appreciation for cultural differences are a few potential positive attributes for the preteenagers due to relocation.²¹

Nevertheless, recurrent relocation affects pre-teenagers' academic development in several ways. It is found that changes in school and education medium, teachers, preferred tutors, and peers affect the pre-teenagers in their educational progress. Moreover, the academic results deteriorate in a few cases, imposing a barrier in pre-teenagers' learning quest. On the other hand, lack of parents' quality time after relocation and discontinuation of extra-curricular training put additional academic performance burden. Such impacts are aggravated for the children of dual-serving parents where the absence of father or mother adds fuel to the flame.²²

However, parents can utilise the positive impacts of relocation to mitigate the adverse effects on academic advancement. Statistical evaluation proclaimed that parents' quality time and efforts for re-establishing the educational chain could prepare children to acclimate the educational changes due to relocation. Managing tutors for covering the weakness can be a potential option for dual-serving parents. Furthermore, parents'

active coordination with school and teacher can provide feedback on children, accelerating learning in the school. Encouraging extra-curricular activities, preparing the children psychologically and astute stress-coping by parents can make relocation conducive to educational progress.²³

Recommendations

Staying for longer duration in a school is always better for pre-teenagers. This paper recommends that a minimum of three years stay in a garrison is advantageous for the pre-teenagers' academic development. However, due to the present state of officers' recurrent relocation, parents need to convert the relocation related disadvantages into advantages. As such, the following recommendations are made for adapting recurrent posting:

- a. While posting, Military Secretary's Branch of Army Headquarters may consider officers whose children will appear Primary Education Completion and Junior School Certificate examination in a particular year. For effective planning, the affected officers' detailed state can be taken beforehand, from formations, by the Military Secretary's Branch.
- b. Army parents may follow an 'action plan' for attending preteenagers during recurrent posting. Education Directorate of Army Headquarters may circulate parents' 'action plan', with a comprehensive checklist, for pre-teenagers' smooth academic progression on relocation. This checklist may be prepared by a team of psychologists employed by the Directorate. The list may contain the potential positive implications of relocation and 'Dos' and 'Don'ts' for the parents to prepare preteenagers psychologically.
- c. Central Coordination Committee for Army-run school, under Chief of General Staff's Branch of Army Headquarters, may instruct school authority to render special care to the frequently relocated pre-teenagers. Under this committee, schools' principals may be employed for formulating some standard measures that schools may adopt to attend frequently relocated children. Furthermore, the committee may instruct schools to provide a formal 'pen-picture' as feedback report for pre-teenagers on posting to new places.
- d. Military Training Directorate of Army Headquarters in consultation with Education Directorate may arrange study period or seminar for officers in the formation focusing parenting, pre-relocation preparation, and post-relocation care. Ladies Club may also arrange the same. Military psychologists or civil experts may be invited twice in a year to conduct this session.

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Brief Biography



Major Riaz Mahmud, psc, Engrs was commissioned with 55 BMA Long Course in the Corps of Engineers. He has a diverse experience of serving in regimental, instructional and staff appointments. Apart from the unit service, the officer served as GSO-3 in Quarter Master General's Branch of Army Headquarters, Instructor Class 'C' in the School of Military Engineering, Platoon and Term Commander in Bangladesh Military Academy. He also served in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Mali as a contingent member. Apart from the mandatory courses, he attended Potential Platoon Commander Course and Officers' Bomb and Explosive Device Disposal Course. He is a graduate in Civil Engineering from the Military Institute of Science & Technology (MIST). He received the prestigious 'MIST Medal' and 'MIST Research Medal' in 2016. He has graduated in Army Staff Course 2020-21 from Defence Services Command and Staff College. He is married and blessed with one daughter.

AN ANALYSIS - WHY THE US COUNTER - INSURGENCY EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FAILED?

Colonel Md Humayun Kabir, SUP, SPP, psc, psc(j)

Abstract

The US involvement in Vietnam has always remained as one of the most important military topics to study. The Vietnam War was the second longest war in United States history, after the war of Afghanistan. Despite having such military might, spending billions of dollar, US simply had to suffer a humiliating loss in the war taking a toll of 60,000 American lives. The war was not fought between conventional army forces. Being motivated by Maoist Guerrilla insurgency strategy, the North Vietnamese insurgents, being inferior in strength, displayed an incredible resistance initially against French and later against US. The communist bloc, in Cold War period (1945-90), displayed such superior strategic prominence over US that even Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administration could not cope with. US involvement in Vietnam started when Truman made a promise to the people and government of South Vietnam to keep communist forces from overtaking them that reached back into the Truman Administration. Eisenhower placed military advisers and CIA operatives in Vietnam, and John F. Kennedy sent American soldiers to Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson ordered the first real combat by American troops, and Richard Nixon concluded the war. The long drawn conflict slowly and gradually gained momentum from the insurgent movement that Ho Chi Min coined from North Vietnam. The gaining of strength of Viet Cong forces, the weak US response to various events and poorly run Diem administration of South Vietnam contributed heavily to build the foundation of loss for US in Vietnam. The strategic perspective of pre and post insurgency period (1961-1964) is a must read for any reader to understand the Vietnam War, and for every military leader getting inside the insurgency period will give an insight to carry home number of enduring lessons that perhaps will sharpen the professional acumen of any military leader. This article gives an inside analysis of the Vietnam War especially the insurgency period that worked is a pivot to defeat of US forces.

Introduction

The United States (US) got involved in Vietnam creating yet another battle ground in the context of Cold War to fight back communism. They entered the Vietnam War with a military trained and equipped to fight a conventional war in Europe, and totally unprepared for the counterinsurgency campaign it was about to wage.¹ Initial US involvement in this war was indirect. Its support was focused on assisting the French

Colonial power to deter the Russia and China backed communist block. The first commitment was in the shape of Military Assistant Advisory Group (MAAG) in 1950 by Truman that was carried forward by Eisenhower as well. But, the joint effort failed in tackling the communists in Vietnam. The French defeat in Dien Bien Phu marked an end to French colonization after the signing of Geneva Accord in 1954. Since then US got involved independently in the quest of dominating Southeast Asia and preventing further expansion of communism. But, US could not ultimately win over in South Vietnam. The combination of nationalist feeling and communist inspiration added a new dynamism in the movement. Though it took a long time after French collapse in 1954, the Vietnamese insurgent movement could finally achieve the unification of Vietnam as a state defeating the US intervention in 1975.

Being a super power, US failed to keep Saigon (South Vietnam) from falling into the hands of the North Vietnamese who were motivated to struggle on Maoist theory of *revolution*. They mainly *adopted* small scale guerrilla tactics and slowly geared for large scale conventional attack. Prior to direct military intervention in 1965 (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964) US was indirectly involved for counter insurgency (COIN) operation. Though they adopted a credible policy and strategy to deal with the Viet Cong (hereafter VC) with the help of the Diem regime, still VC got gradually strengthened and COIN effort failed. There are potentially three aspects to consider while identifying the possible cause of the US failure. Firstly, the insurgents in South Vietnam were strong in organizing their movement and fought following an effective strategy to counter both government and US forces. They could slowly paced for their ultimate objective i.e unification of North and South Vietnam and be part of Communist block. Secondly, the US did not follow a pragmatic strategy that was coherent to counter the insurgents or communists. The issue was handled by five presidents who adopted different strategies. Thirdly, the Saigon government politically or militarily displayed poor COIN strategy compare to the insurgents.

In broad terms, the US effort to counter insurgents in South Vietnam (from 1961 to 1964) was not a success.² Within this time the insurgents numbers by all means were multiplied two fold, US military effort was multiplied four fold and a much trusted Diem Government fell out resulting a US backed planned coup. After the coup the country became extremely destabilized displaying complete absence of any potential to tackle the insurgents. At the end of 1964, US had to manipulate the Congress through Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to get a free hand to handle the insurgents with a full-scale military intervention. Consequently, since 1965 US got militarily involved to pursue their strategic objective in preventing communism in South Vietnam.

Keeping the above discussion in mind, an endeavour will be taken in this paper firstly, to set the scene by discussing the pre-1961 situation between US and Vietnam. After that the possible cause of US failure in countering insurgency will be analyzed. In doing so, the paper will focus on identifying the reasons for US failure analyzing the responses of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ineffectiveness of Saigon Government to tackle the inland insurgency and finally the reasons for the insurgents success;.

Background – Pre-1961 Situation

Since 1883, the French colonized Vietnam rulers were characterized as the era of economic exploitation, cultural chauvinism and political repression.³ The insurgency against French colonialism started in early 1930s when Indo-China Communist Party was formed. It gained momentum after the Second World War. Indo-China Communist Party initially led by Ho and later by his son Ho Chi Minh, quest to expand communism provoking independence movement to bring an end to French Colonialism. Ho Chi Minh arose as a savior offering the Vietnamese people their much coveted freedom. Inspired by Mao's popular insurgency theory, the Vietnamese struggle ended with French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954. But, the decision of the Geneva Conference divided Vietnam into two parts along the 17th parallel was not liked by the North (controlled by the Communist Hanoi government backed by China and Russia). South Vietnam that opposed communism was governed by Diem, a French loyal. Though Hanoi signed the agreement calling for French withdrawal and a national election or the question of unification of North and South, the South under Diem never allowed that election to take place. That was the initiating point for the North and the sympathizers of communism of the South to start an armed guerrilla movement against Saigon to secure a unified Vietnam.

US got involved in Vietnam through Truman after the Second World War. Since 1950 US was assisting French colonial power through funding and MAAG. After Truman, Eisenhower viewed and accepted Vietnam as a vital nation in the global strategy to contain communism.⁴ He advanced the "domino theory" with increased economic support where almost 80 percent of military expenses were borne by US during 1954. After the French withdrawal from Vietnam, Eisenhower sensed that communist backed Viet Minh would not rest until a unified Vietnam fell under a communist regime. To counter, United States formed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) along with France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and Philippines in order to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent subversive activities directed against their territorial integrity and political stability."⁵ To establish a legal basis of supporting anti-communist regimes, SEATO extended a protocol for the protection of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Under this protocol Eisenhower almost took responsibility for supplying and training the army of the newly created Republic of South Vietnam (RVN).

When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency on 20 January 1961, the political and military situation had deteriorated significantly in RVN. Precursors to the deteriorating effort were the two incidents of 1960, where on November 1960, Army of Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) paratroops officers attempted a coup against Diem but failed and on April 1960, 18 prominent South Vietnamese politicians openly signed a manifesto calling Diem to carry out reforms and get rid of Nepotism. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFL/NLF) was created in December 1960 as a “united front” who basically worked as mainstream of the insurgency in South Vietnam.

Possible Reasons of US Strategy to Fail in South Vietnam

When Kennedy was inaugurated as the 35th President of US, he inherited Vietnam as an agenda from Eisenhower. While leaving the office the outgoing President Eisenhower privately told Kennedy “I think you’re going to have to send troops” to Southeast Asia.⁶ Kennedy clearly understood that the communist bloc was trying to unify Vietnam to expand their banner. The means adopted by Hanoi for this purpose was insurgency, which was not very strong prior to 1961; however, it slowly paced for strong and robust insurgency for the soft approach of Kennedy of not committing ground troops. Kennedy adopted moved with ‘flexible approach’ to deal with Vietnam. Till his assassination, he took number of steps like using special forces (Green Beret) troops, providing ARVN increased training, fire power and technological support, conducting covert operation by CIA officers, encouraging humanitarian efforts to win over the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people and initiating the strategic hamlet program modeled following successful British COIN strategy in Malaya.⁷ All these effort did not provide envisaged outcome. Kennedy’s top administrative aides at Vietnam Issue like Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk who directly dealt with Vietnam (recruited from academic and business community) were novice in statesmanship business. They played crucial role in deciding strategy for Vietnam over next several years and in fear of degrading their position constantly projected false picture to the presidency. As a result, the gradual deteriorating situation remained almost shadowed and to some extent prevented Kennedy from taking appropriate decision regarding Vietnam.

Inheriting Vietnam as an issue, Kennedy was somehow determined to draw a clear distinction between the US supportive role in aid to Diem and actual military mission. As such he, in his tenure hardly faced the difficulty in discerning the choice between accepting the loss of Vietnam and committing ground troops to tackle the escalating

situation. In a television interview in September 1963, Kennedy stated that, “in the final analysis, it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose the struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear.”⁸

However, being advised by his aides Kennedy first decided to send 400 American ‘Green Beret’ Special Advisers as a new initiative in May 1961. They trained the ARVN soldiers on counter insurgency technique. At a later stage they recruited fierce mountain men known as the Montagnards form Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG). The primary task/purpose of CIDG was to prevent infiltration of the North Vietnamese by establishing a series of fortified camps laced along the mountains along 17th parallel. Despite undertaking all these efforts, conflict kept on widening and VC achieved appreciable success which was a matter of worry for both US and Diem. However, to discern the overall scenario, top Kennedy aides, Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow, visited Vietnam on October 1961. Taylor reported to Kennedy ‘If Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult to hold Southeast Asia’ and suggested to expand the number of US military advisers and to send 8,000 combat soldiers.⁹ McNamara who constantly favoured sending ground troops in Vietnam, joined by Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended massive force show by sending six divisions (200,000 men) to Vietnam to tackle the situation. Kennedy rejected their proposal and sent additional military advisers along with American Helicopter units to support ARVN operations against VC. Kennedy justified the expanding of US military role as a means to prevent a communist takeover of Vietnam. At this point of time the cost to America of maintaining South Vietnam’s sagging 200,000 men army and managing the overall conflict rose to a million dollars per day.

Despite the US’s continuous military and economic support to Saigon, VC guerrillas gradually gained control much of the countryside in South Vietnam. Kennedy thought of winning in COIN through Diem where ARVN was the key player. Observing the weakness of ARVN headquarters, Kennedy replaced the MAAG (established in 1950) with MACV (Military Assistance Command for Vietnam) in 6 February 1962 to establish a command headquarters to control and direct all military operations in South Vietnam. But it did not yield a positive result because of the inefficiency of the ARVN forces. Being reported on the extensive use of Ho Chi Minh trail by the North Vietnamese to strengthen South, Kennedy signed the foreign Assistance Act of August 1962. A US Special Forces camp was set up at Khe Sanh to monitor North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltration to ho Chi Minh trail to stop reinforcing South. In essence, Kennedy restrained from committing ground troops to directly carrying out operation for COIN purpose. Whether deploying ground troops by Kennedy could save the US from massive

commitment of ground troops in the later years, is a debatable issue and perhaps steps taken by Kennedy was justified considering evolving situations.

The growing tendency to cover up actual information in the plea to forecast success in Vietnam fundamentally prevented Kennedy in taking appropriate decisions. After a visit to assess the ongoing situation in Saigon, McNamara reported to Kennedy in May 1962 that 'we are winning the war'. This strongly convinced the President to continue with his ongoing policy towards Vietnam. By 1963, the insurgents were controlling most of the villages and villagers in South Vietnam. During this time as well General Paul D. Harkings, the American commander in Vietnam, continued to send Kennedy optimistic reports on the progress being made by Diem's government and ARVN forces. American field advisers such as Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, who reported the failures of the South Vietnam forces were silenced.¹⁰ It can be argued that had the real information been delivered Kennedy might have changed his policy and efforts to handle the insurgency issue in Vietnam.

Kennedy relied heavily on the Diem's regime to tackle his Cold War strategy issue of preventing communism. More often than not Kennedy's support seemed guaranteed to Diem not for the only reason of his Cold War outpost issue, Kennedy was a Roman Catholic like Diem and Kennedy was sympathetic to the plight of Catholicism in Asia. But the issue of countering insurgency of VC forces was key issue of supporting Diem to fulfill the strategic goal of defeating Russia. Kennedy had no option but to fund Diem like Eisenhower to keep the Cold War outpost survived. But, despite the sincere effort from US, Diem himself was not serious to tackle the insurgency problem. He maintained ARVN which was primarily meant to secure his regime not to fight the insurgency. They were also instructed not to engage with VC that might cause casualty to his Army.

Being inspired by the Malayan model, US and Saigon embarked on 'Operation Sunrise' or Strategic Hamlet resettlement program. Villagers were uprooted from their ancestral homeland from different scattered villages to be resettled into fortified. Leaving their own homeland, including cultivated lands was a very contentious issue for all the peasants. Though the primary purpose of this program was to separate the insurgents, however, soon the insurgents infiltrated in almost all the hamlets and took control by killing or intimidating village leaders. To retaliate, Diem ordered bombing raids to the VC controlled hamlets conducted jointly by US and South Vietnamese Air Force. Insurgents were quick to hide in jungles leaving the civilian to die in those bombings. Uprooted from ancestral homeland and getting killed by bombings, the villagers lost all confidence for Diem's regime. the insurgents exploited the sentiment of villagers to gain

support for their cause against US and Diem regime. So, Strategic Hamlet program was counterproductive to counter insurgency as a whole.

While Kennedy was trying to find one way or the other to establish influence over Vietnam, lastly by approving a military coup where Diem and Nhu got killed, Kennedy himself was got assassinated within weeks of Diem's death in 1963. His assassination rose the question what he would have done on Vietnam issue had he been alive. Many believe he would have withdrawn while others believe he would have escalated US involvement. Lyndon B. Johnson, the Vice President took charge of Presidency. Johnson was self-made southern based strong politician but not very good at international politics. Johnson's main concern was the creation of 'Great Society' to eliminate poverty and establish social right. As such, he remained focused on domestic issue while keeping almost the same set of Kennedy's administration to deal with Vietnam to just to carry forward the existing policy. Within the first year of Johnson's presidency, the insurgents focus massively shifted from South Vietnam to North. MACV number grew significantly in Saigon. More than Johnson, his advisers were alarmed in the destabilized Saigon situation which was rocked by repeated coup within one year, i.e 1964.

To turn the focus towards North CIA operatives developed a plan to deal with North Vietnam with legitimacy. The 'Maddox' incident of August 1964 was a provocative move to get entangled with North Vietnam. The two incidents in Gulf of Tonkin, where the second incident of 4th August was doubted by the advisers themselves, forced Johnson to go for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases. More importantly, Johnson took the issue to Congress to deal with the issue where he was vested with the power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." This resolution gave Johnson to use military power to whatever degree he wanted and it legitimated dealing with insurgency issue from indirect to direct involvement.

But, Johnson's use of the power proved to be counter-productive. Johnson authorized number of bombing mission to the North which was comparatively easy choice to teach a lesson to the. Bombing saved direct involvement of US's ground troops and as such no casualty. But the effect of bombing with collateral damage gave rise to further hatred for US. Exploiting the bombing mission North recruited many young people to take arms. While the initial bombing mission did not stop violence in Saigon, Johnson authorized gradually expanding of bombing campaign not only in North but also in the South that resulted further worsening the Insurgency situation in Saigon.

Reasons for Failure Following Saigon's Response:

Diem had been in power since 1954 but he was not popular for a variety of reasons. Nepotism was a key issue where he employed his brothers in key posts of the states. Nhu became a very contentious issue not only to the local people but to US that prompted coup. Diem was unmarried as such Nhu's wife was treated as First lady. But, her remarks on the Buddhist immolation as 'barbeque' tremendously escalated the security situation. The strategic hamlet program and mishandling the Buddhist's incident gave massive rise of voice of unpopularity of Diem's regime and naturally facilitated the VC to recruit thousands of insurgents to stand against the government.

One of the very striking reasons why the US was not succeeding in COIN was the ARVN issue. ARVN as a whole were given enhanced military training, mobility and fire power but it did not significantly improve their fighting capability. MAAG kept on training them on conventional fighting which was not really effective to counter the VC Guerrillas. Officers of ARVN were selected on the basis of their loyalty to Diem not their professionalism. ARVN's enlisted soldiers were nearly all draftees who were mostly Buddhist peasants and they were not much interested to sacrifice their life in Diem's cause. Diem gave a free chit to military officers to deal with US aid which make them corrupted to a highest order. More importantly, Diem instructed his military to avoid being getting casualty. They were categorically told that their primary mission was to save him from any attempted coup in Saigon. Hence, the only way for the ARVN officers to avoid casualty was to avoid confrontation with VC. Moreover, they alienated the villagers behaving like colonial army. As they were not dependent on villagers for their rations and essentials, they never care the sentiments of peasants and treated them with disdain and disrespect. Contrary to this, the VC, had no other means but to depend on the villagers for food and shelter. They definitely abused the peasants as part of Guerrilla tactics but it never was without reasons. In that sense, the villagers got a feeling that the VC was more humane and polite than the ARVN. Staying amongst villagers the VC insurgents, slowly and gradually exploited this sentiment and gained trust and support from the villagers. It became evident in many operations that the villagers were inclined to save the lives of insurgents when ARVN operations were going on. The fact is villagers trusted insurgents more than ARVN because of their humanity and dependence compare to ARVN.

For COIN the US and ARVN used air power more often which was not very effective. Insurgents were quick to hide inside the jungle leaving the villagers on the mercy of those bombs. Co-lateral damage or the killing of innocent villagers alienated them against ARVN, US and largely against Diem's government. Villagers started viewing US not as

a savior but as outsider like the French and Japanese. Hence the joint US and ARVN effort mostly collapsed when it mostly relied on air power.

However, a joint operation conducted on 3 January 1963 at Ap Bac became a head line news in the American newspaper. Only 350 VC guerrilla soldiers defeated a large force of ARVN who were actively supported by US helicopters. The planning was flawless but the execution of ARVN forces was ridiculous. As a result, three US helicopter crew were killed in action who were employed in supporting the ARVN raid.

Buddhist in Saigon brought a rally to celebrate the birth day of Lord Buddha in 1963 and government security forces under Nhu's order broke up the peaceful gathering without any valid reason. Following this incident further protest followed and government soldiers at this time shot and killed several demonstrators. Thich Quang Duc, a monk, expressed his outrage by setting himself on fire near a busy intersection in Saigon.¹¹ When this sacrifice was termed as 'barbeque' by Madame Nhu the situation got worsened. More monks burnt themselves like Duc and thousands of protesters came out in the streets calling for Diem and Nhus removal. While US got alarmed with the ongoing incident, requested Diem to handle the situation pragmatically. Instead, Nhu started mass arrests of protesters and attacked on Buddhist pagodas which ultimately destabilized the security situation in Saigon. Meanwhile, insurgents started gaining more support from the Buddhist as more people join the NLF/VC to ousted Diem. It also provoked the Generals to approach for coup to US that further destabilized the country. Overall, the mishandling of Buddhist incident gave rise to destabilizing situation in Saigon that facilitated the operating environment of the insurgents in Saigon.

Analyzing all these incidents, US felt that Nhu was overwhelmingly manipulating his power in suppressing the overall strategic interest of US. US repeatedly asked Diem to get rid of Nhu but Diem denied. At this point, US thought for an alternative to Diem. But, some advisers felt that eliminating Diem would destabilize the South Vietnamese government and cause it to fall. Though ARVN top Generals approached CIA for a coup but Kennedy initially opposed that and insisted Diem to control of the escalating situation in Saigon. Diem tried to show some positive gesture to reform but not removing Nhu who to further agony to US, hinted for a negotiation with North Vietnam to form a neutralist government. The US being frustrated with all these issues approved the coup. But, to the utter surprise of Kennedy, it was discovered that the coup not only ousted Diem but also brutally killed Diem and Nhu. This coup though thought to be bringing a stable military regime in Saigon, was the beginning to entering the verge of total collapse.

Reasons of Success for Insurgent Strategy that was Strong and Robust backed by Hanoi, China and Russia:


North Vietnam was supported morally, economically and militarily by both Russia and China. In 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for ‘wars of nation liberation’ throughout the world. His statement greatly encourages communists in North Vietnam to unify Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. But, the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 was a public rivalry and North Vietnam was inclined towards China for the Hanoi’s war effort. Though Soviets cut aid to North Vietnam as an expression of annoyance with Hanoi’s increased close ties with China, still it continued to follow the Soviet model of reliance on technical specialists and bureaucratic management, as opposed to mass mobilization.

Hanoi provided the fundamental support of political and military guidance to VC from the outset of insurgency the formation of NLF in 1960 had the political agenda to encourage the South Vietnamese to participate as non-communists to gain freedom against Diem government. Diem knew that NLF was established by the North Vietnamese as a “front organization”, with the clear aim of waging war against his regime.¹² The insurgency under the banner of NLF was not much organized initially and Nhu (brother of Diem) tackled the insurgent activities with supreme efficiency prior to 1960. However, to gear up and support the insurgency of VC, it is estimated that around 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated initially by the border and later by the Ho Chi Minh trail between 1961 and 1963. They provided arms, training and moral support *to the VC insurgents* by conducting successful operations against ARVN. As a result of massive recruitment, the VC grew rapidly and an estimated 300,000 members were enrolled in “liberation association” by early 1962 where the ratio of VC to government soldiers jumped from one in ten in 1961 to one in five a year later.¹³ Beside growing number of insurgents, the VC increased their operation in manifold.

VC followed a robust and strong insurgency strategy. They were motivated and guided by Ho Chi Minh, a strong follower of Mao’s strategy, who declared “ whatever the sacrifices, however long the struggle, until Vietnam is fully independent and reunified”. By 1961, VC had stepped into phase two of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. From discriminate small group attacks they organized and attacked South Vietnamese in battalion sized units by 1 May 1962. Meanwhile the military wing of VC (Peoples Liberations Armed Forces) was organized well. The three men military cell usually, composed only of fighters, was the basic building block of the ‘3 by 3’ organizational principle.¹⁴ They were motivated to fight for the unique cause of unifying Vietnam with clear direction of the Lao Dong Party. This dedication of members, direction and constant supervision of the party helped the VC to achieve success in their movement to a great

extent. The inefficiency and unwillingness of ARVN also helped them to strengthen their movement. Exploiting many government actions VC recruited thousands of South Vietnamese in their team. The failed strategic hamlet, the mishandling of the Buddhist movement and military coup against Diem all contributed the insurgents to gain strong hold in South Vietnam. At a point, in December 1963, taking the advantage of the chaotic situation after the military coup in Saigon, North Vietnamese leaders debated the issue of quick victory through the all out effort from north versus continuing the protracted war or guerrilla warfare. However, the leaders felt that it was not the right time and thereby continued with the existing tactics. The following Graph-I shows how the VC slowly gained superiority over ARVN (casualty estimate).

Graph-1: Casualties (1961-June 1964) that Depicts Gradual Strengthening of VC Operatives¹⁵



Source: Author's Construct

Conclusion

Soon after Kennedy's takeover of the Presidency the Bay of Pigs fiasco incident in Cuba, the intimidation in Vienna by the Russian Premier and the Laotian compromise forced him to take a stand somewhere in his Cold War rhetoric; he found Vietnam to be the perfect place.¹⁶ But, Kennedy faltered in analyzing the historical and political reasons for the Diem government's weakness and the resilience of Hanoi government's and the VC. Kennedy inherited Vietnam and he continued dragging the commitment being concerned by credibility but he definitely feared the consequences of defeat. He never felt any heightened sense or any urgency of combating insurgency through ground troops the way Johnson felt. But, it can be argued that Kennedy perhaps could have been more critical and careful in analyzing Vietnam as part of foreign policy in order to avoid handing over a much stronger insurgent gradually strengthened between 1961 and 1963, and a worsened politico-military situation to Johnson.¹⁷

Repeated coups after the fall of Diem rocked the Saigon government and further destabilized the country. Generals were ousted by each other not to take control of the situation rather to gain power and be benefited by the US aides. The South Vietnamese people got really disheartened by these acts and never supported any regime. However, it also presented a problem for the VC to progress with further a recruitment program. With the deaths of Diem and Nhu, the people lost the resentment they possessed and did not find any cause to join NLF. However, the lack of manpower was covered up by the soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army who were mainly infiltrating through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The ARVN soldiers performance did not change at all rather with repeated change in the military hierarchy, their military credibility deteriorated significantly to fight against the insurgents. At this point, Johnson administration was strongly advised by the MACV to take strict control including military intervention if they wanted to stop the Saigon regime falling into Hanoi's hand. Johnson fearing he would called the first President to lose a limited war decided to fight while putting sufficient emphasis on his domestic program.

Despite the fact that Johnson did not want to get deeply involved in the Vietnam issue, yet it turned out to be "Lyndon Johnson's War" at a later time frame. At the end of 1964, while the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was plotted by CIA, Johnson at his Headquarter thought of four options available to him.¹⁸ First option was to Americanize the war and begin an all-out effort to defeat the enemy. Secondly to escalate the America's involvement gradually, after assessing each step before moving to the next. Thirdly, to stop the escalation, negotiate a settlement, and gradually withdraw. Fourth option was to completely pull out from Vietnam and stop any further involvement. For obvious reason, Johnson rejected the first option. A full-scale commitment might trigger Russian and Chinese intervention. Option four was rejected as well because this might mean a defeat to the rest of the world. Johnson was not ready to go for a negotiation with NLF to form a coalition government in Saigon. As a result, third option was not a good one for him. Therefore, Johnson was left with option two, which gave him sufficient leverage to control the pace and direction of the conflict. However, Johnson with his supreme diplomacy could manage to get approval to anything he wanted in Vietnam through Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But, the application of such a great leverage by the military planner proved to be counterproductive which escalated the situation to a "total people's war". Had the planner been more prudent in applying their strategy and, the humiliating defeat of a super power could have been avoided at a later stage.

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Brief Biography



Colonel Md Humayun Kabir, SUP, SPP, psc, psc(j) was commissioned in the Corps of Infantry with 35th BMA Long Course on 13 December 1996. Apart from mandatory courses, he was the pioneer officer to attend Young Officers (Mechanized) Course from India. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Mirpur. He also attended Advance Command and Staff Course from the Defence Academy of United Kingdom. He attained Masters Degree from Bangladesh University of Professional (BUP). He has also a Masters of Arts Degree to credentials from Kings College, London. He completed diploma in Strategic Management and Leadership from Chartered Management Institute (CMI) of London. Besides all regimental appointments, he served in different staff and Instructional appointments. He served as Grade 3 (Operations) Staff Officer in Chattogram Hill Tracts and as Brigade Major at Savar. He served as Platoon Commander and Adjutant in Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA). He also served as instructor at Tactics Wing of School of Infantry and Tactics. He commanded an infantry unit in Chattogram Hill Tracts. Presently, he is serving as colonel staff at military Training Directorate, Army Headquarters.

CAREER PLANNING OF YOUNG OFFICERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THREE YEARS ACADEMY TRAINING

Major Md Rezwanuzzaman Khan, psc, Inf

Abstract

Professional development and management of army officers' career demand a methodical approach and continuous enhancement in the planning process to provide the most competent and dedicated officers corps to lead their under command in the battlefield. In 2015, the paradigm shift of the BMA training system from two years to three years focused on providing a firm base for the future leaders in both military and academic knowledge. However, additional time after the commission is required to complete the academic curriculum. Consequently, the newly commissioned officers spent a long duration on post-commission academic training (PCAT). Again, on completion of the PCAT, officers move out for various mandatory courses. Unit service at the foundation stage of career assists the junior officers to learn the operational role of particular arms and services, troops handling, unit administration and other necessary dimensions of professional efficiency. Hence, the prolonged absence from the unit will have a significant impact on the professional development and subsequent career progression of young officers of three years academy training. At this backdrop, it is imperative to find out plausible solutions to the negative impact posed by the existing career planning of young officers of three years academy training. Initially, an overview of the existing career planning of young officers was discussed. Then, the significant negative impact of existing career plan on the professional development of the young officers and the smooth functioning of the organization were found out. Subsequently, attempt was made to identify a few implementable options to ascertain plausible modification of the existing career planning of young officers. In the end, few recommendations were made for modifying the existing career planning of young officers to make it more effective for the officers and the organization.

Introduction

Career flow structures are the most important variables in career management. They affect commitment by creating different expectations between the individual and the organization.¹ They also affect the competence of the workforce, the strength of organizational culture, and the networks of relationships that can be used to coordinate interdependent parts of the organization. Professional development and management of army officers' career demand a methodical approach and continuous enhancement in the planning process.²


Bangladesh (BD) Army took a holistic approach to make its officers more competent and enhance their proficiency to keep pace with the modern world. The paradigm shift of the Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) training system from two years to three years focused on providing a firm base in both military and academic knowledge. 'From 75 BMA Long Course, Officer Cadets need to stay in BMA for three years till their commission. After a brief regimentation period, officers of Honours and Engineering curriculum fall back to BMA and MIST respectively to complete academic studies. On completion, they will undergo mandatory courses. At the same time, presumably, conceiving the basic lessons of regimental affairs with such service length and rank are likely to be difficult.³

Transition to three years training duration, however, may create a significant imbalance in the career planning of the officers in their foundation stage. Various important dimensions of military career might be impeded. Especially, there remains a void of unit service for the young officers. Whereas unit is the best place for the junior officers to learn the operational role of particular arms and services, troops handling, unit administration, and other necessary dimensions of professional efficiency.⁴ Consequently, the future leadership of the organization will be at stake, if immediate attention is not given on the progressive development of the young officers through an efficient career planning.

The Existing Career Plan for Young Officers of Three Years Academy Training

Career planning entails proper utilization of the employment potential of an officer basing on his performances in various post-commission training and services to ensure his selection for the right job. However, primarily it is the officer himself who makes his career by taking the profession sincerely and other agencies are there to assist him to reach his coveted goal.⁵ Hence, the career of an officer can be considered as a blend of the perspective of both the officer and the organization.

Figure 1: An Officers' Career from Different Perspective




Source: Author's Construct

Training and Courses at Different Stages of Career

Post-commission Academic Training (PCAT): Considering the academic pressure during the training in BMA, several modifications were made in the academic syllabus.⁶ Consequently, changes were made in credit hours in BMA and PCAT, duration of PCAT, and system of level drop for the Engineering curriculum. From 77 BMA Long Course, the existing system of PCAT came into effect as shown below:

Figure 2: Existing System of PCAT



Source: BMA

Mandatory Courses: Mandatory courses are planned at different stages of the career to ensure their progressive development and their effectiveness in the units.⁷ These courses are also a requirement to become eligible for promotion to the next ranks. However, with the inclusion of PCAT, the timeline of these courses will be different for officers of different academic curriculum.

Non Mandatory Courses: Besides the mandatory courses, officers attend various courses on different aspects of military affairs basing on the vacancy allotted by the Army Headquarters and the formations to the units. Duration of these courses varies from 2 months to 9 months. In a few courses, officers are directly nominated by the MS branch.⁸ However, it is evident that most of the young officers will not get this opportunity due to acute scarcity of young officers in the unit.

Foreign Courses: In recent years, BD Army has intensely focused on modernization of its armaments. Hence, the requirement of training on these advanced weapons and equipment from the originating countries is essential for better effectiveness and maintenance of the inventory. However, selection of the young officers of the new training system will be difficult. Firstly, they will lag behind the mandatory courses. Secondly, this will further delay their qualification for the next rank. Finally, unit service experience will be hampered.⁹

Promotion Policy for the Officers

Promotion Time Frame: According to the latest policy circulated by Military Secretary (MS) branch on 15 October 2019, the time frame of promotion for these officers are as following:

- a. An officer will be eligible for promotion to the rank of Captain after 2 years of commissioned service.
- b. Promotion to the rank of Major will require minimum 6 years of service. The timeline for promotion to the rank of Major might vary depending on the availability of vacancy.

Requirements for Promotion: The officers' promotion requirement to the next rank is regulated by the '**Promotion Policy for Officers of BD Armed Forces-2003**'. However, considering the changes in BMA training system, the latest policy of MS branch delineated the requirement for promotion to the next rank as following:

Table 1: Requirements for Promotion

Course	Requirements for Captain	Requirements for Major
75 BMA Long Course	a. Qualified in promotion IPFT and RET. b. Category 'A' (Category 'B' and 'C' for attributable to military service). c. Promotion CR approved. d. OBC, OWC and Promotion Examination (PE) is exempted till 2021. They need to qualify in OBC, OWC and pass in PE (Both Part-I and Part-II) during this time period. Officers failing to qualify in PE by 2021 will be issued with a written warning (Recordable) by Formation Commander.	a. Must have obtained clearance from MS branch. b. Category 'A' (Category 'B' and 'C' for attributable to military service). c. Qualified in promotion IPFT and RET. d. PE qualified. e. JCSC qualified. f. Promotion CR approved.

76 BMA and Onward Long Course Officers	a. Qualified in promotion IPFT and RET. b. Category 'A' (Category 'B' and 'C' for attributable to military service). c. OBC qualified. d. PE qualified (Officers will appear PE part-I during MIST or BUP curriculum). e. OWC is exempted. They need to qualify in OWC within first four years of commissioned service. Officers failing to qualify in OWC will be issued with a written warning (Recordable) by Formation Commander.	g. Must have obtained a military driving license for Jeep/ Pickup/ 3 Ton Truck.
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Source: MS Branch

Pattern of Service at Various Capacity

Unit Service: The PCAT in BMA will start after 06 months of unit service. For PCAT in MIST, courses passed out in June will have 06 months of unit service before joining, but courses passed out in December will join MIST after one month of service in the unit. These officers will undergo various mandatory courses after the completion of PCAT for different duration.¹⁰

Prospect of ERE Service: Extra Regimental Employment (ERE) posting usually starts at the rank of captain in BD Army. Some of the ERE postings require special qualifications such as qualified and recommended in specific courses. Some ERE postings are routine for which qualifications are not delineated. According to the latest directive, officers of the new training system will not be considered for any ERE until a further decision is made regarding their mandatory unit service requirement.¹¹ This is shown below in Table 2:

Table 2: ERE Vacancies for Captain

Place of ERE	Number of Vacancies	Present State
Within the Organization	261	39
Outside the Organization in RAB, SSF, BGB, DGFI, MIST, BUP etc	350	50

Source: MS Branch

United Nations Mission: At present, the selection of officers for UN mission is based on the seniority of service in different ranks. However, when a unit is nominated to be the core of a contingent, its parent officers are also selected without the consideration of service seniority.¹² According to the existing policy, an officer can be selected for UN mission when he fulfils the following criteria:

- a. Officers in the rank of captain need to qualify in JCSC.
- b. Parent officers need to have minimum 3 years of service and qualify in OBC and OWC.

Evaluation System of Young Officers

Officers Performance Report (OPR): OPR products contribute to self-development of the officer by apprising him of his strengths and weaknesses, as assessed by the Initiating Officer, and giving him specific advice for improvement. An officer is assessed based on his demonstrated performance which includes his personality traits and professional attributes. The initiating officer can also recommend suitable future appointments, courses, posting in ERE, and promotion to the next rank in the OPR.¹³

Tabulated Record and Comparative Evaluation (TRACE): TRACE is used to scrutinize an officers' entire service, course performance, physical fitness, gallant actions, discipline, and health state. Therefore, the elements of TRACE include the performance of an officer from the foundation stage of his career. The existing system of TRACE is shown below in Table 3:

Table 3: TRACE System

Total Mark - 100					
OPR – 60	Courses – 30		IPFT – 10	Bonus	
Percentage of total OPR marks obtained by an individual officer in his whole career	OBC	5	Percentage of IPFTs passed by an officer in his service career	Awards	0.25-3.50
	OWC	3		Higher Courses	0.25-0.50
	BCC	1		Publication	0.25-0.50
	JCSC	5		Service in CHT	0.20 for each year
	Non-mandatory	3			
	Staff course or UCSC	13 10			

Source: MS Branch

Impact of Existing Career Planning of Young Officers in the Context of Three Years Academy Training

In BD Army, the career of an officer is mostly an achievement-driven planning process regulated by the organization. However, the initial stage of an officers' career is pivotal to establish the base for the progressive development.¹⁴ To promote the development and learning process, the organization needs to ensure that the officers adapt and evolve through the accumulation of knowledge by being constantly involved in the unit's routine activities.¹⁵

Impact on Attaining Individual Proficiency

Inadequate Tactical and Technical Proficiency: To be tactically and technically proficient a young officer needs to be involved in “On Job Training” and various activities of the unit.¹⁶ The learning process is a two-way traffic for the young officers. He learns from the environment and exercises the acquired knowledge in different scenarios to be more efficient.¹⁷

Lack of Seriousness in PCAT: The young officers join the PCAT with little understanding of its importance in the subsequent stages of their career. Moreover, immediately after the BMA training they feel complacent and do not give adequate attention to the PCAT.¹⁸ Furthermore, the result of PCAT is not included in any of the evaluation system of an officer. Thus, officers are found reluctant towards the academic training.

Lack of Preparedness for Various Courses: Officers build their own path for the progression of their career through merit and hard work by performing well in various courses.¹⁹ Officers, who must adapt to the changing organisational environment, must have training and development to enhance their managerial and leadership skills and abilities.²⁰ In the present system, the officers will not have much exposure to unit training and exercise which contributes in preparing the officers for various courses.

Declining State of Personal Discipline: PCAT offers the newly commissioned officers a greater degree of flexibility and freedom of action. They are not supervised the way a young officer is taken care of in the unit.²¹ The state of personal conduct and discipline is deteriorating as the young officers remain away from close supervision at the foundation stage of their career.²² Such deterioration is likely to affect the grooming up and career of these officers in the future.

Imbalance between Officers from Honours and Engineering Curriculum in the same Arms or Services: The duration of PCAT will make a significant difference in the career of officers from Honours and Engineering curriculum.²³ The officers from Honours curriculum is likely to get advantages over the officers from Engineering curriculum to serve in the units, ERE, UN missions, and attend courses as the career progresses.²⁴ This is shown in Table 4 below:-

Table 4: Engineering Curriculum Officers in Non-technical Arms and Services

Course	Armoured	Artillery	Infantry	Ordnance
75 BMA Long Course	2	16	35	3
76 BMA Long Course	1	14	14	2
77 BMA Long Course	4	14	11	1
78 BMA Long Course	1	5	14	-
Total	8	49	74	6

Source: MS Branch

Impact on Developing Leadership Attributes

Lack of Cohesion with the Under Commands: The intangible quality of leadership of the young officers in BD Army develops by establishing a bond with the under command. Young officers need to work in close proximity of the troops to build a strong cohesion with them.²⁵ Frequent absence from the unit at an early stage of career is likely to put a barrier in developing the bond between the leaders and the led.²⁶

Difficulty in Establishing Chain of Command: Understanding and establishing the chain of command is a vital element of leadership function in the unit.²⁷ Chain of command is considered as the linchpin that ensures the effective functioning of the organization. The void of unit service is making it difficult for the young officers to establish an effective chain of command.²⁸

Absence of Mutual Trust and Faith: Developing mutual trust is a distinguishing leadership quality which helps an officer to earn the willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation of his men.²⁹ Officers of the new training system often fails to connect with their men for prolonged absence.³⁰ Hence, the existing system works as an impediment in developing mutual trust and faith between the commanders and their men.

Low Self-confidence: Confidence is developed by performing challenging tasks in the units. When a young officer is exposed to the command climate of the unit, his

confidence in handling troops and performing various tasks increases through gaining experience.³¹ 85% Officers of the formations opined that existing scenario results in low self-confidence of young officers in the unit.

Lack of Decision Making Capability: This fundamental quality develops gradually as an officer goes through the process of performing in different roles in the unit. He learns the decision-making process as a commander or staff in close supervision of his superiors.³² In the existing system, a young officer can hardly perform in such appointments as his duration of stay in the unit is very less to appoint him in such important roles.

Impact on Understanding Regimental Affairs

Lack of Experience in Regimental Staff Work: Learning the staff work is essential to develop an understanding of the functioning of an organization. Young officers usually hold the unit staff appointments like adjutant and quartermaster. This experience becomes the foundation of staff work in subsequent career.³³ Officers of the new training system are not placed in such appointments due to their interrupted service in the unit.

Lack of Exposure to the Training System of the Unit: BMA provides the basic military training to an officer. His subsequent development happens when he participates in various unit training activities special to his arms and services in the unit.³⁴ It will be difficult for the young officers to plan and execute various training for his unit or sub-unit without participating in these activities at the foundation stage.³⁵

Lack of Exposure to the Administrative Function of the Unit: Sound administration has a direct impact on the morale and efficiency of the troops. A young officer is expected to be thoroughly aware of the administrative function of the unit.³⁶ The administrative function of a unit covers diverse issues from barrack maintenance to discipline and welfare of the under commands. The young officers are missing the exposure to this important aspect due to their existing career pattern.

Lack of Comprehension of the Regimental Tradition: The spirit and dedication of a military officer lies in having a firm belief in the regimental tradition of the unit. Officers of three years training system may suffer from lack of attachment with the unit due to interrupted regimentation programme and lack of unit service.³⁷

Lack of Understanding the Peacetime and Wartime Function of the Unit: BD Army is a force not designed to function in wartime only. It has to perform multifarious role in peacetime as well. To understand the role and employment of the Army in different

environments, an officer has to remain present in the unit and perform various duties and responsibilities.³⁸ In the existing system the young officers will have an inadequate understanding of the functioning of a unit in different role and employment during peace and war.

Impact on the Organization

Scarcity of Junior Officers in the Unit: Young officers act as the linchpin for the functioning of a unit. The existing design of career for the officers of three years academy training has created a void of junior officers in the unit due to the PCAT and other courses.³⁹ It is hampering the unit environment. While there are 4 to 5 officers of the new training system posted in a unit, hardly any of them remain present at the same time.⁴⁰

Reduced Efficiency of the Units: The effectiveness of a unit depends mostly on the effectiveness of its officers. The acute scarcity of young officers is affecting the routine functioning of a unit. The officers present in the unit are multi-tasked and remain under tremendous pressure. Moreover, troops devoid of direct command of the officers cannot perform effectively.⁴¹

Selection of Officers for Utility Courses: The short tenure of service in the rank of captain coupled with limitation of unit service will make it difficult to plan various non-mandatory or utility courses for the officers of the new training system. Hence, the professional development of these officers will be affected.⁴² It will also result in a shortage of qualified trainers in the units.

Posting Officers in the Rank of Captain in ERE Establishment: ERE in different headquarters, units, and institutions widens the view of an officer and provides valuable experience in service life.⁴³ The officers of Engineering curriculum are less likely to get this opportunity. Consequently, there will be a void in the ERE appointments while MS Branch looks for a way to make a balance between the ERE and unit service.⁴⁴

Selection of Officers for United Nations (UN) Mission: Besides the organizational requirement, UN mission also provides the officers economic solvency. With the existing trend, selection of these officers for UN mission as captain will be difficult, as they will be affected in other areas like unit service, promotion or posting in ERE appointments. At the same time, their consideration for UN mission in the rank of major will delay their employment which may have a morale effect on these officers.⁴⁵

Plausible Modification Required in the Career Planning of Young Officers for Better Effectiveness of the Organization

Career planning of the officers is a dynamic task with an intent to meet the requirements of the organization and professional development of the officers. With the evolutionary changes in the organizational approach, the career planning process must respond to the changing requirements of the organization and the officers.⁴⁶ The identified impact of career planning of young officers will affect the efficiency of the officers as well as the organization. While these issues remain unresolved, there is a probability that the organizational progressive changes in the training system of BMA will stumble in attempting to implement a modern strategy to build a professional corps of officers.⁴⁷

Mandatory Service in the Unit

Before the PCAT: With the recent modification of planning, officers from the Honours curriculum will stay 06 months before their departure to the PCAT. However, officers from the Engineering curriculum commissioned in December will not even complete the regimentation.⁴⁸ Hence, there needs to be a provision ensuring at least six months to one year mandatory service in the unit before joining the PCAT.

After the PCAT: ‘The Armed Forces Division Policy states that a young officer must stay at least one year in the unit before joining any course. However, in the recent system, due to the duration of the PCAT, they will be lagging in qualifying for the next rank. Consequently, immediately after the PCAT officers will move out for various mandatory courses.⁴⁹ Therefore, provision should be made for a mandatory service of at least six months and one year after PCAT to re-orient with the regimental life in the unit.⁵⁰

Mode of Conducting the PCAT

Duration of PCAT: Though the duration has reduced for the Honours curriculum to six months, it has increased to two years for the Engineering curriculum.⁵¹ Hence, the duration of PCAT should be reviewed to make a balance between the officers of different academic background to ensure maximum unit service for the young officers at the foundation stage of their career.⁵²

Centralized PCAT: BMA provides adequate care in monitoring and supervising the activities of the officers. On the other hand, MIST cannot intimately monitor the young officers due to obvious reasons.⁵³ Therefore, a centralized approach of conducting the PCAT in BMA can reduce many differences between the officers. At the same time, monitoring and supervision system of BMA would allow better grooming up of officers during the PCAT period.⁵⁴

Adjustment of Promotion System

Promotion Policy: Requirements for promotion need to be reviewed to have some space between the training and courses so that an officer can serve in the unit. In the present system, when an officer from Engineering curriculum will join the unit after two years of PCAT, he will become eligible for Captain. Conversely, officers of Honours curriculum will have to fulfil the criteria by attending various courses and examinations. At the same time, there are officers from both Honours and Engineering curriculum in the same unit. Hence, the requirements for promotion should be made similar for both the faculty.⁵⁵

Promotion Timeframe: Adjustment of promotion timeframe will provide flexibility in an officers' career progression and allow gradual development of professional competence in all the dimensions.⁵⁶ In the existing system, an officer will become Major with little experience of ground service. Considering the present scenario, the required service length for the rank of Major should be increased to build officers' competency on command and staff related work in the unit.⁵⁷ Majority of the officers of the formation opined 8 years' service length to be ideal for becoming a Major in the present context.

Modification in Posting System


Commissioning Officers from Engineering Curriculum in Technical Arms: The academic discipline of the officers is selected immediately after joining in BMA. Hence, at the end of three years of training when officers are commissioned, it becomes difficult to accommodate officers of Engineering curriculum in technical arms.⁵⁸ A projected vacancy by MS Branch for each course before dividing the academic discipline can help in solving the problem. At the same time, the existing cadets of Engineering curriculum should be accommodated in technical arms for better efficiency and output in the organization.⁵⁹

Service Bracketing for ERE: ERE in different headquarters or institutions demands a certain degree of maturity from the young officers. Hence, it is imperative to ensure that officers with the right qualification are posted in ERE organizations to bring out the best performance of the officers and to increase organizational effectiveness.⁶⁰ The officers of the new training system will require more time to put some service experience in the units.⁶¹ Survey shows the preferable service length to be posted in ERE is more than 5 years.

Modification of Progressive Development Plan and Feedback System

Review of Various Courses: The best training is achieved through the unit experience at the early stage of the career. An individual obtain 70 % of their knowledge from job-related experiences, 20 % from interactions with co-workers, and 10 % from formal training and educational events.⁶² Timeline and duration of the courses should allow officers more time to be with the unit and the men they are to lead.⁶³

Figure 3: Unit Service vis-à-vis Courses and Trainings



Source: Author's Construct

Mentoring at Unit and Formation Level: Units have a tremendous role in developing the professional and personal attributes of the young officers. An organizational approach based on specific attributes of the officers will be essential for a well-coSordinated development plan. Regular workshops, seminars, and refresher programmes are some useful tools for the progressive development of young officers.⁶⁴

Figure 4: Officers' Performance Based on Organizational Approach



Source: Author's Construct

Feedback and Performance Appraisal: Besides the yearly feedback through OPR by the Commanding Officers, performance appraisal and forecast of career progression by MS branch can assist the young officers in building an effective career profile. Furthermore, through this system, officers will be more focused to identify their likely areas of interest and overcome the weakness to enhance professional competence in their respective domain.⁶⁵

Young Officers Career in Neighbouring Countries

Indian Army: In the Indian Army, officers complete their graduation within the training period in the academy. After commission, unit service is given maximum importance. An endeavour has been made to ensure the availability of young officers in the unit so that they can contribute maximum to the unit and the organization. After the commission, an officer serves for 3 to 4 years in the unit. Within this period he attends various courses. The duration of these courses is less than 6 months. Formation and unit training with men is given the highest priority. After 4 to 5 years, officers are posted to other units or training institutions. There are no Grade-3 appointments in the ERE for captains. Officers are promoted to the rank of major at 6 years of service.⁶⁶

Pakistan Army: In the Pakistan Army, officers get their commission along with a graduation degree. After commission, an officer serves in the unit for 4 to 5 years. Unit service is considered as the cornerstone of an officers' life and forms part of basic grooming in the military career. The duration of various courses at the initial stage of service are: Basic Infantry Course for 6 months, Own Arms Basic course for 4 to 5 months, and JSC/MCC for 5 to 6 months. After completing the JSC/MCC officers are posted out at 5 to 6 years of service. The required service length for becoming major is 8 years and 6 months.⁶⁷

Conclusion

BD Army is constantly adapting with the rapidly changing world. With the advancement of doctrine, technology and modern military equipment, it was essential to change the training system to build a competent corps of officers. Hence, a knowledge-based academy training system with an intended duration of 3 years was introduced in 2015 with an additional allotment of time to complete the academic graduation immediately after the commission. Along with the paradigm shift of officers training system, the career pattern of the officers also formed a new dimension. It became apparent that the existing career pattern of the young officers will affect the officers of three years of academy training as it upsets certain areas of progressive career

development design in the post-commission period like posting, promotion, training, courses, UN mission, performance evaluation etc.

After analyzing the career planning of young officers, it was identified that certain aspects of career will have significant negative impact on the professional development of the young officer and the organizational efficiency. The salient aspects of these impact involved individual proficiency, leadership attributes, regimental affairs, and smooth functioning of the organization at different levels. Most of these impact were linked to the absence of young officers in the unit due to PCAT and other mandatory courses. Consequently, the existing career planning of young officers will impose certain constraints and reduce the effectiveness of the officers and the organization.

In an attempt to ascertain plausible modification of the existing career planning of young officers, a few implementable options were identified. The duration and conduct of PCAT should allow the progressive development of professional and personal attributes of officers along with the academic curriculum. Units being the cornerstone of officers' professional growth requires the presence of young officers to be with the men they are to lead. Further attention is required in the adjustment of promotion policy, careful selection of arms and services before commissioning, suitable posting policy, the conduct of courses and training, formation and unit-level development programme, and a system of performance appraisal which are entangled characteristics of an officers' career.

Recommendations

Basing on the findings of the paper, following recommendations are made to modify the existing career planning of the young officers:

- a. Army Training and Doctrine Command may form a board to review the duration of the PCAT in consultation with BUP and MIST and. They should also determine the credit hours to be completed within BMA training to reduce the duration of the PCAT. Furthermore, the board may carry out a feasibility study to organize centralized PCAT in BMA.
- b. MS Branch may form a board to carry out a feasibility study regarding the following:
 - (1) Ensuring mandatory unit service for the officers of three years academy training before and after the PCAT and determine the duration of stay in the unit which should not be less than 6 months.

(2) Reviewing the promotion policy for both Honours and Engineer curriculum officer to maintain a balance between all arms and services. The suggested requirements for promotion should consider the necessity of unit service and decide on the course qualification requirement for the next rank. The service length required for the rank of major should also be reviewed in the present context.

(3) Providing a tentative vacancy state to BMA once a new course joins the academy to distribute the cadets in different academic disciplines. The board should also formulate plans to absorb maximum existing cadets of Engineering faculty into technical arms and services.

(4) Setting a specific timeframe to be posted to ERE organizations after completing a certain length of unit service. In this regard, the requirement of various institutions and establishment should be taken into consideration to plan for various courses at different length of service.

(5) Formulating a system of performance appraisal to project future career prospect and providing feedback basing on the existing state of performance in line with the latest trend of human resource management for better effectiveness of the officers.

c. Military Training Directorate may carry out a feasibility study to review the existing duration of courses for various arms and services. They may also formulate a plan to integrate formation and unit-level training specific to arms and services to reduce the duration of prolonged courses at the initial stage of the career.

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9. Interview with Maj M. Khan, Deputy Assistant Military Secretary, Army Headquarters, on 17 August 2020.
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17. Interview with Lt Col Taher, WorkSmart Consulting, on 09 August 2020.
18. Interview with Lt Col Rahman, Former Officer in Charge, Post Commission Academic Training, Bangladesh Military Academy, on 14 August 2020.
19. Interview with Brig Gen Bakir, Former Battalion Commander, Bangladesh Military Academy, on 09 August 2020.
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23. Interview with Maj Gen Momen, Commandant, Bangladesh Military Academy on 05 August 2020.

24. Interview with Brig Gen Bakir, Former Battalion Commander, Bangladesh Military Academy on 09 August 2020.
25. FGD-2, Officers of the Formation, on 14 August 2020.
26. Interview with Lt Col Taher, WorkSmart Consulting on 09 August 2020.
27. Interview with Brig Gen Haque, Former Battalion Commander, Bangladesh Military Academy on 15 August 2020.
28. FGD-1, Officers of Three Years Academy Training on 11 August 2020.
29. Interview with Brig Gen Bakir, Former Battalion Commander, Bangladesh Military Academy on 09 August 2020.
30. FGD-1, Officers of Three Years Academy Training on 11 August 2020.
31. Interview with Maj Gen Momen, Commandant, Bangladesh Military Academy on 05 August 2020.
32. Interview with Lt Col Shawon, Commanding Officer, 66 East Bengal Regiment on 13 August 2020.
33. Interview with Lt Col Mahmud, Commanding Officer, 63 East Bengal Regiment on 13 August 2020.
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Brief Biography



Major Md Rezwanuzzaman Khan, psc, Inf was born on 04 September 1987 at Barishal. He passed both Secondary School Certificate and Higher Secondary Certificate examinations from Barishal Cadet College. He was commissioned from Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) with 57 BMA Long Course in the Corps of Infantry on 13 December 2007. He has a diverse experience of serving in the unit and training institutions. He has served in various regimental appointments. As Instructor, he served in Non Commissioned Officers' Academy and in BMA as a Platoon Commander. Apart from the mandatory courses for his professional career, he attended the Potential Platoon Commanders' Course in BMA and Junior Command Course from India. He has graduated in Army Staff Course 2020-2021 from Defence Services Command and Staff College. He has participated in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in DR Congo as a contingent member. He is married and blessed with a daughter and a son.

LEVERAGING NANOTECHNOLOGY FOR NAVAL CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT

Lieutenant Commander Suraj Kumar Singh, psc, Indian Navy

Abstract

Nanotechnology is one of the most promising technologies of this century and holds immense potential for enhancement of capabilities of Naval forces. However, presently, its potential has not been adequately leveraged by the Navy. This research highlights the scope for leveraging nanotechnology by the Navy through development of better weapons, surveillance equipment and Network Centric Warfare capabilities. The research has generated valuable data through literature review, a sample survey and interviews of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). An analysis of the responses reveals that a majority of the respondents agree that nanotechnology should be focused upon by the Navies as it will be crucial towards enhancing capabilities and meeting evolving requirements in the future. The research also brings out that the harnessing of nanotechnology to its full potential requires nations to develop suitable policies to encourage innovative research and enhance the budget allocation for initial infrastructure development. Further, the specific fields for application of nanotechnology in accordance with the strategic, operational and tactical requirements of the Navy need to be identified by each country. This needs to be followed up with the training of personnel. There is also a need at the global level to modify existing international regulations to cater for the changes which will be brought by the use of nanotechnology in the armed forces.

Introduction

Nanotechnology (NT) deals with materials at the nanoscale dimension and is amongst the most capable technologies of this century. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) of US has defined NT as ‘a science, engineering and technology conducted at the nanoscale (1 to 100 nm), where unique phenomena enable novel applications in a wide range of fields, from chemistry, physics and biology, to medicine, engineering and electronics’.¹

NT has demonstrated its potential to affect future warfighting. The prospects include defence against chemical/biological warfare, novel materials to manufacture weapons, novel energetic materials, information technology, and network architecture. This is the reason that several major powers across the globe have continued to enhance their budget to sustain R&D in NT. As Ralph Merkle, eminent American Computer Scientist observes, “Nanotechnology will let us build computers that are incredibly powerful. We’ll have more power in the volume of a sugar cube than exists in the entire world today.”

The Navy is one of the most technology driven components of a military and operates in multiple dimensions which include air, surface and underwater. NT offers promising options for enhancing the capabilities of a Navy. These range from smaller, lighter, and more lethal weapons to smart surfaces with capabilities of self-healing on damage. Lighter, agile and more resistant platforms for the Navy can be developed using nano-structured materials. NT, when applied in battle system architectures, has the capability to improve situational awareness and therefore has a large scope for application in Network Centric Warfare.²


ADVENT OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND CURRENT PROGRESS IN THE FIELD

Brief History

Initial Conception

- a. **First Thoughts.** The well-known lecture by Richard Feynman (Photo 1) in 1959, 'There is plenty of room at the bottom', set the grounds for future manufacturing of nano-size products using atoms as building blocks (Feynman, 1959).
- b. **Coining of the Term.** The term NT was devised by Norio Taniguchi (Photo 2) in 1974 at the International Conference on Industrial Production in Tokyo, Japan. He defined the super thin processing of materials using the precision of nanometer range (Cummins, 2011).

Photo 1: Richard Feynman



Source: Internet

Photo 2: Norio Taniguchi



Source: Internet

- c. **Theory of Nano - Machines.** K Eric Drexler proposed the possibility of making nanomachines in 1986 in his book 'Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology'.

Converting Theory to Practicality. Subsequently, three important developments, helped turn NT into a reality:


- a. **Scanning Tunnel Microscope (STM):** In 1981, Binnig and Rohrer invented the Scanning Tunneling Microscope (STM) using which the clear identification of individual atoms became possible.³ (see Figure 1)
- b. **Atomic Force Microscope (AFM):** AFM, invented in 1986, was capable of imaging non-conducting materials like organic molecules. This invention was fundamental in the study of carbon bucky balls, discovered at Rice between 1985–86.⁴ (see Figure 2)

Figure 1: STM



Source: Internet

Figure 2: AFM



Source: Internet

- c. **Molecular NT:** The 1980s were also the period when the first articles and books by E Drexler on molecular NT appeared and the Foresight Institute for molecular NT was founded.⁵
- d. **Development in 1990s:** In the 1990s and beyond, breakthroughs were achieved in many areas viz Carbon Nanotubes (CNT) were discovered and a CNT transistor was demonstrated.⁶

Current Progress in the Field

United States: US was the first nation to commence a NT program in 2000. It assigned US \$ 500 million towards establishment of National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) .⁷ The salient features of the NT initiative undertaken by US are as follows:

a. The US Army teamed up with industries and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to launch the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) with an aim to explore technologies that could vividly increase the safety and survivability of soldiers.⁸

b. The ISN has identified Five Strategic Research Areas (Tomar, 2014) to deal with the challenges confronted by the armed forces. These are mini sensors, rapid processing, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), enhanced virtual reality training and augmentation of human performance.

China: China began its R & D in NT in 1989 as soon as the Atomic Force multiplier was created (Bhattacharya & Bhati, 2012). NT research is quite advanced in China; centres have been set up in the Chinese Academy of Sciences and various universities. The government has set up a National Coordination Committee for nanoscience and NT (Altmann, 2005). China has become the fastest growing NT market in the world. The NT market in China was estimated to be worth US\$145 billion in 2015 (Italian Trade Agency, 2009). The Chinese forces have also shown intent to exploit NT for future war fighting.⁹

Russia: The Russian initiatives in the field of NT were started by President Vladimir Putin in Apr 2007. A comprehensive strategy was launched and world class NT industries were designed through enhanced allocation of public resources. This made Russia the world's second largest spender on R & D in NT by 2009 (Adamsky, 2014). Russia implemented the Federal Targeted Program (FTP) in Aug 2007 in order to develop its NT industry. Numerous federal agencies which included Atomic Energy, Industry, Space, etc. became members of the program. The budget for the FTP was around 100 billion Roubles (US\$ 3.3 billion) out of which two-third was allocated to R & D.¹⁰ In Jul 2007, Russia created the Rusnano, to function as the principal organization for implementing the state policy on NT.

European Union (EU): The first step by the EU which focused on research and use of NT was reported in 1996.¹¹ Thereafter, in 2002, NT was identified among one of the seven key priorities for R & D in the 6th Framework Program (FP6). The EU adopted the Nano Science & Nanotechnology action plan for Europe (2005-2009) in 2005 (De Neve, 2009). Subsequently, the 7th Framework Program (FP7) (2007-2013) was developed. This laid special emphasis on research in NT, nanomaterial and novel production procedures and was supported with a budget of Euro 3475 million. The FP7 was succeeded by Horizon 2020 which will run for seven years. Defense related R & D and funding in EU involves research in electronic devices, nano sensors, and Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defense.¹²

India: India acknowledged the vast potential of NT by introducing Nano Science and Technology Initiative (NSTI) in its 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) with a budget of about 60 million rupees (Rajput, 2017). The Department of Science & Technology (DST) was made responsible for executing the plan. This was followed by the launch of the Nano Mission in May 2007 in the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–12) and it was allotted 10 billion rupees.¹³ The Nano Mission envisions the overall development of R & D on NT and leveraging its potential for national progress.

APPLICATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY IN THE NAVY

Application of NT in Naval Weapons

NT is being applied towards development of weapons as follows:

- a. Nano High Energy Materials (HEMs). Over the past few decades, the use of high energy materials by leveraging NT to enhance the performance of weapons has become a key focus area. The growth of nanomaterials has made it possible to enhance the capabilities of energy materials and devices by overcoming limits through proper structural designing. Lithium batteries, fuel cells, and supercapacitors are a few examples.¹⁴
- b. Nanomaterial. Large scale research and progress is being undertaken on nanomaterials and their use in nanoweapons. Nanomaterials are classified based on the number of dimensions, which are falling outside the range of the nanoscale (<100 nm).¹⁵
- c. Radiation hardened nanoelectronic integrated circuits have been developed and their use in weapons such as missiles and torpedoes will result in significant reduction of size.
- d. Nanoparticles are being used in explosives due to their enhanced destructive force and potential to eventually replace conventional explosives. For example, the US Department of Defense is using nanoaluminium to create ultrahigh burn rate chemical explosives which have ten times greater explosive power than conventional explosives.¹⁶

Based on the information brought out above, the scope for application of NT for development of weapons is as follows:

- a. Using NT for the reduction in size and weight of existing weapons such as missiles, torpedoes, rockets and depth charges.

- b. Application of NT for development of weapons and their launchers which are resistant to effects of weather and require much lesser maintenance.
- c. Use of NT based explosives in the warheads of missiles and torpedoes.

Application of NT in Naval Surveillance Systems

NT can enable the development of new classes of sensors, communication systems, and information processing systems. The following features can be achieved with the use of NT and help to further enhance the effectiveness of surveillance systems.¹⁷

- a. Reduction in size of the equipment thereby occupying lesser space.
- b. Manufacturing of equipment which is lighter in weight.
- c. Reduced power requirements and heat dissipation by the equipment.
- d. The ability to withstand effects of external factors such as weather.
- e. Lesser rates of failure resulting in minimal maintenance requirements.
- f. Enhanced detection ranges through high performance components integrated into the surveillance equipment.

The use of NT in the information and communication domain of the Navy presents the following performance enhancement potential.¹⁸

- a. Development of sensor suites with 1000 times smaller size/power consumption compared to conventional technology.
- b. Processors with 100 times faster speed and 100 times higher density.
- c. Non-volatile, radiation-resistant memory having 50 times greater access speed.
- d. Communications with 100 times greater bandwidth.

In order to achieve digital switching at greater speeds, resonant tunneling systems are being developed using NT. The circuits using these devices will have enhanced capabilities due to lesser device count, reduced area, very high speeds, and lower power dissipation. These devices can form the foundation for smart sensors in Naval surveillance systems fitted on aircraft, submarines, ships and even satellites.

Application of NT in Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a concept of operations based on information superiority. NT has the potential to boost the effectiveness of NCW by enabling further

improvement in the information flow by enhancing the capabilities of its constituent components as follows.¹⁹

- a. NT can enable manufacturing of computers capable of delivering better computing power while consuming lesser energy.
- b. The use of NT enabled interconnects in devices comprising the architecture of NCW can help make the network faster, having better heat dissipation and the capability of working effectively with ultra-low power transistors.
- c. Graphene, single-walled carbon nanotubes and magnetic nanowires are being used for manufacture of spintronic devices which have abilities to take memory into three-dimensional sphere and deliver ultra-high density information storage. This will be a major contributor towards NCW capability enhancement.
- d. The use of nanoelectronics in NCW can help in reducing power requirements and achieving better signal to noise ratio and rate of data processing.

IMPLICATIONS OF APPLICATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY IN THE NAVY

Implications

Naval weapons and surveillance equipment have inherent requirements of being sturdy and highly reliable in the harsh environment often experienced at sea (Kulshrestha, 2017). NT can make manufacturing of equipment with such properties a reality, substantially reduce the cost of large scale production, and enable the exploitation of new features which are not possible at the macro level. The use of NT could have the following implications in the Navy.

- a. **Weapons:** NT can have the following implications on weapons.²⁰:
 - (1) Weapons can be manufactured with the use of NT through replacement of metal with high strength nanocomposite plastics. This will enhance the carrying capacity of Naval platforms due to the reduced weight and size.
 - (2) Since NT allows control at the nanoscale, it enables the production of defect free structures with exceptional properties of strength and conductivity. This can help in production of weapons

immune to effects of environmental conditions and having a longer service life span.

(3) The use of NT enabled smart mechanisms with in-built condition monitoring systems can increase the overall effectiveness of weapons.

(4) The use of NT enabled radar absorption coatings and camouflage can make weapons stealthier.

(5) Nanomaterials can enable superior control over the release of energy and form smaller diffusion routes for high-intensity energy explosions. This results in higher damage levels with reduced explosive content.

b. **Surveillance Equipment:** The desirable properties in the surveillance equipment used by the Navy include small size, power efficiency, ability to operate in a dense EW environment, enhanced detection ranges, capability of storing and processing large volumes of data, and cost effectiveness. With the use of NT, the manufacturing of surveillance equipment with such properties is possible and would have the following implications.²¹

(1) The integration of different functions of the surveillance equipment can be achieved with the help of nanoelectronics. These include sensing, radio, memory and power functions.

(2) NT would make the equipment easily portable due to reduction in its size and weight.

(3) The scaling down of sensor devices to nano level would bring the sensing component to a similar dimensional scale as the targets. This would result in achievement of higher sensor-sample ratio, enhanced sensitivity and increase in signal to noise ratio.

c. **Network Centric Warfare:** The desirable features in a robust and efficient network are seamless connectivity, high rates of data transfer and processing, communication capabilities, and power efficiency. NT can be utilized to attain these features and have the following implications for the Navy (Kulshrestha, 2019):

(1) The application of NT would result in the production of faster and better capacity structures for command, control, communication, and surveillance.

(2) The integration of nanocomputers, sensors, and nanomechanical architectures into one system would improve communications and information processing in NCW.

(3) Equipment manufactured using NT would include features of lower power consumption, lesser noise and higher processing speeds. These features have the potential to significantly enhance the NCW capabilities of a Navy.

(4) NCW equipment with nanoelectronics could progressively take on cognitive functions leading to development of smarter equipment capable of performing human functions.²².

CHALLENGES IN NAVAL CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT THROUGH NANOTECHNOLOGY

Challenges

The process of force capability enhancement requires continuous monitoring to keep pace with emerging technologies, threats and challenges. Likewise, the process of Naval capability enhancement faces challenges which include budget constraints, international law, rapid technological advancement, requirements of training and changing threat scenarios. In this context, the challenges which are likely to be encountered during the process of leveraging NT for Naval capability enhancement are as follows:

a. Militaries around the world are already fielding expensive and secretive R & D programs to leverage the advantages of NT. However, these capabilities could lead to an arms race. Therefore, devising ways and means of leveraging NT while also preventing an arms race remains a challenge.²³.

b. The current national as well as international laws may be inadequate to match up with the swift changes brought by NT. Therefore, it will be essential to address questions of possible dangers arising from military use of NT and its impacts on national security.²⁴.

c. The next challenge pertains to making a policy to prevent misuse of NT without restricting innovation.

d. The safety of men and material presents the next challenge. Nanoparticles are extremely small in size and could enter the body or environment after breaking off from surfaces and pose safety hazards. Due to their small size, the properties of nanoparticles not only differ from bulk material


of the same composition but also show different interaction patterns with the human body tissue.²⁵

e. NT would enhance NCW capabilities, leading to units, command posts, surveillance equipment and remotely operated or autonomous vehicles being integrated with rapid, secure communication and control channels. This will result in the delegation of more decisions to semi-autonomous systems which respond automatically to developing situations. The correct use of such advanced systems would require development of adequate training infrastructure.²⁶

f. In order to ensure high-volume, low-cost manufacture of NT enabled equipment a considerably high initial investment is needed to build up the infrastructure for research and subsequent manufacturing. This would be a challenge in case the budget is limited.


Sample Survey Responses: The responses to the sample survey have brought out that NT has immense potential to enhance the capabilities of a Navy. The responses of the SMEs also acknowledge the role NT can play in enhancing the capabilities of a Navy. The results depicted in Figure 3 below show that 83% respondents in the survey opined that NT would significantly enhance the operational capabilities of a Navy. Further, the results depicted in Figure 4 show that 85% respondents agree that NT would be essential towards meeting future demands of Naval warfare.

Figure 3: Responses to Role of NT in Enhancing Naval Capabilities



Source: Researcher's Construct Based on Survey Results

Figure 4: Responses to Need of NT in Future Naval Warfare



Source: Researcher's Construct Based on Survey Results

SPSS Analysis: The result of the Pearson Chi Square Test conducted on the data from sample survey is $X^2(4df) = 31.946$ ($P=0.010$). Since the obtained P- value is lesser than the selected significance level $\alpha = 0.05$, it shows that there is a substantial relation amongst the chosen variables. Moreover, the Chi Square value of 31.946 at 16 degree of freedom and P-value of 0.010 indicates a significant relationship observed in the sample also exists in the population. Furthermore, the obtained value of $\Phi = 0.512$ certifies the strong positive relationship amongst the variables. Thus, based on the SPSS analysis, it can be stated that leveraging NT will significantly enhance the capabilities of a Navy.

Conclusion

NT offers an array of applications and has therefore emerged as a focus area for R & D. It has already begun demonstrating its potential to affect future war fighting. Taking cognizance of this fact, several nations have taken initiative and enhanced budgetary efforts for R&D in NT. It is a fact that advancement in technology and the process of its implementation into the field brings a host of challenges. Therefore, the faster the armed forces accept and adapt to this challenge, the better would be their chances of success in future conflicts. For the Navy, NT presents multiple possibilities in fields such as weapons, smart surfaces, propulsion machinery, medical equipment, clothing, battle system architectures, surveillance equipment and Network Centric Warfare.

NT can enable development of lighter, stealthier, highly agile and more efficient weapons. The initial impact of NT on weapons is likely to result in improving the existing weapon systems. It would help in overcoming issues associated with corrosion and result in appreciable cost savings in the longer term. With reduction in the size of weapons, Naval platforms will have a larger carrying capacity thus increasing their operational efficiency. Further, the use of NT based explosives will enhance the destructive potential of these weapons.

The use of NT for development of weapons presents the following advantages:

- a. The reduced size and stealthier nature of these weapons will increase their effectiveness as they will be relatively more difficult to counter. Additionally, lighter weight and smaller size will simplify the process of transportation and loading/unloading.
- b. The weapons would have an enhanced life cycle and lesser maintenance requirements due to higher resistance to external effects. Further, due to the longer shelf life and lower bulk production cost, these weapons would be more economical compared to conventional weapons.
- c. The maintenance of larger stocks of weapons in storage facilities would become easier due to smaller size, lighter weight, enhanced safety features and a greater shelf life.

In the field of surveillance equipment, NT has the potential to aid the development of new classes of sensors, communication systems, and information processing systems. These systems would be characterized by features such as reduced size and weight, lesser power consumption, resistance to external effects, higher reliability, lesser maintenance requirements, enhanced detection ranges, and reduced cost of mass production.

NT can make the NCW capabilities of a Navy far more effective. The advantages include enhanced computing power, improvements in the CMOS technology, higher information storage and processing capabilities through spintronic devices, improved communication between computer chips through nanophotonics, reduced power consumption, and better signal to noise ratio.

In order to fully harness the benefits of NT, Navies need to develop plans to overcome challenges posed by budgetary limitations, obligations under international law, devising ways and means to prevent an arms race, enacting policies for preventing misuse of NT without restricting innovation, ensuring the safety of men and material from the potentially harmful effects of free nanoparticles, developing infrastructure and training facilities, and building up supply chains.

The following conclusions have been drawn from the survey and SME interviews:

- a. A majority of the respondents agree that NT should be focused upon as it will be crucial in enhancing the capabilities and meeting evolving requirements of Naval forces in the future.
- b. The responses bring out that an initially high budgetary allocation would be required for setting up of research and production facilities. However, once set up and functional, these would prove to be more economical.
- c. The majority of respondents agreed that use of NT will enable Navies to manufacture weapons, surveillance equipment and NCW systems of reduced size, weight and maintenance requirements.
- d. The respondents agreed that NT would improve the effectiveness of weapons, enhance carrying capacity onboard platforms, improve integration between systems, provide higher data storage and faster processing capacities, improve reliability and ease the handling of equipment.

Recommendations

The potential that NT holds for capability enhancement for a Navy has already been realized by multiple nations and they have taken significant steps towards its use. In accordance with the conclusions of the research, the following recommendations are proposed:

- a. **Short Term:** The measures recommended for the short term are as follows:
 - (1) Each country needs to identify the specific fields for application of NT as per the strategic, operational and tactical requirements of its own Navy.
 - (2) Nations need to make an enhanced allocation of budget and ensure creation of conducive conditions for R & D in NT keeping its potential long term benefits in mind.
- b. **Medium Term:** The recommendations for the medium term are as follows:
 - (1) Nations need to devise suitable policies for research and use of NT. These policies need to strike a balance by being neither too restrictive to discourage innovation and at the same time ensuring adherence to international and national regulations.
 - (2) The training curriculum of the Navy may also be modified to include NT. This will aid in better assimilation of its capabilities.

c. **Long Term:** The measures recommended for the long term are as follows:

(1) The setting up of research, manufacturing and training infrastructure for NT based systems may be prioritized for the armed forces.

(2) To ensure cooperation at the international level, the United Nations may create an international working group on military NT. Through this forum, the scientific community could engage in collaborative data collection for better understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks of NT.

d. **Further Research:** It is recommended that further research be undertaken on the impact of nanoparticles on humans and the environment. Thereafter, the initiation of suitable remedial actions would be required to ensure the safe harnessing of NT.

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Brief Biography



Lieutenant Commander Suraj Kumar Singh, psc was born on 01 Jul 1984 at Mumbai, India. The officer joined Naval Academy, Goa in 2005 and was commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jul 2009. Lieutenant Commander Suraj is a specialist in Anti-Submarine Warfare. As a specialist, the officer has vast operational experience and has served onboard frontline warships of the Indian Navy. He was awarded the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (East) Commendation in 2012. He is happily married to Dr. Priyanka Singh and they have been blessed with a daughter.

CANDIDATES' ENCOURAGEMENT PROCESS FOR BANGLADESH ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICERS: WAYS TO MAKE MILITARY PROFESSION MORE ATTRACTIVE

Major Md Nazir Uddin, psc, Inf

Abstract

The military profession is considered to be one of the most prestigious professions of human civilization since its inception. Bangladesh Army is one of the leading organizations in the country where officers play the pivotal role in its effective functioning. In the present context, Bangladesh Army is experiencing more need for induction of quality officers' intake than ever before to address the rapid expansion of the force. Encouragement process in the recruitment system is essential for any organization to get quality candidates. An individual gets encouraged towards any profession for intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors as well as by the advertisement process of the organization. However, it is felt that the existing encouragement process in the recruitment system is not at its best in meeting the demand of existing requirement of Bangladesh Army. The change in the socio-economic environment also provides more scopes and opportunities for the candidates to select more lucrative professions. Outside Wide Career Development Opportunity, Effect of Growing Economic Condition, Fast Changes of Socio-Cultural Atmosphere, Organizational Risk, Discontent in the Profession are some of the mentionable factors which pose challenges for the Bangladesh Army in getting quality candidates in its recruitment. Optimistic Projection of Bangladesh Army, Enhance Job Satisfaction, Morale and Military Value Development were considered. Finally, it qualitatively and quantitatively proved the hypothesis that a comprehensive 'Candidates' Encouragement Process' will make young generations more attracted to choose Bangladesh Army Commissioned Officers as their profession.

Introduction

The military is considered to be one of human history's most prestigious professions since its inception. Officers are the nucleus and key influencing force for the effective functioning of any defence force. Bangladesh Army (BD Army) is one of the leading organization of our country, where the officers play the leading and pivotal role. They act as the best ambassador of this organization. Bangladesh Army (BD Army) recruits the young generation as commissioned officer considering their valour and courage, patriotism, honesty, loyalty, sense of responsibility and physical fitness. After the great liberation war, serving as an officer in defence services used to be a matter of great

honour and prestige as well as a lifetime dream for any bright youth. However, this so-called challenging and prestigious life in the armed forces is now losing its competitive edge to attract the youngsters.¹

The shortage was there in the past, but the present shortage is 'critical'. Bangladesh Army (BD Army) at the moment remains short of approximately 40% of its officers. The quality candidates have been less interested in defence services in recent years. It was found that nowadays, most of the intakes are 'jobseekers' and many of them join the Army failing to get a chance elsewhere.² The well-educated, urban and upper-class youths are not much attracted to the Army. Bangladesh is developing in all aspects, especially in regards to the economy and various social indexes as such different options are created for the young generations. The recent socio-economic growth, diversity in career choice, internal socio-economic factors within the army compared to private sectors are some of the critical reasons for the downward trend in the standard of the intake of officers in the army occupation. Besides, unsettled family life, problem of childrens' education, physical hardship of army life, barriers of voluntary retirement, lack of post retirement re-employment opportunities etc are the few other reasons discouraging the potential good candidates to join army.³ Thus, it is challenging for the army to bring all potential candidates in the recruiting process.

The military profession lost its fascination not only in Bangladesh but in other countries as well. Indian Army has been facing similar problems from the early 90s.⁴ The UK Armed Forces are facing difficulties in getting an adequate number of candidates since 1979.⁵ In Bangladesh, people used to join the army because of leading a life of honour and pride. The much-needed patriotism is also fading out. So, potential candidates who are born and brought up in this society are not encouraged to join in the army.⁶ Therefore, it is imperative to closely look to a comprehensive candidates' encouragement process for BD Army commissioned officers. In view of the fore, this research paper will aim to find out a comprehensive candidates' encouragement process to make the young generations more enticed to the military profession.

PRESENT STATE OF CANDIDATES' ENCOURAGEMENT PROCESS OF BD ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICERS


Potential Candidates before applying for any job get motivated towards the particular profession. Any organization must take sufficient measures to encourage good candidates for its recruitment. Any individual gets encouraged towards any profession for intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors as well as by the advertisement process of the organization. In this chapter, present state of encouragement process of Bangladesh Army

which includes advertisement procedures, intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors will be discussed.

Candidates' Present Encouragement Process

Present Advertisement Procedure: Advertising messages will help promote the youth's interest in military service and inform them of the specific service which a youth may prefer.⁷ The advertisements for joining in BD Army are published only in a few National Newspapers just prior to preliminary selection test, which hardly can notify potential candidates about the circular. BD Army has also started using 'Join BD Army' website for recruitment system since 2016. Maximum young generations are well acquainted and familiar with the social media. BD Army does not use this type of easy way of communication to inform young generations about its activities.⁸ However, BD Army does not use this SMS sending means widely at present. Result of the surveys carried out among Young Generation is shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Response from Young Generations – 'Present Advertisement Procedure'



Source: Author's Construct

Intrinsic Motivational Factors: Intrinsic motivation is a behavioral catalyst driven by a desire for personal satisfaction or fulfillment. It is defined as the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than for some separable consequence.⁹ BD Army, as a profession, has honour and pride in the contemporary social arena. Many people used to get motivated to join military from the attractions towards uniform.¹⁰ Military is a profession where its members get a higher scope of leading an honest life.¹¹ In Figure 2, total 70.6% of young generation through Surveys 2 opined that 'Overall Intrinsic Motivational' factors motivate the present candidates very low / low to join in BD Army as commissioned officers now-a-days.


Figure 2: Response from Young Generation – 'Intrinsic Motivational Factors'



Source: Author's Construct

Extrinsic Motivational Factors: Extrinsic motivation is a behavior determined by external factors such as a reward or averting of negative consequences (Extrinsic, n.d.). Extrinsic motivation inspires the conduct or behavior through different external factors. The rise of materialistic attitude amongst the young generations has a deep impact on the choice of their profession.¹² In case of reality, present young generations give priority to tangible and external gaining in the life now-a-days.¹³ Economic stability at first instance of military life motivates many young generations to choose military as their profession.¹⁴ BD Army provides medical treatment facilities to its all members including their families, which attracts the young generations heavily to the military profession.¹⁵ Available educational facilities inside the cantonment for children influence the potential candidates and their parents to this profession. Family accommodation in better environment motivates the young generations very highly in selecting the military as their profession. Figure 3 shows that 83.6% young generation's parents feel that 'Extrinsic Motivational Factors' motivate candidates highly / very highly to choose military as their profession.

Figure 3: Response from Young Generation – ‘Extrinsic Motivational Factors’



Source: Author's Construct

Present state of ‘Candidates Encouragement Process’ was identified and validated with both qualitative and quantitative analysis. For BD Army Commissioned Officers, present candidates’ encouragement process includes present advertisement procedure, intrinsic motivational factors and extrinsic motivational factors. From survey analysis, FGD and interview, it was found that present advertisement measure is insufficient / very insufficient to notify or encourage the young generations to choose the military as their profession. It is also found that present young generations get very low motivation from intrinsic factors. On the contrary, they are being motivated highly from extrinsic factors.


STATE OF AWARENESS ABOUT FACILITIES AND PERCEIVED FEAR BY THE YOUNG GENERATION IN JOINING BANGLADESH ARMY AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

BD Army is one of the proud and prestigious organizations in our nation. The people of Bangladesh have great respect and honour towards BD Army because of its contribution to nation-building activities, safety and security of the nation, UN peacekeeping activities. Any jobseeker gets adequately aware regarding the existing facilities of that organization before employment. There are also perceived fear amongst the job seekers about that organization. In this chapter, young generation’s awareness regarding the existing facilities and perceived fear of BD Army will be discussed.

Awareness of Facilities in Bangladesh Army

Awareness of military facilities by both the young generation and parents plays an important role in motivating the candidates. There is inadequacy of information centers where potential candidates can contact to learn more about the military job itself and the different types of benefits that the service provides.¹⁶ The younger generation of today aspire to some materialistic gaining in their professional lives. Corporate companies meet much of their needs by delivering higher wages and pensions, an outstanding working environment, quality of life, etc.¹⁷ The BD Army also provides its staff with other facilities which many organizations cannot provide. However, current candidates don't know all the military facilities. At the end, bright and potential candidates shift their choice of profession from the military. In Figure 4 approximately 68.4% young generations expressed that potential candidates are slightly / not at all aware about the 'BD Army's Facilities'.

Figure 4: Response from Young Generation – 'Awareness about Bangladesh Army's Facilities by Young Generation'




Source: Author's Construct

Perceived Fear by the Young Generation in Joining Bangladesh Army

Candidates, including their parents, feel much uncertainty before choosing the military as a profession. Some perceived fears felt by the young generations and their parents before choosing the military as their profession are Competitive Selection Process, Tough Training, Remaining Away from Family, Risk of life, Lack of Knowledge on Selection Process, Lack of Freedom, Limited Scope of Higher Studies, Lack of Physical Fitness, and etcetera. A general concept prevailing that minimum physical structure for the hard training in BMA is one of the most important criteria for joining in the military.¹⁸ At present days, potential candidates believe that life in the Army is restricted, confined and less versatile in pursuing creativity with concerning one's ability.¹⁹ Army life is more susceptible to risk and move sensitive than other organization. In Figure 5 total 82.5% young generation opined that 'Perceived Fear of The Military Profession' influence / highly-influence the potential candidates negatively for choosing the Bangladesh Army as profession.

Figure 5: Response from Young Generation – 'Perceived Fear about Military Life by Young Generation'



Source: Author's Construct

From the analysis and discussion above, it is found that Present Advertisement Measures have a significant relation and effect on 'Young Generation's Perceived Fear about the Military' and 'Awareness of BD Army's Facilities'. Candidates who all plan to join in BD Army Commissioned Officers are aware in some extent about the facilities of the

military as well as they feel some fear before choosing the military as their profession. From qualitative and quantitative data analysis of surveys, discussion and interviews, it is clearly found if advertisement increases, young generation aware more and feel less fear for choosing the military as their profession.


CHALLENGES FACED BY BD ARMY TO ATTRACT YOUNG GENERATION TO THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Bangladesh army is one of the most dignified and credible, effective and professional organizations of our country. The fame and glory it has brought for the country is beyond imagination. Even after that the quality of the intake candidates are gradually reducing.²⁰ At present, BD Army is facing challenges to attract young generations to join in military profession. Bright and potential candidates are not interested to join army. The reasons may be multifarious but we have to look for the foremost challenges faced by BD Army to attract young generations to the military profession.

Challenges Faced by Bangladesh Army to Attract the Young Generation

Outside Wide Career Development Opportunity: Rapid technological progress, privatization, foreign investment, and local entrepreneurial initiative play a pivotal role in creating diversified choices for jobs in Bangladesh.²¹ Stipend provided by various institution and organizations to meritorious students has become lucrative options for many at present. Consequently, the military profession remains their least preferred option.²² In Figure 6, 80.6% Young Generation agreed/strongly agreed that overall 'Outside Wide Career Development Scope' is affecting the BD Army adversely in getting suitable candidates for commissioned officers.

Figure 6: Response from Young Generation – 'Wide Career Development Scope'



Source: Author's Construct

Effect of Growing Economic Condition: Privatization and open market economy due to globalization have created several corporate houses in Bangladesh.²³ Potential Candidates for military services are also affected by this globalization (Interview). Many parents do not want their children to join the military because of financial difficulties²⁴ Researcher found in the Survey, 79.9% Young Generation viewed highly/very-highly that ‘Effect of Growing Economic Condition’ has an adverse impact on the young generations not to choose the military as their profession.

Fast Changes of Socio-Cultural Atmosphere: ‘Modern Technological Development’ handicaps young generation physically and reduces the working spirit required, especially for a career such as the Army.²⁵ ‘Impact of Widely Spread Corruption’ in Bangladesh hinders its development.²⁶ Doing corruption by any individual has become very regular and socially about to be accepted in Bangladesh now-a-days. The future candidates that the BD army is looking for are also members of the same culture where they see corruption as it is practiced. Researcher found in the Survey, 68.5% Young Generations have also expressed that the ‘Fast Changes of Socio-Cultural Atmosphere’ including its elements affect the young generation highly/very-highly not to choose the military profession.

Organizational Risk Factor: Nowadays, Army service is more sensitive than other organizations. In recent years, it has been observed that many senior and mid officials retire forcedly as the government transitions.²⁷ Stress is inevitable in the military profession during both peacetime and war.²⁸ On the other hand, young generation are more freedom seekers. They do not prefer to choose a restricted and stressed life like the Army. In the survey carried out by the researcher, 57.7% Young Generations opined that ‘Organizational Risk Factors’ demotivate the potential candidates highly/very-highly not to select the military profession.

Discontent in the Profession: Many officers cannot be promoted to the selective ranks, although competent; this ‘Limited Opportunity of Career Acceleration’ in the Army is widely known to outside people at present.²⁹ The officers must lose either his family life or the ‘Education of the Children’ due to frequent and remote area postings.³⁰ Researcher found in the survey, total 74.7% Young Generations agreed / strongly agreed that ‘Discontent in the Profession’ demotivates the young generation in choosing the military profession.

Insufficient Advertisement: “There are not enough information centres around the country to provide adequate information to potential candidates about the Army and its opportunities”. Advertisement in recruitment attracts the interest of candidates towards

any organization. There is a lacking of Bangladesh Army in this regards.³¹ Researcher also found through the survey that 70.8% of Young Generation viewed/strongly viewed the insufficient advertisement as a challenge for getting adequate suitable candidates for the Army Commissioned Officers.

In the above discussion, the challenges faced by the Bangladesh Army to attract the Young Generation have been identified by both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The survey results from the officers, young generations and parents, interviews and FGD identified some challenges. 'Outside Wide Career Development Opportunity', 'Effect of Growing Economic Condition', 'Fast-changes of Socio-cultural Atmosphere', 'Organizational Risk Factor', 'Discontent in the Profession', and 'Insufficient Advertisement' put challenges to Bangladesh Army to attract the potential candidates. Next chapter will highlight a few suggestive steps to make the young generations more attracted to the military profession.

WAYS TO MAKE THE YOUNG GENERATION MORE ATTRACTED TO THE MILITARY PROFESSION


While researching on shortage in officer's cadre in Indian Army Gen Gurdeep Singh and Dr. Goswami stated that "Every organization would seek to recruit the best and thereafter manage and retain the best. There is a need to examine the effects on core values consequent to changes in socio-economic conditions and enhanced aspirations at all levels to encourage the suitable candidates".³² The researcher considered this as one of the cornerstones in finding the solution to the research problem.

Ways to Make Young Generation more Attracted

Optimistic Projection of BD Army: BD Army should utilize the 'Electronic and Print Media' properly for developing its correct image (Ahmed, 2006). It should release its operational and peacetime activities of both at home and abroad regularly, particularly about the Chattogram Hill Tracts, UN Peacekeeping Operations, Nation Building Activities, and etcetera. BD Army should make the 'Join BD Army' and Inter Services Selection Board (ISSB) websites interactive, informative and user friendly. It should increase the use of 'Social Media' for the optimistic projection of its operational and peacetime activities, including recruitment process advertisement. The BD Army can consider one day in a year to be a 'Civilian Day' when general mass may visit the cantonments. It will establish a mutual bonding between the military and civilians through which the potential candidates may get genuine interest in the Army.³³ Sending SMS to HSC appearing and qualified students about the BD Army Commissioned Officers circular may become one of the most effective means to notify the young generations timely. In Figure 7, total 84.9% Young Generation opined that 'Optimistic

Projection of BD Army' is effective/very-effective to motivate the potential candidates to choose the military profession.


Figure 7: Response from Young Generation – ‘Optimistic Projection of BD Army’



Source: Author's Construct

Enhance Job Satisfaction: BD Army can attract suitable potential candidates by instilling job satisfaction to its members. Good candidates emphasize ‘Transparent Promotion and Posting’ policy of any organization before choosing their profession. BD Army can explore the feasibility of establishing Best Quality School in a joint venture with renowned institutions in all the cantonments to ensure quality ‘Education of the Children’. It is a fact that better pay and allowances are the most decisive factors for a candidate to select his profession. To attract bright and quality candidates, BD Army should propose for Separate Pay Scale for the officers. In Figure 5.2, total 84.9% Young Generations agreed/strongly agreed that measures to ‘Enhance Job Satisfaction’ will motivate the potential candidates to choose the BD Army as their profession.

Figure 8: Response from Young Generation – ‘Enhance Job Satisfaction’



Source: Author's Construct

Morale and Military Value Development: Regular advertisement of importance about patriotism will increase the morale and military value amongst the young generation, which will motivate them to join in the military profession. Job security does not, however, mean that it costs military discipline and values. Once serving officers feel safe and secured, they will have more morale and military value inside their heart which will be spread automatically amongst the civilians. Thereby, integrating the sense of job security will motivate the young generation indirectly to the military profession.

Candidates Selection from Feeder Organizations: Talent Hunt from good reputed colleges, including cadet colleges will increase the interest of the Young Generations to the military profession. Like many other developed countries, the BD Army may have to look at the promising and spirited serving soldiers with a requisite qualification who displays the potential to be an officer. There are also many volunteers and energetic students who join in BNCC in the different educational institution of Bangladesh. Besides imparting basic military training, these students should be allowed to visit various military installations and to attend different training competitions, which encourage them to join the military.

From the above discussion, some reasonable measures for BD Army to attract the present young generations have been identified. Enhancing Job Satisfaction, Optimistic Projection of BD Army, Morale and Military Value Development and Candidates Selection from Feeder Organizations will increase the interest of present Young Generation to choose the military as their profession. All these measures were identified through systematic qualitative analysis.

Conclusion

The military profession is considered to be one of the most prestigious professions of human civilization since its inception. BD Army is one of the leading organization in the country where officers play the pivotal role in its effective functioning. It is evident that number of good and potential candidates in officers' selection has reduced due to less interest of the present young generations to the military profession. Encouragement process in recruitment system is very important for any organization to get quality candidates. However, it is felt that, the existing encouragement process in recruitment system is not at its best in meeting the demand of existing requirement. Therefore, the researcher has selected "Candidate Encouragement Process for BD Army Commissioned Officers: Ways to Make Military Profession More Attractive" as the area of this research.

To initiate the research, the researcher has made an attempt to analyze the present state of candidates' encouragement process of BD Army, which includes advertisement measures, intrinsic motivational and extrinsic motivational factors of the young generations. From qualitative and quantitative analysis, it has been found that present advertisement measures are very insufficient to notify the potential candidates about the selection process of 'BD Army Commissioned Officers'. Intrinsic motivational factors in regards to joining in the military profession includes Honor and Pride in the Contemporary Social Arena, Attraction towards Uniform, etcetera. Extrinsic motivational factors means tangible gaining from the profession like Early Establishment, Assurance of Medical Treatment and Children Education, etcetera. From the study it is clearly evident that intrinsic factors motivate the present young generations very low while extrinsic factors have strong positive influence on them to join in the military profession.

The research starts to investigate about the state of awareness of facilities and perceived fear of the young generations in joining the military profession. From both subjective and objective analysis it is found that there is a significant relationship between the awareness of facilities and perceived fear of young generations with the candidates' encouragement process. Awareness of facilities of the military profession by the young generation increases if the advertisement measures increases. On the contrary, perceived fear by the young generation about the military profession decreases if the advertisement measures increases.

Next step was to ascertain the challenges faced by the BD Army to attract the young generations keeping the effect of present encouragement process on them into considerations. Outside Wide Career Development Opportunity, Effect of Growing Economic Condition, Fast Changes of Socio-cultural Atmosphere, Organizational Risk, Discontent in the Profession are some of the mentionable factors which pose challenges for the BD Army in getting quality candidates in its recruitment. Similar technique of qualitative analysis through interviews and FGDs were adopted to find out the challenges. Mentioned above findings were further validated by the statistical analysis of the survey result.

To determine measures for adoption, research tried to define parameters of effective ways to attract the young generations to the military profession. Then research found some broad areas to look for ways. Optimistic Projection of Bangladesh Army, Enhance Job Satisfaction, Morale and Military Value Development were considered. Since, suggested measures could not be validated through implementation, statistical SPSS analysis of the survey result was taken as a logical base to consider the validation of hypothesis. From both qualitative and quantitative analysis it was evident that all the suggested measures

have direct positive relation with the candidates' encouragement process. Thus, the researcher accepted the hypothesis finally that 'A comprehensive candidates' encouragement process will make young generation more attracted to the military profession as BD Army Commissioned officers'.

Recommendations

Basing on the findings of the research, following are the recommendations to attract the young generation to the military profession:

Optimistic Projection of BD Army: Bangladesh Army should project its activities utilizing electronic and print media, social media, organizing seminars/workshop and campaigns at different schools and colleges. Establishing information centres and sending SMS will notify the potential candidates about the recruitment process. Allowing the civilian day inside the cantonment once or twice in a year will motivate the young generations towards military profession.

Enhance Job Satisfaction: BD Army can attract suitable potential candidates by instilling job satisfaction to its members. Introducing Separate Pay Scale, Transparent Promotion and Posting, Post Retirement Rehabilitation of the officers, Second Job Provision for the superseded officers will enhance job satisfaction.

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Brief Biography



Major Md Nazir Uddin, psc, Inf was born on 30 November 1986 at Kalihati, Tangail. He passed both Secondary School Certificate and Higher Secondary Certificate Examinations from Rangpur Cadet College. He was commissioned from Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) with 56 BMA Long Course in the Corps of Infantry on 20 June 2007. On commission, he joined the 30th East Bengal Regiment. He has a diverse experience of service in units, headquarters, and as an instructor. He served in two infantry battalions and one border guard battalion and held all the regimental appointments within his capacity. Apart from regimental appointments, he has served as a Platoon Commander in Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) and as an Instructor Class-B in Tactics Wing of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T). He also served as an Assistant Director (Protection) in Special Security Force (SSF) and as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General in Personnel Administration Directorate of Army Headquarters. Apart from the mandatory courses for his professional career, he attended Dignitary Protection Course (DPC) in SSF, Potential Platoon Commander Course (PPCC) in BMA and United Nations Military Observer Course (UNMOC) in BIPSOT. He has also attended one Seminar on 'Leadership' in the USA. He has graduated in Army Staff Course 2020-2021 from Defence Services Command and Staff College. He has also participated in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic as a Military Observer. He is happily married to Nusrat Zahan Tusty and blessed with a son (Md Nazmus Saadat Ibad) and a daughter (Nafisa Ulfat Iffah).

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS



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